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CHAPTER I
Introduction
.Statement of the Problem
The phenomenon of surrogate parenting through artificial insemination has disclosed a new arena to the counseling profession through
the psychological, medical, moral, and legal controversies which accompany it.

Coming to prominence in the late 1970 s as a viable and perl

sonal alternative to adoption for childless couples, surrogate parenting is now becoming a growing concern for those who believe in the dignity of man.

Psychologists and medical doctors are researching the

various medical and emotional effects which surrogate parenting has had
and will continue to have upon the adults involved and the offspring. 1
Theologians and various religious spokesmen have begun to investigate
the morality and religious criteria, both pro and con, of the phenomenon.

Attorneys and legislators are looking into the legality of the

lOr. Philip Parker, a psychiatrist at Wayne State University,
conducted an interview with sixty applicants for surrogate mothering.
The results of his research showed that most applicants have not considered the problem of the loss of the baby at term or thought of how
they would explain the loss of the baby to their own young children
and to colleagues at work. Some replied that they would lie, saying
the baby had died.
His research found that some prospective parents plan to tell
their prospective children the steps leading to their birth as soon as
they are old enough to understand the concepts involved; while others
insist that they will keep the child from learning these facts.
David Sobel, The New York Times: "Style", Monday, June 29,1981.
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procedure as it pertains to the surrogate, the adoptive parents, and
the infant, and its effect upon public policy.

Dr. Parker has taken

this into consideration:
People react strongly, often totally negatively, to
the mere mention of surrogate motherhood. It seems to
trigger their fantasies about baby-buying, slavery and
black marketeering. (Dr. Parker) said he wanted to provide a real data base so that any social action to prohibit or regulate surrogate motherhood could be founded
on information instead of gut feelings or prejudice. 2
Although many of these professional people sincerely have the best
interests of all concerned under consideration, several do not.

For

these few professionals it has become big business and big money, thus
compounding the legal and moral aspects. 3 This new-found venture for
entrepreneurs has brought surrogate parenting and artificial insemination out of the laboratories and into the Want Ad sections of newspapers, extracting the emotions of greed or compassion from the respondents.

IIFees for services or expenses no rma 1 average $5,000 to

$10,000, but they can go as high as $20,000 ... 114
The desire to satisfy these emotions, both of the potential surrogate parent and the potential adoptive couple, often supercedes
their awareness of the need for proper medical advice and assistance:
Doris and Jack Kent (after a surrogate mother had
been secured) said, IIWe were so excited, all we wanted to
2Ibid.

3Dave Lindorff. liThe Bus i ness of Surrogate Births II, Venture:
The Magazine for Entrepreneurs. (September, 1981): 56.
4Katy Brophy, Louisville, Ky., attorney who operates Surrogate
Family Services, as quoted in The National Law Journal, (April 9,
1981): 4,33.

3

do was find a doctor willing to help us get on our way to
becoming parents. We made an appointment with our family
doctor, but he couldn't help us, nor could the colleague
he recommended. Our need to consummate our hopes and
dreams was so intense that we decided to perform the artificial insemination ourselves. And we did."
Interestingly, it was the wife, in each case, who
performed the artificial insemination ... 5
Counselors are going to be overwhelmed with multitudes of questions concerning surrogate parenting as the phenomenon becomes more and
more disclosed to the public.

Childless couples from all walks of life

will be seeking advice and counsellors will need to be well versed with
regard to the legal, medical, psychological, and moral aspects in order
to answer their questions.
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to present an investigation of the
legal, moral, medical and psychological interests which bear upon surrogate parenting.

Within this framework, an analysis of the presently

available studies and opinions will be presented.

The paper will also

present and analyze the motivational aspects of the potential surrogate
mother, potential adoptive parents, and those professional persons who
arrange the operation.
Surrogate motherhood is a phenomenon that many find
difficult to understand ... Elizabeth Kane says she became
a surrogate because of her great sympathy for women who
are unable to have children ... Dana acted out of friendship ... In fact, money was a motivating factor for a majority of surrogate applicants studied by Dr. Philip Parker. 6
5Karol White. What To Do When You Think You Can't Have A Baby
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981), p. 129.
6Elaine Markoutsas. "Women Who Have Babies for Other Women,"
Reader's Digest (August 1981): 70-74.
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Counselors will have in hand, within this finished thesis, a guide
which will aid them in counseling in this matter.
Statement of Importance of the Problem
The importance of the problem of the phenomenon of surrogate parenting lies in the fact that no one at this time has a definite grasp
on the totality of the implications.
There is one key point. There are no laws pertaining
to surrogate mothers .. For the truth is that artificial
insemination, the primary medical contribution to surrogate
mothering, is relatively simple ... We do not know, and will
not know for some time, what the long range psychological
consequences of the surrogate mother are ... The question:
By promoting the surrogate mother, are we doing good? Are
we on the side of the angels (in promoting life) or the
devils (in violating traditional moral taboos)?7
These implications can and do coincide with those of
the in vitro fertilization process, i.e., genetic manipulation, embryonic experimentation, selective breeding, and
the quest for a super-human race.
The selective breeding and the quest for a superhuman race have become a reality. With the establishment of
numerous "sperm banks" throughout the nation it is possibl e
to select a particular father for the potential child. It
has been reported that these certifiable intelligent women
have been impregnated by semen from Nobel laureate donors.8
At this juncture, "everyone is doing what is right in his own
eyes."

There is clearly a need for a thorough investigation of the

reality of surrogate parenting, bringing in those arguments for and
against the process.

No indepth analysis of its effects upon the

family structure have been presented from a psychological or Biblical

York:

7Noel P. Keane with Dennis L. Breo. The Surrogate Mother (New
Everest House Publishers, 1981), pp. 233,240,246,255.

8Matt Clark with Jonathan Kirsch. "Recipe for Genius: First,
Get Sperm ... ," Newsweek Vol. XCV, No. 10 (Mar. 10,1980): 85.
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point of view.

Questions which have not been answered, as yet, bear

upon all four of the areas mentioned in this thesis.
1.

Med i ca 1
a.

Is this procedure really bringing joy and fulfillment
to the childless parents?

b.

Is science being represented at its best in serving
human beings by assisting nature when nature cannot
do its job?

c.

Is it expanding our knowledge about conception and
fetal growth?

Clearly these technologies (surrogate mothering, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization) bring joy and
fulfillment to parents who long for children and cannot have
them in the ordinary way. This is the strongest argument
in favor of such procedures. They represent science at its
best, serving human beings by assisting nature.
This research, too, is vastly expanding our knowledge
about human conception and fetal growth. This serves the
quality of human life ... 9
This thesis will illustrate that the medical profession contends
that the surrogate parenting process is greatly enhancing their knowledge of human embryology.

However, it will be demonstrated that those

involved do have concerns about the moral and ethical value of their
studies.
2.

Moral
a.

Is the introduction of a third party into a marriage
harmful to the union?

b.

Is the offspring a commodity offered to only those
who can afforci it?

c.

Are the surrogate mother and the infant without dignity?

9Edward Stevens. Making Moral Decisions (New York/Ramsey:
Paulist Press, 1981), p. 53.

6

d.

Is the artificial insemination moral?

e.

If

donor semen is used, who is the "real" father?

More than any other aspect, the moral implications of surrogate parenting have contributed to its lack of popularity.
tion is not a new solution to an old problem.
mention its use as far back as 300 B.C.I0

Artificial insemina-

Writings in the Talmud

In the fourteenth century

an enemy injected some fine Arab mares with the sperm of an inferior
breed.

This method has been around for centuries but is now coming

out of the closet.
Noel Keane, a Detroit attorney, cites the following in the Introduction to his book, The Surrogate Mother:
Once, perhaps, she might have adopted. But the
pill and abortion have changed that. There are very
few babies to adopt ...
The ability to help people like Tom and Jane is
what sustains me when the going gets rough -- when
the peopl e in my pari sh tell me, "What you're doi ng
is immoral," or when the editori a 1 writers scoff,
"Rent-a-womb."ll
The moral issues have provoked a verbal war between the religious
spokesmen and scientists.
Science is not the highest value. We must consider
the implicit danger to man's right to life of discoveries
in the field of artificial insemination, birth and fertility control, and genetic engineering.
- Pope John Paul, II, speaking to an audience of Italian
physicians, October 27, 1980.12
10Martin Gallin and Philip Newman. "Whose Child Is This,"
Rights. Vol. 8, No.2 (Summer 1979): 140.
IINoel P. Keane, The Surrogate Mother.
12Ibid., p. 2.

p. 13.

Human
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Science cannot stop while ethics catch up.
-Elvin Stackman, speaking as president of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, January
9, 1950. 13
There are those in the religious circles who contend that no moral
violation has occured .
... if the goal is to provide an infertile couple
with children, surrogate motherhood is morally unobjectionable. 14
Although Rabbi

Seymo~

Siegel sees nothing objectionable in the moral

issues of surrogate parenting, there are age-old Jewish beliefs which
would contradict his statement.
Surrogate parenting - surrogate mothers and AID - is causing concern for morality among scientists:
Laboratory control of human reproduction is fraught
with danger and uncertainty. Once scientist, Martin CurieCohen, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, raises certain valid
concerns:
Inadequate genetic screening of donors.
Lack of control of multiple use of donors,
leading to inbreeding.
Inadequate record keeping.
Lack of uniform policies responsible for the
practice of AID.15
The greatest concerns are being expressed by certain professional
organizations within the medical profession itself.
zation is the Ciba Foundation.

One such organi-

Founded primarily for the promotion of

13Ibid., p. 2.
14Rabbi Seymour Siegel, Jewish Theological Seminary of America in
New York City, as quoted by Elaine Markoutsas. "Women Who Have Babies
for Other Women," Reader ' s Digest (August 1981): 70-74.
15White, p. 124.
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international cooperation in medical and chemical research, it is a
scientific and educational charity established by CIBA Limited, now
CIBA-GEIGY Limited, of Basle and operates independently in London under English trust law.
The sum of all this is that moralism compromises
truth: a judgement that the act ought not to be done,
while it continues to be done, gives rise to an accumulating deceit upon society, both in records and in
rel ati onshi ps ...
It is therefore, a matter of serious concern that
a new medical practice, grounded upon scientific research and so upon the high value put on truth, should
in fact result in, and to some extent require, deceit
and uncertainty. The secrecy involved in A.I.D. obliges
the practitioner, the husband and wife, and the donor
(surrogate mother) to conspire together to deceive the
child and society as to the child's true parentage, his
genetic identity. Truth is violated, credibility is
undermined, and this is a serious ethical matter.16
As demonstrated here, the moral/ethical issues loom as legend.

However,

it is not the intent of this thesis to attempt a resolution of all that
is involved.

It is intended to enlighten the reader to those various

moral/ethical issues which will need to be addressed in counseling
sessions with prospective surrogate parents.
3.

Legal

Another aspect of surrogate parenting which is quickly becoming
of greater concern than the medical or moral issues is that of the
legality of the process.

The relative newness of the phenomenon has

exposed the legal system as inadequate to deal with the issue at this
time.

Many states are hurriedly and perhaps haphazzardly struggling

to initiate legislation to cover A.I.D. and surrogate mothering.
16G. R. Dunstan. "Moral and Social Issues Arising from A.LD."
Law and Ethics of A.I.D. and Embryo Transfer, Ciba Foundation Symposium 17 (New York: Associated Scientific Publishers, 1973), p. 48.
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Some questions which have been raised are:
What is the rational legislative reason why a single
woman cannot be an adoptive parent?
How is the validity of the Agreement affected if there
is a dis pute whether pregnancy occurred by natural i nsemination rather than artificial insemination?
Does the Agreement only permit wealthier adoptive parents? Can single fathers enter into surrogate agreements?
How will the family "unit" be defined and applied?
Could it be a conflict of interest for the physician
who artificially inseminated the surrogate mother to
be able to recommend abortion?
Will Agreement terms which contradict provisions required by the Act to be included in an Agreement be
enforceab1 e?17
Questions have arisen in another state, Kentucky:
Whether such a contract (surrogate mother and adoptive parents) is legal in Kentucky.
Whether ordinary custody rules would apply in the
event one or more of the parties to the agreement
changed their minds while the pregnancy was in
progress.
Whether surrogate transactions can be regulated by
the state.
Whether the couple or the doctor could be held liable
if the surrogate died or had her health impaired by
the pregnancy.18
The state of California has been faced with cases which have required
I7Ra1ph Mawds1ey, Ph.D., Attorney at Law, upon reviewing House
Bill No. 5184 introduced by Rep. Fitzpatrick to the Michigan State
House, October 26,1981.
I8Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky,
response to a letter from Mr. Joe Ward, Editor, Courier JournalLouisville Times, Louisville, Kentucky (January 26, 1981).
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the intervention of the Supreme Court of that state.

This particular

case illustrates the ways in which the issues complicate the lives of
the participants in this eternal human drama.
The State of New York has also been involved in numerous cases
dealing with A.I.D.
v;

Strand.

The earliest dates to 1948 in the case of Strand

In these cases, II Adul teryll seemed to be the prevel ant

issue. 19
Although the courts will be the deciding factor as in the issues
of abortion and euthenasia, a big question to be resolved is:

Can

legislation pertaining to surrogate parenting be considered legislating morality?

As in abortion, many will ask, Ills the surrogate mo-

ther not able to do with her body and its products (egg, embryo) as
she pleases?1I

Ills not the donor of sperm permitted to dispose of his

bodily products (sperm) as he pleases?1I
These are legitimate questions and the courts will have to resolve them in the formulation of public policy.

Noel Keane proclaims:

The solution to this controversy is very simple. We
need legislation from the states to clarify the issues
and we need regulation by the states to control those involved. Court decisions can only point the way. The real
answer is to be found in legislation. 20
This thesis will present an analysis of the existing legislation
in the above mentioned states.

It will also provide the reader with

19Martin Gall in and Philip Newman. IIWhose Child Is This ll
Rights Vol. 8, No.2 (Summer 1979): 17.
20Keane, p. 233.

Human
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a summary of those opinions and articles which have been complied by
the legal profession dealing with surrogate parenting.
4.

Psychological

The psychological aspect of surrogate parenting is probably as
weak in research as the legal area is in legislation.
have attempted and are presently conducting

Psychologists

studies to provide infor-

mation concerning the donor parents, adoptive parents and the offspring.

At this present time, information regarding the long range

effect upon the offspring is extremely limited.

There are a few

cases which have surfaced and the available information on these will
be investigated.

Some of the questions being asked are:

What are the long-range psychological consequences of
surrogate parenting?
What are the motivations of a surrogate parent?
What psychological consequences will there be for society?
What type of person will be a surrogate parent?
What are the psychological effects upon the family members
of one who is a surrogate parent, i.e., husband, wife, son,
daughter, mother, father, sister, brother?
At the time of this writing, two psychiatrists are conducting research into the motivations for surrogate parenting and are beginning a
study of its effects upon the parties concerned.

Philip Parker, M.D.,

Psychiatry, has done a preliminary study on the surrogate mother's motivation.

He finds:

However, most women did not admit that any feelings of
loss would occur and denied that the baby would be theirs.
They said such things as:
IIIl m only an incubator.1I
IIIld be nestwatching. 1I
IIIt won't be my husband's and mine. 1I
II I 11 thi nk of doi ng it for the money for my
I

12
children; like an illness, Illl think, lIn
four months, I I11 be better. I
"Illl be doing it for someone else."
"Ild be doing it for the woman: lid be closer
to the wife.
"Illl attach myself in a different way - hoping
it Ish ea lt hy . 21
II

II

II

With responses like these, it is clearly evident that there is a great
deal of psychological manipulation on the part of those involved.

Al-

though only in preliminary stages, the studies do provide an abundance
of insight into the "person" of those who seek to be surrogate parents.
Dr. Darrell D. Franks has also investigated the psychological aspect of surrogate parenting.

His results showed:

Most viewed this process somewhat like that of an unwed
mother placing her child for adoption but these women felt
assured that the background and characteristics of the family
who would be rearing the child were good. Almost all wished to
see the infant one time to assure themselves that the child was
normal. 22
It is the intent of this thesis to provide the reader with the available
information at this writing which is pertinent to the psychological implications of surrogate parenting.
Statement of Position on the Problem
The position taken by this thesis in relation to the surrogate
parenting issue is that it is morally and psychologically wrong.

Also,

since the legal entanglements presently seem insurmountable, the emo21Philip Parker, M.D., Clinical Instructor, Dept. of Psychiatry,
Wayne State University School of Medicine, "Surrogate Mother l s Motivation - Initial Findings," paper presented at the annual meeting of
American Psychiatric Association, New Orleans, May 12, 1981. p. 5.
22Darrel D. Franks, M.D., "Psychiatric Evaluation of Women in a
Surrogate Mother Program" American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 138
No. 10 (October 1981): 1378.
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tional injustices are incalculable.

Since the artificial insemination

process involves masturbation, the introduction of a third parw into the
marital arrangement, and the possibility of incest between the offspring,
it will be proven that surrogate parenting is unbiblical.
With the negligence of the parties concerned to seek proper medical advice and assistance, it will be proven from a medical point of
view that it is potentially hazardous to the surrogate mothers and the
offspring.

In additon, it will be shown that in the A.I.D. process

there is a potential danger of disease being transmitted to the surrogate mother or the A.I.D. recipient.

These illnesses may range from

a minor infection to venereal disease.
However, I have found that the transmission of disease
to be more of a problem than these authors suggest. This
seems to be especially true in the case of mycoplasma infection from the donor, and may possibly account for the recent
increase in spontaneous abortion in my "successful" patients. 23
The ultimate question to be answered is, "Is surrogate parenting contrary to God's plan for the human family unit?" and the answer will be
res 0 un d1i ng1y, "Yes!"
Limitations
The limitations confronting this project lie in the area of research.

Since this is a relatively new issue, written material dealing

specifically and extensively with the subject is sparse.

While numerous

articles are available, it has been dealt with only as an alternative
to childlessness in various books and pamphlets on the subjects of
23Herbert W. Horne, Jr., "Artificial Insemination, Donor: An
Issue of Ethical and Moral Values." New England Journal of Medicine
Vol. 293, No. 17 (October 23,1975): 873.
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Infertility, Human Reproduction, Pregnancy, Genetic Engineering,
Gynecology, Morals, Ethics, Adoption, Sterility, and Cloning.
The study itself is limited in that the thrust of this thesis is
surrogate parenting as it relates to married couples and the family
structure.

Single parenthood through surrogate parenting, although a

very real concern and one which stands in need of further investigation, will not be considered as an issue to be confronted within this
paper.

However, in presenting pertinent material for the topic it will

be necessary to make reference to those areas in which there is a correlation.
Also, it is not the intent of this thesis to discuss at great length
the in vitro fertilization issue.

But, as with single parenthood, it

will behoove the text to discuss those areas of concern which are common
to both.
A side issue which is rapidly developing within the medico/science
realm is embryo transfer/fetal adoption.

This will be discussed because

it is a direct surrogate parenting result in its truist definition.
The woman who donates the ovum to be fertilized and
the woman into whom the zygote is transplanted do not need
to be the same woman. Indeed, women who are unable to
carry a child to term may desire to hire a IIsurrogate
mother" who would carry the child. 24
Another issue springing from the surrogate parenting procedure is
24This method of surrogate motherhood produces a child which is
the biological issue of both parents, rather than a child of the wife
alone, as in A.I.D., or husband alone, as in a surrogate mother. Paula
Diane Turner, "Love's Labor Lost: Legal and Ethical Implications In
Artificial Human Procreation." University of Detroit Journal of Urban
Law, Vol. 58, No.3 (Spring 1981): 471.
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the ability of homosexual men and women to become parents.

Many

doctors report that if they are aware that a woman or man is homosexual, they will refuse to perform artificial insemination.
The greatest fear of the surrogate parenting phenomenon for those
professional institutions involved is that it opens a new "Pandora's
Box" of impl ications.

This thesis will deal only with those impl ica-

tions which involve the husband/wife relationship.
Research Methods
This thesis will be a combination of library research, a descriptive study of existing data and analyses, and it will involve
some questionnaire/interview situations with local gynecologists.

An

interview with potential adoptive parents is currently being pursued
but is not confirmed.

There will be correspondence with medical

doctors, attorneys, psychiatrists, and institutions which are presently working with surrogate parenting.

At the time of this writing,

forty-one organizations dealing with surrogate parenting have been
contacted.
The questionnaire will be brief and with yes/no answers.

They

will deal with motivation, justification, method, moral implications
and medical views. 25
The basic research is library research.

There will be no test

25These interviews and questionnaires may not be used depending
upon the quantity of such tests found within the research. Should they
be used, it would be restricted to Liberty Baptist College students and
personnel and perhaps the other local college students and personnel.
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conducted which relates to the cultural attitudes by this writer.

How-

ever, material currently being compiled by other professionals will be
analyzed within the thesis.
Proposal for Chapter Division
Chapter

I:

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will give to the reader an overview of the

content of the thesis and bring an awareness of the necessity for research in this area.

It provides brief discussions of the implications

projected by the surrogate parenting procedure.

Chapter I also pre-

sents a detailed listing of various definitions of terminology which
will provide a better understanding of the overall subject.
Chapter

II:

INTERESTS FURTHERED BY SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
This chapter provides the reader with the genesis of

surrogate parenting and will serve as a catalyst for the development
of the thesis.

The intent of this chapter is to make the reader aware

of the potential benefits and dangers of the act of procreation through
artificial means.
Chapter III:

CURRENT EFFORTS PRO~OTI~G
SURROGATE PARENTING

I~TEREST

IN

Chapter III will present the excesses and abuses of the
surrogate parenting IIbusinessll.

The material presented here will pro-

vide an insight into sequential results of the actions discussed in
Chapter II.

It will also review some of the legislation which is be-

ing proposed to regulate the surrogate parenting business.

17

Chapter

IV:

PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
Surrogate parenting at present is governed by no moral,

legal, or medical guidelines.

Material presented here will discuss

the various court cases which have stemmed from issues raised about
surrogate parenting.

The varying views of religious sects will also

be reviewed as well as the moral/ethic, legal, medical, and psychological professions.
Chapter

V:

CONCLUSION
The content of this chapter will summarize the presented

material, analyze it and state the position of the writer on each aspect.
Proposed Summary of Each Chapter
Chapter

I:

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss those problems which present

a limitation to this study, i.e., relative newness of the problem,
the lack of extensive research and writing from the various fields
encompassed by surrogate parenthood.

It will provide an overview of

the various books, articles, magazines, and opinions of professional
agencies, i.e., The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Fertility Society,
and the Attorney Generals of Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, and California.

The chapter will also present definitions of the various medical,

Psychological, and legal terminology which will be used throughout the

18

thesis.

This will expose various issues which provide the structure

for the thesis.
Chapter

II:

INTERESTS FURTHERED BY SURROGATE PARENTING
Those interests which

se~ingly

have profited from sur-

rogate parenting, adoptive parents, medical research, and the surrogates
themselves, will be discussed.

The chapter provides information from

recent studies of surrogate parenthood candidates concentrating on their
motivations.

The medical research which has been furthered, genetic

manipulation, and in vitro fertilization, is also presented.
Chapter III:

CURRENT EFFORTS PROMOTING INTEREST IN
SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
Presented here is an overview of those organizations

which are currently publicizing the positive results of surrogate parenting and their motivations for doing so.

This chapter presents an

insight into the excesses and abuses of the human reproduction process.
Chapter

IV:

PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
Basic to this chapter will be the pursuit of answers to

various questions which have been raised:
"The practice is morally unjustifiable, because a
third party is introduced into the marriage of two who
have become one flesh ... 11, Richard McCormick, Professor,
Georgetown University.
"I know of no court that would be sympathetic to a
contract involving the selling of babies", Professor
Sanford N. Katz, Chairman, American Bar Associationls
Family Law Section.
"Depersonalization of the reproductive process could
have adverse effects on human society", Dr. Jack W. Provonsha,
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M.D., Professor, Loma Linda University."26
Chapter

V:

CONCLUSION
This chapter will evaluate the material presented in the

thesis in view of the Biblical and ethical arguments for the dignity of
human reproduction.
Survey of Literature
The research will include reading, personal interviews, and a
brief questionnaire.

It will be conducted at the libraries of Liberty

Baptist College and Seminary, Lynchburg College, Lynchburg City Public
Library, and at the Medical School Library, Law School Library, and the
School of Psychology Library of the University of Virginia in Charlottesville.
The interviews will be conducted with gynecologists in the city
of Lynchburg and with doctors at the University of Virginia Medical
School.

The questionnaire will be distributed to various college stu-

dents and professors of the local colleges.
The literature used for research in this project is seventy-five
percent articles which have been published in newspapers, i.e., New
York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times.

Many major maga-

zines and periodicals have also carried articles of interest.
include:

These

Newsweek, Time, Venture, Reader's Digest, New England Law

Journal, New England Journal of Medicine, Alabama Journal of Medicine
and SCience, Fertility/Sterility, The Public Interest, The National
Law Journal, Psychology Today, and others.
26Markoutsas, p. 72.
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Books which have been written on the subject will supply twentyfive percent of the research material.

There are few authors who have

dealt extensively with surrogate parenting.
are professionals in their fields:

However, those who have

attorneys, doctors, and nurses.

These authors have approached the subject in a manner that presents
openly the dangers and benefits and those "gray" areas which are presently hindering its furtherance.
Noel P. Keane and Dennis L. Breo in their book, The Surrogate
Mother, which is the only book written on this subject specifically,
write from a positive viewpoint.

Mr. Keane is the first attorney in

the U.S. to deal with surrogate parenting.

They are not reluctant,

however, to express the negative aspects because they state that answers are needed for these questions.

Their motive is to instigate a

reaction that will foster legislation establishing controls on the
phenomenon.
What To Do When You Think You Can't Have A Baby, written by Karol
White, emphasizes the problem of infertility.

It is noted in the Fore-

word that extensive time and research have been directed toward the
writing of the book.

Karol White devoted more than eighteen months in

researching the material, interviewing the clinicians, conversing with
the patients and compiling the data.

The major contributors to the

book are recognized authorities in their specific fields.

She says of

the book:
This is a book of many voices, many tongues, and
many viewpoints. From Israel to South America, from
England to Australia, techniques, technology and treatment are highlighted. I spoke to women lying on operating tables in cool, green operating rooms, their arms
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strapped down, an IV dripping into their veins. I questioned doctors in their offices and operating rooms. I
traveled from Boston to California, from St. Louis to
New York, speaking to ferti1 ity "exgerts" in Tennessee
and Illinois, Texas and New Jersey.Z7
This history of artificial insemination and human reproduction is
the thrust of Robert T. Francoeur in his book, Utopian Motherhood.

He

traces the course of medical science as it relates to the fertility
processes of mankind from the early Greek writers, Aristotle, Hippocrates, and others, to the 1970's.
The dilemma of infertility is discussed in They Say You Can't Have
A Baby by Madeline Blais.

This book discussed the psychological and

physiological trauma suffered by infertile couples.

She offers the

many alternatives to childlessness and presents them in detailed form.
The Fertility Handbook by Judith A1sofrom Fenton and Aaron S. Lifchez, M.D., gives insight into alternative conception plans such as
artificial insemination, test-tube babies, and surrogate mothers.

They

offer detailed descriptions of male and female sexual anatomy, information about the cost of medical treatment, case histories of infertile
couples, and interviews with experts in the field.
Wilfred J. Finegold, M.D., discusses all of the aspects of impregnation through artificial methods in his book, Artificial Insemination.
He presents the moral and ethical views of professional institutions,
legal, medical, scientific and religious.
Another book which deals with various aspects of surrogate parenting is Law and Ethics of A.I.D. and Embryo Transfer.

This book is a

compilation of lectures of the Ciba Foundation.
27Karo1 White. What To Do When You Think You Can't Have A Baby.
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981) p. 5.
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Numerous articles have been published in a quantity of professional journals.

These deal with the many various aspects and impli-

cations of surrogate parenting.
Results
The results and conclusions of this thesis will show that the
process of surrogate parenting ;s legally, morally, and Biblically
wrong.

It is an invasion into the sacredness of the marital bonds

and an exploitation of the human reproductive process and human life.
In surrogate parenting, babies become a commodity rather than the
blessing which God intended them to be.
It will also be proven that there are definite medical and psychological effects upon the surrogate parent, the adoptive parents,
and the child.

The lack of legal restraints will be used as one of

the arguments to provoke public awareness of the threat to moral decency.
Definition of Terminology
There are several terms which need to be defined in order to establish a clear basis for the herein contained discussion.
Abortion - The premature expulsion of an embryo from the uterus (either
spontaneous or induced).
Adhesions - The joining of the healed parts such as fibrous bands which
attach to inner body organs.
Amenorrhea - The absence or cessation of menstruation.
Amniocentesis - The removal of a sample of amniotic fluid to test for
certain conditions.
Andrologist - One who studies men and disease of the male sex.
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Artificial Insemination - The depositing of seminal fluid by mechanical means into a woman's cervix to achieve pregnancy.
Artificial Insemination, Donor (A.I.D.) - The depositing of seminal
fluid into the cervix of a woman by mechanical means using
donated semen.
Artificial Insemination, Husband (A.I.H.) - (Artificial InseminationHomologous) The depositing of seminal fluid into the cervix of a woman using her husband's semen.
Artificial Insemination, Mixed (A.I.M.) - The depositing of seminal
fluid into the cervix of a woman using mixed semen from her
husband and a donor.
Aspermatogenesis - The absence of sperm in the testis.
Aspermia - The complete absence of sperm and semen.
Azoospermia - The absence of sperm and semen.
Basal Body Temperature - The temperature taken first thing in the morning, while the body is at rest.
Cervix
Cesarean

- The neck of the uterus.
A method of delivering a baby in which the uterus is cut to
remove the child.

Cilia

- Tiny hairs attached to the fallopian tubes.

Clomid

- Called Clomiphene Citrate, it is a non-sterioid estrogen
used to stimulate ovulation in women who do not ovulate.

Coitus
Condom

The sexual union between male and female; sexual relations.
- The sheath which covers the penis worn during intercourse
to prevent pregnancy or infection.

Contraception - The prevention of pregnancy.
Culdoscopy - A visual examination of the female pelvic organs, using
a telescope-like device (an endoscope) which has been inserted into the pelvic cavity through a slit in the vagina
near the cervix.
Dermatoglyphics - The study of patterns of ridges of skin of the
fingers as a genetic indicator, specifically used to identify chromosomal abnormalities.
Dysparneuia - Painful sexual intercourse for a woman.
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Egg

- The female sex cell, also known as female gamete or ovum.

Ejaculate - The semen expelled during the process of ejaculation, the
act of expelling sperm.
Endometrium - Lining of the uterus.
Epididymis - The elongated cordlike structure along the outside of
the testis in which sperm are stored.
Estrogen - Female hormone produced by the ovaries and, in much smaller
amounts, by the adrenal glands of both men and women.
Fallopian Tubes - The long slender tubes which extend from the ovaries
to the uterus and serve to transport the ovum.
Fertilization - The union of sperm and egg.
Follicle - A sac filled with fluid containing the oocyte or ovum in
the ovary.
FSH

- A gonadotropic hormone of the pituitary which stimulates
growth and maturation of the foll icles in the ovaries and
stimulates spermatogenesis in the male.

Genetics - The study of heredity.
Gonorrhea - A form of venera1 disease spread through sexual contact.
Habitual Abortion - The recurrent spontaneous loss of a fetus prematurely.
Hysterosalpingogram - An x-ray of the uterus and fallopian tubes after
dye is injected.
Implantation - The attachment of the embryo to the lining of the uterus.
Infertility - The inability to conceive after attempting to do so for
one year.
In Vitro Fertilization - Fertilization which takes place in a glass.
Laparoscopy - The examination of the interior of the abdomen using an
instrument that is equipped both for viewing and making
minor corrections.
Luteinizing Hormone (LH) - A gonadotropic hormone of the pituitary
gland that causes ovulation and estrogen secretion in the
female, and testosterone secretion in the male.
Miscarriage - The loss of the embryo from the uterus, i.e., spontaneous abortion.
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Morphology - The study of the form and structure of cells, e.g. sperm
cell s.
Motility - The ability (of the sperm) to move spontaneously.
Normosperia - A semen sample which, under analysis, shows sperm
numbe ri ng more than twenty mill ion per cubic centimeter
of semen and showing normal morphology and normal motility.
Oligomenorrhea - Irregular menstrual cycles.
Oligospermia - Low sperm count, between fifteen and twenty million
per cubic centimeter.
Ovary

- The female gonad, one of two sexual glands, in which the
ova are formed.

Ovulation - The discharge of an egg from the follicle of the ovary.
Ovum

- The egg produced by the ovaries each month.

Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome (PCO) - A condition in which many cysts
on the ovaries retard fertility.
Post Coital Test (also called Sims-Huhner test) - A test which measures the ability of sperm to penetrate cervical mucus.
Retrograde Ejaculation - The backward release of sperm, usually into
the bladder instead of out through the penis.
Rubin's Test - A test designed to evaluate the patency of the fallopian tubes by insufflation with carbon dioxide.
Semen

- A thick, whitish secretion of the male reproductive organs
composed of spermatozoa, nutrient plasma, secretions from
the prostrate and other glands.

Semen Analysis - Measures the quantity, quality, motility and morphology of the semen.
Sexual Dysfunction - The inability to perform sexually.
Shirodkar - A stitch that closes the neck of the uterus to prevent
spontaneous abortion.
Sperm Agglutination - The collecting of sperm into clumps of cells.
Spermacide - An agent that is destructive to spermotozoa.
Spermatozoa - Mature ma 1e cell s, the generative el ements of semen
which impregnate the ovum.
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Spinnbarkeit - The formation of a thread of mucus from the cervix
when blown into a glass slide.
Split Ejaculate - A process in which the semen is seperated.
Sterility - The inability to reproduce.
SWIM

- Sperm Washing Insemination Model.
antibodies from semen.

A procedure to remove

Testicle - The male gonad.
Testosterone - The hormone produced by the testicles and responsible
for male sexual characteristics.
T-Mycoplasma - Tiny organisms found in the urogenital tract which
form small colonies and may inhibit reproduction.
Uterus

The hollow, muscular organ in the female in which the egg
becomes embedded and in which the embryo develops and is
nourished.

Vagina

The female canal which receives the penis during coitus.

Vaginismus - A painful spasm of the vagina.
Varicocele - A varicose condition of the veins of the scrotum.
Vas Deferens - The vessel carrying the spermatozoa.
Vasovasostomy - The joining of the ends of a severed vas deferens to
restore fertility in a man who has undergone a vasectomy.28
Summary
The overview presented in this chapter lifts the lid on Pandora's
box and exposes the fact of existing moral, legal, medical, and psychological problems created by the surrogate parenthood concept.

Many

scholars, scientists, theologians, and attorneys are being confronted
with these issues.

Society is demanding a resolution.

The majority

of articles, being by laymen, i.e, newspaper and magazine reporters,
are pro.

It makes for good circulation.

28White, pp. 187-197.
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Those professional institutions which are directly involved have
published the most technical writings dealing with the relevant issues.
Theses are questions which definitely demand an answer.

This chapter

has laid the cornerstone for the foundation of an examination of the
questions.

CHAPTER II
Interests Furthered by Surrogate Parenthood
Science has always been labeled as the instrument through which
man can make life better and easier for all or it can be the monster
which can destroy the universe.

As scientists continue to explore the

regions of the unknown, develop and prove new hypotheses, delve into
the secrets of mankind and proclaim new "truths

II ,

society will continue

to reap benefits and experience increasing dangers from their experiments.
Leonardo da Vinci, premiere product of the Italian Renaissance,
sculptor, artist, military engineer, and scientist, was labeled an
heretic and a threat to humanity by his fellow countrymen and churchmen.

He would often sit by the bedside of dying pauper men and women,

talk with them and hold their hand as they slipped from this life into
eternity.

As their eyes closed in death, he carried their bodies td a

makeshift morgue and there

be~n

dissecting the corpse.

Ghoulish and

horrifying as it may sound and as it was viewed in his time, medical
science would not be what it is today without da Vinci's undertakings
and personal sacrifice.

Medical schools still use his diagrams and

drawings of functions and positions of the human body both internal
and external.

Oa Vinci's interest in the human body in the fifteenth

century and its results are an invaluable asset for mankind today.29

York:

29Robert Wallace. The World of Leonoardo da Vinci 1452-1519 (New
Time, Inc., 1967) pp. 57-58.
28

29

The attitudes of the general public are much the same today as
they were in the fifteenth century.

In the academic medical and sci-

ence laboratories of contemporary time much of the experimentation
with new drugs and medicines and methods of bodily repair, which is
done under the cloak of "betterment of man's state", would also be
condemned as unethical and immoral by society.

Scientists and doctors

will never be totally free of the skeptics and gnostics of modern technology.

Surrogate parenthood has become "the tal k of the town" in the

past two years and will provide for and be provided with close scrutiny and criticism, both positive and negative, until it reaches its
plateau of arrival.
Noel P. Keane, a Detroit attorney who is the first to do an extensive writing on the subject of surrogate parenting, declares, "Surrogate parenting is an idea whose time is coming ... "30

Mr. Keane is

reputed as the first to engage in the surrogate mother aspect of parenting.

His expertise is often sought by infertile couples who wish

to have children.
Dr. Philip Parker, who serves as a psychiatric consultant for Mr.
Keane, has a novel theory about surrogate mothering which he calls,
"an informed speculation".

His hypothesis is:

Strong opposition to the surrogate mother concept
will, in many cases, be due to the fact that the concept
triggers unconscious fantasies of adultery and incest.
Although the surrogate mother is artificially inseminated
and often does not even meet the biological father, to
many adults her very existence will trigger anxieties and
guilt about sexual intercourse. He says it all goes back
30Keane, p. 15.

30

to Freud and the Oedipal complexes. In other words, the
surrogate mother may remind many people of the repressed
fantasies they may have had about having sex with their
parents, or others, and their guilt may make them rise
up and in knee-jerk fashion, condemn the surrogate mother.
Also, Dr. Parker believes that our own unacceptable anger
and hostility towards children may be stirred up and expressed by an irrational condemnation of the surrogate who
will give up the child she bears. Such irrational opposition, he says, should be identified and discredited.
Certainly, there are enough genuine problems presented by the surrogate mother that we do not need any
that only exist in fantasy.31
Mr. Keane aNd Dr. Parker are most likely the prominent leaders in
the surrogate parenting movement.
criticism from

~int

They have endured the blasts of

and sinner alike.

Their experience is first hand

and they are well aware of the ramifications of their undertakings.
Keane declares, "I have become a legal expert on surrogate parenting
simply by being a maverick attorney who did on-the-job training." 32
He further states:
I tend to have a very independent turn of mind and
have never been afraid to take on controversial or unpopular causes - if I believe in them. I believe in
surrogate motherhood because I know there are thousands
of people who want it and need it, including the surrogate
mothers. I intend to help them. That's how I got into
this and that's why I am staying. 33
This Detroit attorney, though honorable in his declaration, is
not without predecessors.

Medical history records that artificial in-

semination is not a new issue.

In order to understand the interests fur-

thered by surrogate parenting, a brief review of the history is necessary.
31Ibid., pp. 254-255.
32Ibid., p. 238.
33Ibid., p. 23.
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A History of Artificial Insemination
In 1884 a wealthy businessman and his Quaker wife, ten years his
junior, and childless, approaced Dr. William Pancoast with their dilemma.

Dr. Pancoast was undoubtedly the right man to be approached with

this situation.

After graduation from Haverford College and Jefferson

Medical College in Philadelphia and a tour of the medical facilities
of London, Paris, and Vienna, he had begun a meteoric career in medicine.

He had served the Union as a Surgeon-in-Chief and second officer

of the Philadelphia military hospital during the Civil War.

At the end

of the war he accepted a teaching position in human anatomy at his alma
mater.
Motivated by the nature of the problem, Pancoast brought it to
his classroom for discussion with six student doctors.

They decided

to concentrate their efforts on the wife giving her an examination
lias compl ete, almost as perfect as any army examination ll . The conclusion was that the husband was at fault.

After confrontation, the

husband admitted to a youthful bout with gonnorhea.

Two months of

treatment proved unsuccessful as a remedy, however.

Discussion of the

situation among the class led to the suggestion of a IIhired manll.

They

suggested that perhaps lithe best looking member of the class" might
volunteer and during a routine examination of the wife, some of his
semen might be :tnjected into her womb with a rubber syringe.
to be done under anesthetics.

All was

Dr. Pancoast approved the ingenious solu-

tion and the experiment was conducted without consultation with either
the husband or the wife.
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When a healthy son was born, Dr. Pancoast began to wonder about
the judiciousnous of the act.

He disclosed the deed to the husband

and was much relieved to find him not the least disturbed.

His only

request was that Pancoast not divulge to his wife how she had conceived.
The case remained shrouded in secrecy until well after Pancoast's
death in 1898.

In 1909, Addison Davis Hard, one of the students in

the class exposed the whole story in an article in Medical World under
the title of "Artificial Impregnation".

He personally had shaken hands

with the son, who had himself become a successful businessman, on his
twenty-fifth birthday.34
Dr. Hard was motivated by his own interests to expose the story.
He used it as a springboard to launch artificial insemination as a
means of improving the human race.

He advocated it as a method of

eliminating venereal disease since four of every five men in New York
city at that time were afflicted.

His claim that men might in one

stroke both protect their good women and improve the human race was
to be performed by castrating the diseased and collecting semen from
the respectable men.

Thus the women could be inseminated with disease-

free semen.
This bit of medico/scientific venturism was greeted with a somewhat double response:

It has been done before and it is against the

laws of nature and God.

However, Hard's article brought to public eye

the evidence of a major turning point and technological development in
the biological revolution.

This technology has already placed many

34Robert T. Francoeur. Utopian Motherhood (New York:
Barnes and Co., 1973) pp. 2-5.

A. S.
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aspects of human reproduction and sexuality in the controlling hands
of man.
The reproductive process of the human has posed as a mind-boggling
mystery since Creation.

Ambiogenesis, the spontaneous generation of

life, has been held as an honorable explanation.

The Greeks and many

early civilizations accepted it as truth.
Aristotle, for instance, tells of visiting a pond
that had been completely dried up but was later filled
with eels and fish spontaneously generated from decaying
matter and slime. The Roman poet Virgil records a recipe
for producing insects from mud, while other noted scholars report how thunderclouds and rain produced fish and
frogs and how honey bees came from the decaying carcasses
of horses. In medieval times, people believed that worms,
flies, and crawling creatures were the spawn of damp putrid waters; serpents were born of women's hair that had
fallen into water, and mice could be produced by wheat
fermenting in a dark corner with a sweaty shirt. Such
views held sway even into the time of our Pilgrim Fathers. 35
To prove the evidence of mystery, consider the old question,
"Which came first, the chicken or the egg?"
ing for the roots of his beginning.
until 1672 by Regnier de Graaf.
inside the ovary.

Man is continually search-

The human egg was not discovered

What he saw was actually a follicle

It was to be another century and a half before

Karl Ernst von Baer would discover and correctly identify the mammalian egg. 36

It is little wonder!

Those who have younger brothers and

sisters and were raised in a Victorian home can remember the "su ddenness"of their arrival in the family.
35Ibid., p. 5.
36Ibid., p. 6.

When pondered, it is easy to
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see how the early scientists could classify animals in two categories:
those reproduced by eggs and those in which the male seed is the key.
This was due to the fact that they could not relate the sexual intercourse and pregnancy.

The time lapse of months and the fact that in

some cases intercourse did not result in pregnancy confused them.

And,

when you think about it the connection between coitus, with both male
and female contributing equally, is not that obvious.
An Egyptian papyrus of the Twelfth Dynasty, circa
2500 B.C., contains prescriptions for contraceptives,
abortion, and inducing permanent sterility. Early Hindu
writers seem to have believed that human pregnancy was
caused by the union of the male seed and the menstrual
blood since menstruation stops with conception ... One
eastern Australian tribe believes that baby girls are
fashioned by the supernatural powers of the moon and boys
by wood lizards. In Queensland, the thundergod supposedly forms babies out of swamp mud and inserts them in
the mother's womb. Spirit children enter the womb
through the mother's navel. Hunting a particular kind
of frog, sitting by the fire or leaping over it, cooking a special kind of fish, all can lead to pregnancy.
The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico thought maidens
could conceive from a heavy summer shower; ... the
founder of the Manchu dynasty was conceived when a
maiden ate red fruit dropped on her lap by a magpie;
and Longfellow records how Winonah was quickened by a
western wind and gave birth to Hiawatha. 37
Hippocrates and Aristotle also researched the reproduction mechanisms.

Hippocrates formulated that since humans were not the products

of eggs, like a chicken's, the preformed human could not be in any
egg.

He specified that semen was produced in all organs and members

of the body and after traveling through the blood they gathered into
one complete pattern in the testicles where they formed the male seed.
Aristotle also viewed the male semen as the most important factor
in reproduction.

For him, the male shaped and formed society.

37Ibid., p. 7.

The
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woman was passive matter waiting to be molded and activated by the male
principle and then as an incubator of his seed.

This appears to be the

first time in recorded history a scientific and philosophical argument
was worked out for the natural superiority of the male.
an incurable male chauvinist.

Aristotle was

He was quick to point out that the male

is larger, stronger, and\even more handsome.

In reproduction it is

the semen of the male which cooks and shapes the menstrual blood into
a new human being.
Thomas Aquinas, the "Universal Doctor of the Church", also held
that the male semen was the active principle of reproduction and the
menstrual blood or egg the passive molded substance.

In some of his

writings he purported that the semen cooked the unformed uterine blood
much as a baker does his dough or that the semen coagulates the uterine
blood just as certain substances curdle milk.

He even had a beautiful

canard about the conception of baby girls in his first book of his
Summa Theologica:
Woman is misbegotten and defective, for the active
force in the male seed tends to be the production of a
perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of a woman comes from a defect in the active
force or from some material indisposition, or even from
some external influence, such as a south wind which is
moist. 38
Leonardo da Vinci, in the fifteenth century, was the first man,
of whom we have record, to truly conduct a scientific experimental
approach to human reproduction.

It has already been stated that he was

the first to make medically accurate and detailed drawings of the dissected male and female reproductive systems, of sexual intercourse, and
38Ibid., pp. 8-10.

36
of the human fetus in the womb.

He noted beside his drawing of the

fetus in the womb that lithe heart of the child does not beat nor does
it breathe because it is continually in water.

If it breathed it would

drown, nor has it need to breathe because it is vivified and nourished
by the 1 ife and food of the mother ... 1139

Da Vi nc i pronounced that the

semen is not produced in the blood system, but in the testes.

This

came from his observation of castrated men and male animals.
Semen was not properly identified until Leeuwenhoek in 1677 examined the nocturnal emissions of an old sick man.
field for more debate.

This only opened the

Many old wive1s tales about reproduction were

passed from generation to generation.
very common among animal breeders.

Belief in telegony is still

It proposes that if a purebred

bitch first mates with a mongrel or a prize mare is first covered by
an inferior work horse, the future of prize breeding results will be
ruined.

The poor blood of that first mating will carryover to any

future offspring regardless of the sire.

Some theologians have argued

that if the human is preformed in the sperm, then every sperm must have
a human sou 1 !
Abbe Lazzaro Spallanzai, in 1776, began to take the study of artificial insemination seriously.

Experimenting with frogs he dressed up

some male frogs in 1I1ittle breeches of oilskinll.
frogs were left lIall natural

il

•

As a control, other

Placed with ripe female frogs the

trousered males produced no offspring.

Experimenting further, he re-

moved eggs from the female frog and secured semen from a male frog.
He proceeded to dip a pencil into the semen and spread it over the eggs
39Ibid., p. ll.
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which hatched.

"Thus I called into life a number of animals, by imi-

tating the means employed by nature."
and other animals.

He continued his work with dogs

For him, the sperm was merely a stimulus to the

development of the preformed germ in the egg.
Spallanzani's experiment awakened the scientific world to new horizons.

The French biologist, Charles Bonnet, wrote to him and stated,

"I am not so sure but that what you have just discovered may not some
day have consequences for mankind of no mean significance." 40
The first human A. I. was performed at about this same time in
England.

Dr. John Hunter successfully impregnated the wife of a Lon-

don linen merchant artificially.

Dr. Everard Home reported a normal

pregnancy and delivery.
In France, Professor Thouret of the Medical Faculty of Paris, was
successful in his attempt at A.I.
the semen in the vagina.

He used a tin syringe to deposit

The patient was his own wife.

In America, Dr. J. Marion Sims, reported fifty-five artificial
inseminations performed on six women.
"test-tube" pregnancy.

He also reported the first

Although at first he promoted A.1., he later

recanted, proclaiming the method immoral and decided to abandon it.
It was his report that gave rise to the publications on A.I.

Most of

this literature appeared in Germany and France. 41
40Wilfred J. Finegold, M.D. Artificial Insemination (Springfield:
Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1976) p. 6.
41Much of the indepth study is presently being carried on in Germany, France, and Sweden. These scientists have written numerous articles covering the whole of surrogate parenting. Their experiments
and articles have prompted the legal concerns of these countries to
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Semen of a donor was not listed in any of the published material
before 1900.

However, Dr. H. Rohleder of France indicates that some

patients were interested in obtaining A.I.D.

He reports the follow-

ing:
Professor Semola of Rome relates that a lady, on
whom he had performed several inseminations to no avail,
requested him to procure semen from someone else. To
this he replied in no uncertain terms that a proposition
of that kind came from the Devil and that an insemination
such as she suggested was no whit less sinful than cohabitation with a stranger. 42
In 1400, Dan Ponchom performed the procedure on fish; 1550, Bartholomens Eustachius advised digital guidance of semen toward the cervical as following coitus; 1677, louis Van Hamman discovered spermatozoa; 1838, Girault blew spermatozoa into the vagina through a hollow
tube; 1876, de lajatre successfully treated 567 women; and 1884, Pancoast was the first to rely on donor semen.
Since the 1890·s, Dr. Robert l. Dickinson has been the prominent
pioneer of donor insemination.
wers.

In the

ninet~en

His enthusiasm stirred a host of follo-

twenties and thirties interest gained momentum

and the following doctors produced American Medical writings:

Dr. S. R.

Meaker, Dr. I. Rubin, Dr. l. W. Mason, Dr. W. Gary and Dr. M. Huhner.
In modern days, works have been produced by:

Dr. A. F. Guttmach-

er, Dr. A. Koerner, Dr. Sophia Kleegman, Dr. Frances Shields, Dr. A.
Wiseman, Dr. W. W. Williams, Dr. J. Macleod, Dr. Marie Warner, Dr. l.
research and write legal opinions and introduce governing legislation
in the past decade. These articles were not available at the law library at the University of Virginia. However, they are listed in the
Bibliography of this thesis as IISuggested Readingll.
42Francoeur, p. 6,7.
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Portnoy, Dr. S. Payne, Dr. J. O. Haman, Dr. M. J. Whitlaw, Dr. R. S.
Hotchkiss, Dr. S. Abel, Dr. Frances Seymour, Dr. G. S. Beardsley,
Dr. S. J. Behrman, Dr. S. L. Israel, Dr. R. Bieren, Dr. R. N. Rutherford, and others. 43
A History of Surrogate Mothering
The surrogate mothering phenomenon is not a new discovery in the
strictest sense of the word.
roots in animal husbandry.

Like artificial insemination, it has its
Experiments have been conducted by embry-

ologists since the early 1900 l s using everything from doe rabbits to
prize cows.

Francoeur gives an indepth review in Utopian Motherhood.

He reports a conversation with a young research technician at Fairleigh Dickinson University:
As we talked he casually mentioned that he likely
held the world1s record for superovulation of the rabbit. In the course of one of his experiments he had
injected a doe rabbit with a combination of female hormones normally associated with ovulation. The shocked
rabbit responded to this physiological overdose by releasing not the usual eight or ten, but well over a
hundred eggs. The doe was then artificially inseminated. When she was definitely pregnant, the technician sacrificed her for observation. With 135 tiny
embryos developing in her womb, this doe rabbit certainly would qualify as a IIsupermotherll, even though
she could not have possibly carried the 135 fetuses
full term and delivered them normally.44
Francoeur asks the question, IIWant to be a mercenary mother?1I

as part

of the title of this particular chapter.
The experiments of IIsuper motherhood ll continued.

Dr. Gregory

Pincus artifically inseminated a supermother rabbit in 1940.

Sheep

were added to the list in 1942 by co-workers at London1s National
43Ibid., p. 7.

44Ibid., pp. 89, 90.
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Institute for Medical research.
in 1944.

Dr. John Hammond superovulated cows

Goats, in 1949, were added by Dr. A. J. Folley.

and hampsters were added in 1950, 1953, and 1962.

Rats, mice,

The superovulation

of monkeys, in 1957, spurred on the idea that this could also be achieved in women.
After successfully ovulating a six-week old calf, it was decided
to experiment with human infertility.

In the mid-1960 ' s research mov-

ed rapidly on this project. 45
Astounding results came from women who had stopped using the
contraceptive pill.

It seems that when they ceased using the pill,

some women experienced immediate ovulation of not one but several eggs.
One woman, who had taken a Pergonal base pill, gave birth to stillborn
octuplets.

With further research the scientists perfected a fertility

drug with a high success potential.
Following these genetic experiment successes, the question was
asked, "Who wants a superpregnated rabbit, cow or wife?"
was soon announced.
foster mother.

The answer

Transfer the embryos to a substitute mother or

Before long, (1963), ova transfers, or inovulation as

this technique is called, were being tried successfully by Hungarian,
Polish, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Japanese, British, French, and
American scientists.
toys.

Scientists were like children with new found

They conducted experiments in which a black Freisian cow carried

and delivered a white faced Hereford calf and cared for it as a substitute incubator for a pure black offspring.
45Ibid., p. 91.
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An amazing experiment in surrogate motherhood was conducted in
1962 by Dr.

L.

E. Rowson.

His plan called for two purebred Dorper

ewes in South Africa to give birth to purebred lambs of the Border Leicester strain from England.

If it had been perfected, the shipping of

frozen semen and eggs of the Leicester breed could have accomplished
the task.

The products could have been implanted in the Dorper ewes

upon arrival.

But, the freezing technique was not suitable.

decided to fertilize the eggs and ship them to South Africa.

Rowson
He dis-

closed the operation in an articl e, "The Successful Long-distance Aerial Transportation of Fertilized Sheep Ova", in the Journal of Reproduction and Fertility.
The fertilized sheep embryos were implanted in the fallopian tubes
of a doe rabbit.
South Africa.

The rabbit was carefully crated for the jet ride to

Snuggl ed in their fur cover "incubator" the embryos con-

tinued to grow and differentiate while their substitute mother enjoyed
the ride.

Upon arrival, the embryos were surgically removed and im-

planted into two Dorper ewes who had been tricked physiologically by
hormone injections into thinking they were about to become pregnant.
The climax was that the two ewes delivered perfectly normal lambs. 46
Surrogate mothers, substitute mothers, mercenary
mothers - however you choose to describe them - were
no longer mere grist for speculations and fantasies of
the science-fiction writers. They had now become part
and parcel of man's technology of reproduction, one of
the several methods available to us in our exploding
ability to manipulate and control our own reproductive
behavior. 47
46Ibid., pp. 93-94.

47Ibid.
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Surrogate parenting is an element in the history of man whose
time has come.

Scientific knowledge continues to plow new ground

where nothing else has dared.

Not content to leave it fallow, genet-

icists and other medical scientists continually plant hypotheses, cultivate experiments, and harvest theories which cannot be contained in
the cluttered barns of our society.

However, as these theories begin

to prove fruitful to humanity, space is somehow made to accept them as
part of life.

These scientists are pulled along in their quest to

solve the mystery of human reproduction.

But what motivates a man or

woman to become a part of something which society may condemn?
Psychological Interests or Needs for Surrogate Parenthood
The first surrogate parent to "go pub1 ic
donym) of Pekin, Illinois.
boy on November 9, 1980.

ll

was El izabeth Kane (pseu-

She gave birth to an eight pound, ten ounce
The child was conceived through artificial

insemination with the sperm of a husband whose wife was childless.
motivation was compassion for the childless couple.

Her

One reporter lik-

ened her action to a biblical reference:
Surrogate mothering is probably a very ancient
practice that has only recently become a subject of
widespread public attention and controversy.
Almost 4000 years ago in Canaan, the Book of
Genesis says, Abraham's wife, Sarah, who would not
conceive, arranged the birth of a child by having
Abraham sleep with Sarah's maid, Hagar. Hagar was
called a concubine rather than a surrogate mother,
but the arrangement was similar to what is happeni ng today ...
A modern-day Hagar who lives in Pekin, Illinois,
and calls herself Elizabeth Kane ... 48
48Ange1 Castillo. IIWhen Women Bear Children for Others
York Times STYLE. December 22, 1980, p. B6.

ll

The New
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It is possible that some women would feel that they are giving
God a hand when they volunteer.

Others no doubt feel a great deal of

compassion for the childless couple.

One woman states, "There are

some women who just like being pregnant.

My mother had six children." 49

When she carried a child, this woman continued, she felt important in
ways she otherwise never did.

Th~

idea of carrying someone else's ba-

by makes her feel even more important because then she is not just
harboring a child, she is harboring a gift.

The publicity about the

surrogates is just an added bonus to the women:

their gallantry shines

back at them from the television set.50
Dr. Richard Levin, founder of Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.,
Louisville, Kentucky, says that he chooses surrogates very carefully,
after a barrage of physical and psychological tests.

He does a physi-

cal examination, reviews medical records, and does a genetic family
history on the surrogates.

Two psychiatrists evaluate each surrogate

and her husband for their mental competence and psychological makeup
and stability.

The surrogate also takes a battery of psychological

tests.
Dr. Levin reports that he follows the surrogate through the pregnancy by phone and regular reports from her physician.
have dinner with her just to find out her motives.
the motives seem to be twofold:
idea,

He may even

He relates that

First, they feel it's an interesting

and they are excited to be able to help another woman; second,

they see it as a financial opportunity to put aside money for the
49Anne Taylor Fleming. "New Frontiers in Conception"
Times Magazine (July 20, 1980): 24.
50Ibid.

New Ybrk
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future or to pay debts. 51
Dr. Philip Parker, a psychiatrist at Wayne State University, has
interviewed numerous surrogate mother applicants and adoptive parent
applicants for Detroit attorney, Noel P. Keane.
Dr. Parker said that one-half of his study subjects
were married and many of those had children of their own.
They saw surrogate motherhood as a chance to earn income
for their families while rediscovering their joy in being
pregnant.
"Pregnancy made them feel more competent, complete,
special, adequate, feminine and attractive," Dr. Parker
reported. "A few called it the best experience they'd
ever had. It gave them an inner glow and made them want
to be pregnant for the rest of their 1 ives. "52
Surrogate mothers have surfaced all across the nation in the past
five years.

Articles have appeared in magazines and newspapers with

varying accounts.

Each episode seems to have a different quirk.

Carol Pavek, a practicing midwife in Amarillo, Texas, has a husband and young son.

She is motivated to be a surrogate out of a de-

sire to do all she can to help other people.

She says she enjoyed her

pregnancy and thinks "it would be wonderful to keep having babies without the responsibility of raising them."

She became a surrogate mother

for Bob and Dorrie Norris of Placerville, California.

Mrs. Pavek is

twenty-seven and her husband is twenty-eight. 53
51Patricia A. Mullan. "Surrogate Parenting Association Sparks
New Interest at AFS Meeting" Ob. Gyn. News, Vol. 15, No.9 (May 1,
1980): 1,36-37.
52Parker, "Surrogate Mother's Motivations," p. 3.
53 Jean Seligmann with Robyne Curry. "Pregnancy by Proxy"
week, Vol. XCVI No. I (New York, July 7,1980): 72.
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What kind of woman would choose to be~r the inconvenience and
risks of pregnancy for a total stranger? What motivates a woman to
become a surrogate mother?
Dr. Philip Parker is conducting what is believed to be the first
psychological research on women who contract with a married couple to
be artificallyinseminated, give birth to a baby, and then give the
baby to the couple for adoption.

An ad was placed in the Detroit News

seeking a surrogate mother and promising a fee of $10,000 plus expenses.
Of those women who responded, Dr. Parker has interviewed eighty-five.
He alleges that money is the motivating factor in eighty percent of
the cases.

The remaining twenty percent expressed their motivation

as ranging from enjoyment of being pregnant to a compassion to give
needy parents a baby.
The women average twenty-five years of age with about one-half
now married and one-fourth divorced.
one-half were Protestant.

About one-half were Catholic and

Sixty percent of the women work or have a

working spouse with income range of $6,000 to $55,000.

Fifty-five

percent of them completed high school and twenty-five percent attended college, business br nursing school.

One had received a bachelor's

degree.
About seventy-five percent of the women had experienced a fullterm pregnancy.

However, one-third had experienced a loss of a child

through abortion, miscarriage or adoption.

"For these women, being a

surrogate mother may become a way of dealing with unresolved guilt by
repeating the traumatic experience in a controlled manner,"

Dr. Parker
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says.54

His evaluation also included the following:

Over 80% of the surrogate applicants said they
required a fee for their participation with most
giving $5,000 as the minimum amount. They related
a need for the money, but the degree of need varied
from a feeling that the money would be useful to
pay bills to a more urgent need for funds. They
also described .their requirements for the parental
appli.cants for whom they would carry a child. About
one-half said they would participate only for a
married couple unable to have a child; one-sixth
for a married or unmarried couple unable to have a
child; one-sixth for a single man or couple (married
or unmarried) but only if unable to have a child;
and one-sixth for anyone for any reason.
The data yielded some interesting results about
the applicant'shistory. About 10% had no previous
pregnancy and about 15% had no previous full term
pregnancy. Those who had been previ~usly pregnant
to term had a feeling regarding their pregnancy that
varied from a tolerable experience to the best time
of their life such that they wanted to be pregnant
for the rest of their lives ... Those who were never
pregnant to term described wanting to have the experience ... The average number of children that the
applicants delivered and raised was over 1.3.
About thirty percent lost at least one fetus,
baby, or child and there were three cases who had at
least two such losses and one woman had three losses ...
In all but one of these cases there was a voluntary
loss, i.e., abortion, adoption, etc. Some women
believed these previous losses would help them to
control or minimize any depressive feelings in response to giving up the baby. For exampl e, one woman
who gave up a child raised by her said: "Being
pregnant doesn't make you the mother. Raising the
kid and giving love, that's being a mother.
Another said, "I know what itls like to give up a baby." Other women felt that they were participating to atone for the guilt they felt in connection
with a prior voluntary loss.
Several factors appear to have a complementary
relationship in determining the applicants's decision
to be a surrogate mother including: 1) the perceived
desire and need for money, 2) the perceived degree of
enjoyment and desire to be pregnant and deliver a
baby, and 3) the perception of the advantages and disII

54"Surrogate Mothers - Why Do They Do It?" The Alumni Report,
Wayne State University School of Medicine, (Fall/Winger, 1981): 8.
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advantages of experiencing glvlng up the baby ... Also expressed here is the often expressed strong wish to give
the gift of a baby to a needy parent. 55
Compassion is the motivating factor in the majority of those cases which are made known to the public.
she wanted to help the childless couple.
sire to have

Elizabeth Kane states that
Carol Pavek expressed a de-

babies for others to experience the joy of raising them.

One article relates that a thirty-year-old woman gave birth to a sixpound, five-ounce baby on December 4, 1980.

She had been artificially

inseminated with the sperm of her sister's husband.

In order to keep

the birth quiet, a midwife was used and the adoptive mother and the
surrogate mother's ten-year-old son assisted.

The adoptive mother

began breast feeding shortly after the birth.

Details were not avail-

able as the sisters refused to give interviews. 56
Another article relates how surrogate mother Anne Lockwood decided to have a baby for her sister and brother-in-law.

Her sister had

suffered several tubal pregnancies which necessitated a complete hysterectomy.

Her husband was totally cooperative.

he assured her.

"Itls your body,"

"Itls up to you to make the decision." 57

Dr. Darrell D. Franks, M.D., a psychiatrist who has a private
practice in Louisville, Kentucky, has completed a psychiatric evaluation of potential surrogate mothers.

He administered the MMPI to ten

55Dr. Philip Parker. "Surrogate Mother's Motivation - Initial
Findings", a paper presented at the annual meeting of American Psychiatric Association, New Orleans, 12 May, 1981.
56 11 Delivery of Surrogate Mother's Baby is Reported"
11 December 1980 Sec. D 11,25:1.
57Mary Jane Beck
p. 83.

liTo My Sister With Love"

New York Times

McCall s September, 1981
I
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women who applied for and were accepted into a surrogate mother program and found no psychopathology in nine of the subjects.

Individual

profiles of the semen showed high feminity and social extroversion
scores.

Dr. Franks states, liThe term, Isurrogate mother ' no longer ap-

plies only to those who substitute nurturing after birth:

the term

now also means the actual process of assuming a sUbstitute pregnancy. 1158
(For psychiatric evaluation, see Appendix 1).
The potential surrogate mothers have definite psychological motivations, but what of the adoptive parents? What motivates them to seek
the help of a surrogate mother?
Noel Keane states that it is simply - Despair!·

One of every six

American couples is infertile. 59 This turn to surrogate parenting is
due to the unavailability of adoptable babies.

Abortion, free birth

control, and the long lists of applicants at the adoption agencies have
made surrogate mothering a viable alternative to childlessness.

It is

more meaningful because of the genetic link between the biological father and the offspring.

This makes it more appealing to the husband of

the infertile wife.
Karol White paints this picture:
The application is on file at the adoption agency.
Then the waiting begins, month after month, year after
year. The couple appears at the agency to claim their
right to a child. They can prove they are moral, upstanding pillars of the community, with extra room in
their home and in their hearts. How much do we have to
wait? Do you have a baby for us?
58Dr. Darrell D. Franks. IIPsychiatric Evaluation of Women in a
Surrogate Mother Program American Journal of Psychiatry 138 (October
1981) : 1378.
ll

59Keane, p. 13.
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"Children? Have we tried? Yes!" The couple's
answer is defiant as they secretly wonder, "Vihat's
wrong with us?" The years go swiftly by. Their chances for parenthood are all but gone. Nighmarish dreams
dominate their sleep as ahereal faces of the unborn
float just beyond their grasp. They reach out.
Empt i ness. 60
A couple may experience this because of the following:
A hysterectomy
Fallopian tubes that are irreparably damaged
Advice that she may not risk pregnancy because of
the damage to her health
She cannot become pregnant since she is a carrier
of a genetically transmitted disease
In the case of Carol Pavek, Dorrie Norris had two teenage daughters
but had a hysterectomy before her second marriage.

Dorrie stated, "Bob

wants a child of his own."61
A similar situation motivated the couple where Elizabeth Kane was
involved.

The couple, husband 37 years old, the wife 34 years old, had

adopted a son two years previously.
the family.

He was not.

She was content with the size of

She explains:

He wants and needs his own child. He went through the
adoption with me, and I feel this is something I can do for
him. The husband says, "I never stopped hoping there would
be an alternate means." Says the wife, "Vihen I heard El izabeth was pregnant, I wanted to go to work and tell everyone
the news - I was going to have a baby! "62
One divorced, infertile woman relates, "John was an only child.

I

so much wanted to give him a child, to give his parents a link with pos60Vihite, p. 125.

61S eligmann, "Pregnancy by Proxy," p. 72.

62Sarah Moore Hall, "An Illinois Vioman Decides to Bear a Stranger's
Child as Surrogate for his Infertile Wife," People's Magazine, 21 April
1980, p. 38.
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terity - to carryon the family name.
to share with him.

I desperately wanted a child

He started a family, only without me!"

Another woman tearfully confides, "If something doesn't happen to
give him encouragement, he may ask me to leave so he can find another
woman who can have a baby. "63
With these perils facing them, childless couples turn to surrogate
mothers for help.

It becomes a last ditch effort at holding the mar-

riage together.
What is the motivation when the situation is reversed?
band is infertile and the couple resorts to A.I.D.

The hus-

Amazing, though

not unexpected, the motivations are reactionary just as the infertile
wife union.

A.I.D. is the only alternative to adoption when:

A husband is absolutely sterile
A.I.H. has failed
For unexplained infertility when time is short
Genetic disease in husband's line
Rh incompatibility
Sperm agglutination, when washing or other male treatment
is not effective
Emily Brennan, twenty, expresses the following upon seeking advice
at a fertility clinic:
"There are two parts to our problem," she explains.
"The first was being told at nineteen that my husband
probably can't give me children, and the second is that
our very good marriage has sometimes hit bottom over this
problem. We1ve been told that ours is not a hopeless situation. One doctor told us, for two hundred dollars, that
conception will probably occur in the next ten years.
VJhy?"64
63White, p. 125.

64Blais, p. 132, 133.
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An infection has left her husband with only one functioning testicle and a series of blocked ducts.

His sperm count is between 10.8 to

12.6 million per cubic centimeter out of an ideal count of 40-60 million.
It is estimated that between 6,000 and 10,000 children are born
through A.I.D. yearly.

Reports indicate that some 12,000 to 15,000

couples request this procedure annually and that for the past twenty
years more than one-quarter million children have been born through
this procedure.
A 1954 study of 38 couples asked:
ther than adoption?"

"Why did you choose A.I.[). ra-

The responses may be summarized as follows:
Wife

Reasons
Desire to experience pregnancy
Dissatisfaction with adoption procedure
Derive benefits from maternal heredity
Closer relationship to child
Conceal infertility
Faith in selection of donor

23%
21 %
20%
15%
8%
2%

Husband
16%
25%
22%
32%
6%
3%

This study surveyed middle-class, college-educated parents.

Sig-

nificantly, the most frequently given reason for the husband's preference for A.I.D. was the belief that a closer relationship would exist
than with an adopted child.

Among the women surveyed, the largest num-

ber (but less than one out of four) indicated their primary consideration was a desire to experience pregnancy.65
The consuming desire to be a parent evidently motivates both sexes
equally.

For many, infertility can be and is a life crisis.

Those

65Aphrodite Clamar. IIPsychological Implications of Donor Insemination," The American Journal of Psychoanalysis 40 (1980): 173-177.
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afflicted almost live a psychosocial vacuum of fear and anxiety.

They

feel they are "picked on" by God; have been slighted by nature; are
freaks of society.

These men and women are forced to face the reality

of being members of an infertile couple group.

Male infertility is

probably more traumatizing than female infertility.

Our culture has

designated man as the procreator and the woman as the "birther".
In a survey of sixteen couples in which the husband was infertile,
reactions ranged from hatred to infidelity for both partners.

The pur-

pose of the study was to examine the conflicts and behavior patterns of
sterile husband couples.

The following was reported:

I interviewed sixteen married couples after the
diagnosis of azoospermia or severe oligospermia ...
Excluded were women who knew before marriage that the
husband was infertile ... The women's ages ranged from
21 to 34 years. The men's ages ranged from 21 to 38
years. At the time of the interview, 10 couples had
decided for A.I.D., 2 couples decided against it, and
4 couples were undecided. The couples had known of the
infertility for 8 months to 4 years.
Of the men, ten reported a period of impotence
that had lasted 1 to 3 months after discovery that they
were sterile. Before this, their sexual frequency was
1 to 3 times per week. The onset was within 1 week.
One of them was impotent for 4 months ... Three of the
eleven men with impotence admitted depression, 1 developed ulcers, 1 man began an affair within one month
(which he felt cured the impotence), and one man suffered
a whiplash and was incapacitated for 6 months. Two of
the 16 men reported no change in sexual or mood but the
frequency was low (less than once per month), and only
3 reported no change ...
Only in the case of the affair was the attitude
toward the wife changed negatively. Some wives said
the husbands were more withdrawn and moody .
.. . Six of the 16 couples reported that the wives
were significantly angrier toward the husbands shortly
after the diagnosis. In 1 couple this led to a temporary seperation. In 2 couples it led to the wife's having
an affair in which no contraceptives were used ...
One woman developed a fear that she would give birth
to a defective child. The phobia was accompanied by rage
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and envy directed at others "who did have children but
were terrible parents."
Ten of the women reported dreams none of them had
experienced in the past. Three themes seem to be incorporated: 1) the women felt bad (perhaps guilty)
about the husband's infertility, 2) she wished to be
rid of her husband, and 3) she felt guilty about her
wish to be rid of him ...
For these couples the decision to pursue donor insemination involves two problem solving stages: 1) coming to terms with the husband's infertility, and 2) confronting the problems of donor insemination itself ... 66
The motivations for seeking A.I.D. are psychological:
couples searching for help.

infertile

But, what are the motivations of the sperm

donor?
In previous days, the brothers or other male, blood relatives of
the husband were encouraged to be the donor.
in some cases were sought as donors.

Friends of the husband

These suggestions led to unsatis-

factory results.
One case is reported in which the sterile husband's extremely fertile father insisted upon being the donor with the couple's approval.
The doctors refused.

Another case related that after being inseminated

several times with the semen of the husband's friend, the wife failed
to become pregnant.
bit with the man.

The husband in frustration encouraged her to cohaShe immediately became pregnant.

It is reported that in most instances the donors are screened by
doctors for genetic, psychological and physical make-up.

In Los Angeles

one clinic maintains a pool of forty in which are graduate students,
mostly in medicine and science, sometimes in law, or administrators at
66David M. Berger, "Couple's Reactions to Male Infertility and
Donor Insemination," American Journal of Psychiatry 139 (September 1980):
1047.
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the nearby University of California, the kind of men who would have
high IQ's.
These men are usually responding to an ad in a campus paper.
ly one out of seven will be chosen.

On-

Once accepted, they are placed on

weekly schedules, every other day, two to three times per week.
average, they will donate sperm for four years.

On an

These men like the

idea that they have been chosen - culled from the crowd; they have a
strong but polite pride, not in their virility as much as their ferti1ity.

They like the idea that they are making babies, making them

for people who can't have them as well as just making them, and they
almost all say that they don't do it for the money.57
Over thirty years ago, Dr. Abner I. Weisman listed
standards for selecting proper donors. All vigilant
sterologists are aware of their credos:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
5.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

The donor must remain an unknown.
The donor should be in fine health mentally
and physically.
The donor should be of fine physical stock.
The donor should be between thirty and thirtyfive years of age.
The donor should be of high fertility.
The donor should be of excellent character.
The donor must be cooperative.
The donor's characteristics must match those
of the patient's husband.
The donor's temperment should closely resemble
that of the husband.
The donor's religion must be the same as that
of the husband.
The donor should protect himself legally by
ascertaining that the physician has the usual
signed documents.
The donors should be men of science or medicine.
The donor's Rh must be suitable.
Multiple donors should be used if possible. 58

57Fleming, p. 22.

58Finegold, p. 38.
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The motivations for surrogate parenting are numerous and varied.
With each situation there is a particular need to be filled and an
emotion to be quelled.

But, the motivations for surrogate parenting

of the couples and donors are not the only motivations satisfied by
the procedure.
Medical Research Interests In Surrogate Parenthood
The medical research motivations for surrogate parenthood are
extremely positive when outlined by those medical scientists who are
performing the research.

Their ultimate aim is to improve the human

race, to eliminate birth defects, eliminate hereditary disease, eliminate the pain and suffering of the mother in childbirth, and to provide
childless couples with children.
On Monday night, March 22, 1982, the ABC Network aired a made-forTV movie entitled, "Tomorrowls Child."

The plot centered around a

medical experiment in which an embryo, generated in a petra dish the egg and sperm being that of the biological parents - was fertilized and brought to birthing age in an artificial womb.

A statement

was made in the conclusion of the movie that what had just been viewed
was based on factual experiments concurrently being conducted in a
laboratory somewhere in the u.S.
Medical science has come out of its hiding.

Francoeur discusses

these experiments in the chapter, "Wombs of Gl ass and Steel", in hi s
book, Utopian Motherhood.

He cites:

Dr. Chamberlin has worked with human fetuses in
both England and Washington, D.C. In his initial ex-
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periments, Dr. Chamberlin used eight living human fetuses, weighing between 300 and 980 grams, which had
been obtained through therepeutic abortion. Seven
were removed with the amniotic sac intact while the
other was placed in a saline solution. All were
placed in tanks immersed in artificial amniotic fluid
to prevent regular breathing from starting. Within
twelve minutes of surgery, the umbilical blood vessels
were connected to perfusion equipment, a combination
heart-lung-kidney machine. The largest fetus, a male
from a fourteen-year-old girl, survived the longest in
these series of experiments. As the Ob-Gyn Observer
reported: "A brisk spontaneous flow of blood was
noted 22 minutes post partum; the fetus was kept on the
circuit for 5 hours and 8 minutes ... Only when a cannula slipped out by accident and could not be reintroduced was the experiment halted."69
There are other reported instances as early as nineteen sixtyeight and nineteen sixty-nine.

The E.M.O., extracorporeal membrane

oxygenator, is one of the earlier devices used to replace the function
of the natural womb.

This instrument has been used to support life

in lambs for up to two and a half days.
Most of these facts were, not long ago, a matter of fantasy or
science fiction.

Aldous Huxley, in his fictional book, Brave New

World, establishes the theme for his readers by recalling a day in
the year 632 A.F. (After Ford), when the director of Central Hatchery
and Conditioning Center gave some new
producing human assembly line.

st~dents

a tour of the mass-

Trained technicians controlled the

entire nine months in a manner which completely bypassed sexual intercourse and personal parenthood.

Eggs and sperm were collected in a

sterile, scientific procedure, fertilized and placed in large bottles
with a solution specific for the type of individual desired.

Decanta-

tion Day would come for these "babies", only to be followed by further
psychological conditioning until at length each child was properly
69Francoeur, pp. 53-54.
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prepared to enter its predestined class in society.
In the 1830 1s, the French writer Diderot was a fantastic dreamer
when he wrote The Dream of dlAlembert.

IIA warm room with the floor

covered with little pots, and on each of these pots a label:

soldiers,

magistrates, philosophers, poets, potted prostitutes, potted kings ... 11
seemed ridiculous to Frenchmen.

Americans today are just as reticent

to accept genetic manipulation.

A 1969 Harris poll revealed that only

three percent of the American population had ever heard of artificial
insemination. 70
In Vitro Fertilization
Dr. Daniele Petrucci, a forty-three-year-old father of two children, shocked and horrified the public evoking moralistic tirades and
threats of criminal lawsuits in 1959.

He announced to the world that

after forty failures, he had finally fertilized a human egg in vitro
and had kept the embryo alive in an artificial environment for twentynine days.

The doctor terminated the experiment at that time because

the embryo had become grossly deformed and enlarged - a monstrosity.
His motivation had been to find a way to culture organs which the
human body would not reject when transplantation took place.

Another

fetus, a female, was killed after fifty-nine days as a result of a
technical error.
Not to be overshadowed, the Russians moved to capitalize on Petrucci1s findings.

Two Soviet scientists, Dr. Anokhin and Dr. Maiscki,

of the Institute of Experimental Biology in Moscow, began their exper70Ibid., p. 57.
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imentations.

In 1966, the Russians reported that two hundred fifty

embryos had been kept alive beyond Petrucci's record and stated that
one fetus had survived for six months and reached a weight of onepound, two-ounces at death.
~ioni

The 1966 report suggested that the Soviet

had ambitions of producing the first human being to spend the

entire prenatal life in an artificial womb.

But, to date there has

been no such happening.
In vitro fertilization involves the removing of an egg from the
ovary and then fertilizing it in a petri dish.

It is the most unique

and revolutionary method for overcoming tubal blockages, in particular for those women who have learned that their fallopian tubes are
hopelessly and irreparably blocked.

In vitro, the Latin for "in glass"

indicated here the use of an artificial environment rather than a
glass test tube as many may think.
Between 1878 and the 1960 ' s, over two dozen scientists in a dozen different countries tried to fertil ize the human egg artificially.
Included were Onaff who worked with rabbits and guinea pigs in 1893,
F. R. Lillie in the twenties and thirties at Woods Hole Marine Biological Station, Yamane and Pincus with rabbits and humans in the thirties, Krosovskaja with rats and rabbits in 1935, John Rock and Menkin
with human eggs in the forties, Moricard with rabbits and humans in
the fifties, and Austin, Yanagimachi, Chang, Dauzier, and Thibault
with golden hampsters and other animals in the fifties. 71
This techinque was perfected by two British scientists.
Edwards, a physiologist, and Patrick Steptie, a gynecologist.
71Ibid., p. 60.
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November, 1977, they have used this procedure on seventy-nine patients,
implanted fertilized eggs in the thirty-two cases where eggs were fertilized in vitro, and achieved four pregnancies.

Two pregnancies en-

ded in spontaneious abortions and two resulted in the birth of Louise
Brown in London in 1978 and Alastair Montgomery in Scotland in 1979. 72
East Virginia Medical School and Norfolk General Hospital is the
first in vitro fertilization clinic.

They announced their first suc-

cessful in vitro pregnancy resulting in a birth in February, 1982.
Dr. Howard Jones is the physician who screens the applicants.
In vitro fertilization involves basically the following taken
from the August 1979 issue of the Hastings Center Report.
Fertilization creates a one-celled zygote which,
after 24 to 36 hours, begins to divide. No special
name is assigned to the two-, four-, and eight-celled
human embryo. However, at about the l6-cell state
(two and one half days) the embryo resembles a little
mulberry and is therefore called a morula.
After four and one-half days a blastocyst (literally "germ-bag") is
formed in which an inner cell mass, or embryoblast, gives rise to the
embryo.

On the sixth day, the blastocyst containing the embryo (bare-

ly visible) is ready for implanting in the uterine wall.

Following

implantation, the human embryo develops to newborn infant provided
all goes well.73
The embryo is implanted by means of a cannula (tube) 1.4mm. in
diameter which is placed through the cervix.

Dr. Steptoe relates:

It is comfy for the patient and no anethesia is
72Judith Alsfrom Fenton and Aaron S. Lifchex, M.D. The Fertility
Handbook (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1980) pp. 79-81.
It?"

73Jack W. Moore. "Human In Vitro Fertilization: Can We Support
The Christian Century, 22 April 1981, pp. 442-446.
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necessary. It is impossible to see the embryo, which must
be picked up from the vessel and loaded into the cannula
under a microscope. It is tricky not to accidentally
draw the embryo out again when removing the cannula. A
small amount of culture medium must be used so the uterus won·t contract. After withdrawing the cannula, the
doctor must check to see if the embryo is gone. Even
at that, one cannot be sure. 74
In order to be a candidate for in vitro fertilization, certain
stipulations are set forth:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The woman must have normal functioning ovaries
that ovulate and menstruate regularly.
Her genitals must be infection free.
Her husband must be fertile, have a normal sperm
count, normal motility, and normal morphology,75
The couple must be under thirty-five years of age.
Their marriage must be stable.
There must be no other chance of achieving pregnancy by any other means other than surgery (as
the last resort), as certified by their physician.
They must be in good physical and mental health.76

The new clinic in Norfolk, Virginia, has received more than five
hundred applicants since its opening.

There are six in vitro clinics

planned throughout the United States.

This has been a source of great

encouragement to many childless couples.
been childless for fifteen years.

Some of these couples have

One young wife reports:

People who can have children at the blink of an
eye don't know how lucky they are. Remember about a
year ago, the woman who dropped her baby at the Social
Services office and left? Oh God, how could she do
that?!Ld go work in the fields before I would give
up a ch,ld. n

74White, pp. 164-165.
75Fenton, p. 79.
76Moore, p. 443.
n"Childless Women Find Hope in New Clinic,"
18 March 1979, p. 26.

The New York Times,
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Fetal Adoption
Medical science has also introduced another aspect which is furthered by the surrogate parenting phenomenon, fetal adoption (artificial embryonation).

This aspect is the thrust behind a new infer-

tility clinic which was opened in Chicago recently.

Two brothers,

Drs. Randolph and Richard Seed have master minded this technique after years of research and experimentation with cattle.
There are two methods to this process:

a childless woman will

be able to give birth to an embryo which was artifically fertilized
in another woman (surrogate) by her husband1s semen; a fertile woman
will donate an egg which is fertilized in the Petri dish with the
sperm of the husband and then implanted in the womb of the childless
woman.
The procedure involves four steps.

First, the doctors try to

regulate the menses of the two women, hormonally, over a period of
several months.

When the cycles are paralled, the uterus of each

woman will be ready to receive the fertilized egg at the same time.
When this occurs, the doctor inseminates the donor woman (surrogate)
with the sperm of the recipient's (childless woman) husband.

The

second step involves a process in which the doctor flushes the fertilized embryo from the donor1s womb.
after the insemination.

This is done four or five days

It takes the elgg three to four days to make

the journey from the ovary, through the Fallopian tube, and into the
womb.

During this journey fertilization occurs.

After reaching the

womb, the embryo will fl oa t freely for another two or three days be-
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fore attaching itself to the uterine wall.
then transferred to the recipient.

Thirdly, the embryo is

This is the same procedure which

is used in the implantation process in in vitro fertilization.

Fourth-

ly, the recipient mother carries the embryo for nine months and qives
birth to her "ownll baby.
Francoeur discusses this same process, only in more detail in the
Utopian Motherhood.
mals were used.

He gives a history of the procedure in which ani-

Then he poses the question:

Could this technique be

applied to man?
The Cambridge team of Steptoe and Clyman think it is possible.
Dr. Edwards is convinced that there is no medical or biological reason why such a transplant would not work.
The transplanted fetus is indeed an allograph, a
foreign tissue, but, the uterus for some unknown reason
is not triggered to an immune response to the embryo.
In fact, Edwards~ earlier experiments with implanting
unfertilized human eggs into a rabbit foster mother
makes him very optimistic about this animal providing
an excellent nursery for a very young human being.
Before the Cambridge group attempts a zygote transplant between two women, they first plan to put human embryos into such furry, four-legged incubators. 78
Since 1973 when the Supreme Court made its historical ruling in
the Roe vs. Wade case, abortion had been an overwhelming issue.

Fetal

adoption/embryo transfer could present an answer to this problem.

Fe-

tal Adoption Centers could be established throughout the nation and
using the technology of the in vitro research, abortions could be eliminated.

78Francoeur, p. 99.
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The unwilling pregnant women would have an alternative to feticide or unwanted pregnancy. The reluctant
prospective mother simply visits the local Fetal Adoption Center, undergoes surgery for removal of her viable
fetus, signs legal documents, and exits a free woman.
At the same time, the developing embryo is preserved.
Fetuses removed during the first trimester are transplanted into the uterus of a surroqate or infertile
adoptive mother and carried to term in the usual manner. Second trimester fetuses are nurtured in warm,
organic artificial wombs until the third trimester,
when conventional modern incubation techniques can be
brought into play. Fetuses taken during the third
trimester are transferred directly to an incubator,
an existing medical technology often used to save
the lives of infants born up to three months premature. 79
Dr. Petrucci quoted the rationale for his experiments as follows:
One of my aims is to help women have babies, for
I have been upset by the large number of women giving
birth to stillborn children, especially at their first
pregnancy. Thus my research was directed along humanitarian lines, guided by the Christian principles I
have practiced since childhood. I love mankind. If
a wife should lose a baby on which the hopes of herself
and her husband have been centering, this is a human
tragedy. That I should be denounced for my experiment
is a great personal blow, for I am a scientist dedicated'
to uncovering those mysteries of nature that God is prepared to reveal to us. SO
Summary
Interests furthered by surrogate parenthood, from the medical/
scientific viewpoint are clear.

Those psychological emotions of the

childless couple, the infertile wife or husband, to be parents are
assuaged by the process.

For the surrogate mother, her need to express

79Robert A. Freitas, Jr. "Fetal Adoption: A Technological Solution to the Problem of Abortion Ethics," The Humanist, May/June 19S0,
p. 22.

SOFrancoeur, p. Sl.

64

compassion, correct a wrong (abortion, etc.), or receive the benefit
of extra income, is granted.

The motivational needs of the donor of

sperm for A.I.D., to feel superior to other men and to feel they are
making babies for those who want and need them are satisfied.

Medi-

cal researchers can feel fulfilled because of their new-found information about the genetics and reproductive processes of the human
mammal.

But, these are not all the interests which seek to promote

the surrogate parenthood phenomenon.

CHAPTER III
Current Efforts Promoting Interest In Surrogate Parenthood
Primary to the success of any new venture is the amount of positive visability in the public arena.
greatest extent through the media.

This is accomplished to the
Newspapers throughout the world

carried headlines when the first in vitro conceived baby was born.
When Elizabeth Kane, the first surrogate mother to go public, announced to the world her undertaking, numerous newspaper articles were
written, she and her husband were interviewed by magazine writers,
she and the physician, Dr. Levin, appeared on a variety of TV Iitalk
shows II and news programs.

The renowned Detroit attorney, Noel Keane,

who is probably the first to write contractual agreements for surrogate mothers, has appeared on a majority of talk shows, also promotinq
the new phenomenon.
Surrogate parenting is definitely an answer to a problem which
many childless couples have had to live with until now.

There are

many people who have determined to take advantage of the phenomenon
and promote it to the fullest.
Advertisements in newspapers have been extremely effective in
"getting the word out."
takes over!

One person reads the ad and word-of-mouth

This classified ad in a California paper brought in one-

hundred sixty responses:
WANTED:

Childless couple with infertile wife
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wants female donor for artificial
insemination. State fee. All replies held confidential.
One hundred and sixty women responded to this ad and each of them
probably told a friend who told a friend, and so on.

The respondent

who was chosen for this particular situation received $7,000.

The

couple who placed the ad picked up all the medical, hospital, and
related maternity expenses.

They referred to the surrogate mother

as "an angel in human form taking pity on a forlorn and helpless man
and woman giving them a child.

11

Now they are thinking of trying for

a boy.81
This article alone spread the news of something great to thousands, perhaps millions.

When worded correctly on the front cover,

the article no doubt sold many additional copies of the periodical.
The Detroit News carried this ad:

013 Personals
Couples unable to have children
willing to pay a $10,000 fee and
expenses to woman to carry their
child. Conception to be by artificial insemination.
All Responses Confidential
Please Contact: 82
This ad prompted many responses.

Any time a new product is placed on

the market, the price is the main attraction.
There have been recent efforts by the national TV networks, ABC
81Karol White. "Motherhood the Surrogate \~ay:
falls, Joys," Science Digest, March 1980, p. 25,
8211Surrogate Mothers _ Why Do They Do It?
p. 8.

II

Practice Has Pit-

The Alumni Report,
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and CBS to promote to the public both surrogate motherhood and in
vitro fertilization with the artificial womb.
Gift of Life" centered on the surrogate mother.

The CBS movie, "The
Brought into pers-

pective were the overriding negative responses of family, friends,
and society in general.

As the young wife who sought to be the

surrogate encountered the negativism, the plot brought out the
positive aspects in such an overwhelming manner that this was presented as the "way to go."83
The ABC movie, no doubt programmed as competition, dealt with
in vitro fertil i zation and the mechani zed artifi ci a1 womb.

"Tomor-

row' s Chi 1d" dealt with the pos itive aspects of becomi ng parents without even the act of sexual intercourse or a "fat tummy."

Presented in

a manner which condemned the negative proponents as old-fashioned promoters of pain and agony, the movie definitely gave the young couples
of the future an extremely inviting alternative method of reproduction. 84

However, the media is not the only means by which surrogate

parenthood is being furthered.
Surrogate Parenting:

A Growing Business?

The American way, the free enterprize system, a capitalisti'c society knows no limits.

Products for sale range from toothpicks to

space shuttles, from insects to elephants, and they go to the highest
bidder.

In every transaction there is a "middle man 'l who skims the

83CBS's "Tuesday Night Movie"
"The Gift of Life" on WDBJ.
84ABC's "Monday Night ~10vie"
"Tomorrow"s Child" on WSET.
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cream off the top.

Now there is a market for human beings.

But this

market need not be looked upon as evil or damaging to society.
is a need for the product.

There are manufacturers.

There

And, there are

buyers!
Surrogate motheri ng, or as one arti cl e puts it, "Wombs for. Rent, II
has already become something of a business venture.

Organizations

have been formed to deal with the varying elements of the process.

Dr.

Richard Levin, an obstetrician-gynecologist from Louisville, Kentucky,
has organized and founded Surrogate Parenting Associates.
ness

ll

This Ilbusi-

operates for the purpose of matching an infertile couple with a

woman willing to bear them a child for a fee. 85
Dr. Levin1s practice is not an ordinary merchandising situation.
He has worked exclusively in the field of fertility for five years
following a reproductive endocrinology fellowship at Yale.

There is

no doubt that the thirty-six year old father of four is well qualified
and capable.

He has taken great care to insure against error.

"I suppose you could set up shop and start doing
this fairly cheaply. Just match the couple and surrogate and let them find their own doctors. Pve spent
a fortune though, with sperm-freezing equipment that
cost $15,000 and an $11,000 computer to help me make
an initial selection of five suitable surrogates for
each couple," he says. In all, count i ng 1ega 1 expenses
(which include a running battle with the state·s attor~
ney general that may wind up in the U.S. Supreme Court),
Levin estimates his startup costs at $100,000.
Of the handful of people in this field, Levin seems
to have the biggest operation with a staff of three two coordinators and a clerical worker. But so far,
he has used only his own money. "Investors?1I he says,
1I0h, God no! An investor is like another wife."
85Judy Alsofrom, "Physician Sees No Problems in Surrogate Mother
Business,1I American Medical News, 23 (June 20, 1980): 13.
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... Levin charges up to $6,000 according to a coupleLs
ability to pay. He now handles 150 to 200 cases per
year.
"We practi ca 11y 1ive with these women for nine
months, dealing with their problems early on so they
wonLt cause trouble later," says Levin, who is putting
$100,000 into an interest-bearing escrow account for
1ega 1 expenses. "That keeps me from payi ng taxes
on it, and if I get a bi 11 from my 1awyer someday, it
won~t be so painful."
And, adds Levin, "There's been a lot of joy involved in this for me - joy in helping the couples become parents and joy in hel ping the surrogates. "86
Dr. Levin explains that they are not selling a baby but merely
compensating a surrogate for her potential loss of income, the pain
and suffering (that accompanies childbirth) and the loss of consortium.

Their business is not to be compared to blackmarket baby-

selling.

There is a definite biological link between the baby and

the adoptive parents through the husband.
The fees to the surrogate, according to Dr. Levin, range from
$5,000 to $13,000, with some doing it for free.

Many couples write

in, he says, with the idea their insurance will cover all costs, including the surrogateLs fee.

The total charge is from $13,000 to

$20,000, including medical fees (his services), the surrogate fee
(around $10,000), hospital expenses, flights to Kentucky for the participants, and legal fees. 87
Dr. LevinLs Surrogate Parenting Association is not the only entrepreneural enterprise springing forth on the surrogate parenting
860 ave Li ndorff. "The Busi ness of Surrogate Bi rths," Venture,
The Magazine for Entrepreneurs, September 1981, pp. 56, 57.
87Alsofrom, p. 13.
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vine.

There is also an organization on the West Coast, Surrogate Par-

enting Foundation, founded and operated by Bill Handel. 88 The financial success of this particular venture was not available to this
writer.
Katie Brophy, twenty-five-year-old Louisville attorney who is a
partner with Levin, started her own organization in 1981.

Surrogate

Family Services was opened with only a three thousand dollar

invest~

ment by Miss Brophy, for office expenses.
Surrogate Family Services has arranged several
pregnancies for fees of $3,000 to $4,000 each ..•
"A lot of people desperately want a child," says
Brophy. HThere are business aspects to this, but
it"s such an emotional thing that if you approach
it from a typical business standpoint, you have
prob 1ems. 1189
Miss Brophy rel ates that fees for surrogate mothers normally
range from $5,000 to $10,000, but can also go as high as $20,000.90
She says the business is dominated by attorneys primarily due to the
vagueness of the 1aws in each state.
I~m

For her, "it I'S very exci ting.

creating a new era of law, which is a chance most attorneys never

have. "91
Another attorney, Noel P. Keane of Detroit, is also very much
into the financial aspect of the surrogate mother business.

His law

office spends upwards of seventy percent of its time on surrogate
88Lindorff, p. 56.
89Ibid., p. 57.
90James Giranelli, The National Law Journal 4 (April 9, 1981):33.
91Lindorff, p. 56.
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matters.

He charges a fee of $3,000 plus expenses and says that

that is too low, "because I spend two years worki ng on each case. II
In October, 1981, his office arranged twelve inseminations.

Keane

maintains he will handle one hundred cases a year at earnings after
expenses exceeding $300,000. 92
Sperm Banks:

Funds For A Deposit?

The enterprising expertise of business tycoon, Robert K. Graham,
is a motivating factor behind Sperm Banking.
not of importance.
telligent

His motivation is to promote a IIbetter, more in-

human race.

ll

For Graham, income is

The sperm bank he founded is called the Her-

mann J. Mull er Repos itory for Germinal Choi ce, 1oca ted in Escondi do,
California.
winners.

Sperm collected for this bank comes only from Nobel Prize

Thus far, five donations are known to have been made with

only William B. Shockley of Stanford University, a Nobel Prize winner
in Physics in 1956, admitting to the deposit.

Three women are now

known to be pregnant after being artificially inseminated with Nobel
Sperm from Graham's bank.93
To qualify for a Nobel sperm insemination, a woman must have an
IQ which would rank her in the top two percent among all Americans.
Graham requires that the women be young and healthy, with no family
background of genetic defects.

Their husbands must be infertile.

The ladies must agree to keep him informed of the outcome of their
92Ibid.
93William J. Broad.
1980, pp. 1326-1327.

"A Bank for Nobel Sperm,1I Science, 21 March
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pregnancies and the child's development.

Those who are accepted pay

air-freight costs and a two-hundred, fifty-dollar deposit, refunded
when they return the liquid nitrogen containers used for shipping the
frozen semen. 94
Not all sperm banks are on a level with

Graham~s.

The Tyler

Cltnic in the Los Angeles area selects men to be donors on the basis
of the IQ also.

These men receive twenty dollars for one ejaculate

and then leave.

They also store sperm for individuals at a yearly

rate of forty-five dollars. 95
The largest sperm bank, commercially, is Idant in New York City.
They have over thirty-thousand frozen samples which include those of
many Broadway stars.
specimen.

Idant pays its donors twenty dollars for each

The donors and storage customers (twenty-five dollars per

year per ejaculate) are led to a private room equipped with a reclining chair and a stack of magazines with erotic art.

They are asked

to ejaculate into a jar and bring the specimen to a technician who
does an analysis and then freezes it. 96
Artificial insemination is big business. It is
estimated that approximately 20,000 human beings were
created as a result of A.I.D. in 1978 alone. Typically, donors are paid $20 - $40 for each accepted
ejaculate. If your physician decides to buy his sperm
94Matt Clark with Jonathan Kirsch, IIRecipe for Genius:
Get Sperm," Newsweek 10 March 1980, p. 85.

First,

95Fleming, "New Frontiers In Conception," p. 20.
96John Stossel, "One Answer to Childlessness ination,N Science Digest, March 1980, pp. 20-23.

Artificial Insem-
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from a sperm bank, he will probably pay $35 for each
str-aw(sample). You will probably be charged $40 $50 per insemination. 97
The charge for each insemination can vary from
$75 - $100, of which the donor receives about $30.
According to Dr. Sherwin Kaufman, a gynecologist at
New York Hospital - Cornell Medical Center who has
performed hundreds of A. 1,0. IS, about 80 percent of
the women who try the method become pregnant, though
two or three artificial inseminations may be necessary.98
That group of women who respond to the ads for surrogate mothers
are also an enterprising group.

They hope to gain anywhere from two

hundred dollars to ten thousand dollars plus expenses.

One applicant,

a medical student, asked that her tuition be paid for one year.

They

have a commodity for which there is now a demand.
Gestation, Inc .
If Englandls Baby Louise Brown, who was conceived
in a petri dish, is a triumph of medicine, what then is
the baby born recently to a surrogate mother? Neither
the product of adultery, as some claim, nor of a scientific breakthrough, as was Baby L., he is still something more than a much-wanted child who arrived at his
parentis home by a rather circuitous route.
Given the fact that she was paid for her time and
trouble, his mother is, in a sense, an entrepreneurial
pioneer. And although babies have been bought before,
he himself, being custom-tailored, is the human equivalent of a bespoke suit. Which leads us to ask: What
are the economic implications of surrogate motherhood
in the marketplace?
Will the doctors responsible for enqineering conception get a slice of the surroqatehs fee? If they
have a number of prospective surrogates on their books,
97White, p. 120.
98Jean Seligmann, IlLife Without Father,f1 Newsweek, 22 September
1975, p. 87.
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could they be said to be keeping a stable? If so, should
a further job description be added to M.D.? And another
consideration: must the surrogate mother pay income tax?
Is the baby then subject to sales tax?
As to the fee itself, how should it be determined?
Since this appears to be a seller's market, we assume it III
be pretty much in the hands of the surrogate, and closely
tied to quality control. Will the college graduate with
an immaculate gene pool be able to charge more for her
service than the high school dropout with unsavory relatives? Can the raving beauty command more money than
the plainer jane? Do blondes get a bonus?
While it's true that some of the same questions were
raised in the past about sperm donation, two factors separate the issues. One is the relative impersonality of
sperm donation. The second concerns the wide difference
in financial incentive. At $20 per donation, there is
just no comparison with the fees a woman could command
for each nine-month gestation.
It is impossible to predict all the medical or
ethical implications of surrogate motherhood. These
are, as the saying goes, early days. But that it represents a whole new sector of the economy is beyond dispute. 99
Legal Efforts to Further Interest in Surrogate Parenthood
According to Noel P. Keane, there are no laws pertaining to surrogate mothers.

Anywhere.

At the time I first heard this request, I had
never even done as much as an adoption. Today, I find
myself the expert in what is a virginal legal frontier.IOO
While specific laws governing surrogate mothers have not Been
enacted, some states have taken steps to regulate and control A.I.D.
These include Georgia, Oklahoma, Kansas, California, Maryland, New
York, Arizona, North Carolina, and Connecticut.

There have also been

cases which have been pursued by attorneys for the purpose of forcing
legislation and rulings by the U. S. Supreme Court.

Many of the rulings

99Editorial, The New York Times, 23 November 1980, p. 20.
100Keane, p. 15, 234.
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in the various states mentioned above resulted from the efforts of the
American Medical Association.

Some of these in summary are:

In 1964, Georgia passed the first such law, declaring: wAll children born within wedlock or with usual
gestation period thereafter, who have been conceived by
means of artificial insemination, are irrebuttably presumed legitimate if both husband and wife consent in
writing to the use and administration of artificial insemination," providing that the physicians and surgeons
involved are licensed to practice medicine.
In 1967, Oklahoma enacted a similar law. This
statute, however, requires that the consent document
be executed before a judge and filed in the manner of
adoption papers. Although such a document prevents
the husband from denying paternity, the required manner of the filing may be a disadvantage.
In 1968, Kansas legitimized the procedure but did
not specify who is legally authorized to perform A.I.D.
In 1968, a decision of a California appellate court,
held that the term "father" cannot be limited in its biological sense: The determining factor is whether the
"legal relationship of the father and child u exist. The
consent of the husband to A.I.D. is irreversible: "One
who consents to the production of a child cannot create
a temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at
will.
II

In 1973, a New York court ruled that A.r.D. accedes
not only the legal duties owed by a father to a natural
child, but also all the legal right in regard to that
child. Thus, the first husband must give his consent
before a second husband can adopt a child born as a result of A.I.D. during the first union.
.
In 1974, Maryland passed a law that legitimizes
A,f.D. children if the husband consents to A.I.D. New
York enacted a law similar to that passed in Maryland
in 1975.101
For A.r.D. cases, the main issue addressed is the introduction of
adultery as a basis for divorce..

As a result of the artificial insemi-

101Bertha Ledecky, IIWhen A Childless Couple Asks For Help - Explaining the Artificial Options," Patient Care, 15 March 1979, PP. 71-82.
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nation, husbands have contended that what took place was an adulterous
act.

States are now enacting statutes which will define artificial in-

semination, its procedure, those who are participants, i.e. the donor,
recipient, adoptive father, and those who may perform artificial insemination.

Many of those states choosing to deal with artificial insemi-

nation have adopted language substantially similar to that proposed in
section five of the Uniform Parentage Act,102
At this present time, twenty-four other states are known to have
statutorily addressed issues related to artificial insemination.

The

great social and moral adversity to artificial insemination has no
doubt contributed to the hesitancy of the legislatures.
increased public

awa~eness

However, an

of the process and its practice, has and

will continue to force 1egisl ative action,
New Jersey, one of the remaining states which has not made a legislative decision, had an interesting ruling in Cumberland County
l02Uniform Parentage Act - Section 5 provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a chil d tnereby conceived. The husband I,S
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify thei'r signatures and the date of the insemination
and file the husbandl,s consent with the (State Department of Health),
where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the
physictanhs failure to do so does not affect the father and child rela~
tionshtp. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whe~
ther part of the permanent record of a court or of a fil e held by the
supervisi'ng physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donorl,s wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived. (Lindsey E. Harris, HArtificial Insemination and Surrogate
Motherhood - A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions," Williamette Law
Review,17 (Fall, 1981): 925 Footnote),
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Court.

The case involved a Vineland beautician and a Vineland elemen-

tary school teacher.

The school teacher, who was the donor of the

semen, had sued the unmarried beautician for visitation rights to a
son who was born to her as a result of artificial insemination.

Both

of them testified that she had wanted a child by artificial insemination and he agreed to supply the sperm.

Marriage was planned and she

had specified that she wanted no sexual relationship before marriage.
She had conceived after injecting herself with his semen.
After learning that she was pregnant she broke off the relationship and barred him from her house.
fully selected the donor.

She testified that she had care-

During the pregnancy and subsequent birth

she had paid for all the expenses.

Judge Frank Testa of the Cumberland

County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ruled:
... a case of first impression, presenting a unique
factual situation with no reported precedents ..• in this
or any other jurisdiction .,. unlike anonymous donors to
sperm banks, the donor in this case was known and consequently qualified for designation as the natural father .
. ,. any natural father is entitled to visit his illegitimate children ... The court takes no position as to the
propriety of the use of artificial insemination between
unmarried persons, but must be concerned with the best
interests of the child in granting custody or visitation.
In this situation a man wants to take upon himself the
responsibility of being a father to a child which he is
responsible for helping to conceive. 103
Some interesting observations came from this particular case which
are of interest:
1.
2.

The judge referred to the donor as the natural father.
The natural father is entitled to visit his offspring.

l03Dona1d Janson, "New Jersey Judge Gives Donor of Sperm the Right
of Visits to Woman's Son," New York Times, 22 July 1977, p. 3.
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3.
4.

The child was designated as illegitimate.
The natural father does have a responsibility toward the
chil d.

A 1948 New York case ruled on a similar situation.

In the case of

Strand v. Strand, the husband had consented to A.I.D. but then separated from his wife.

The court granted him visitation rights and fur-

ther held that lithe husband was entitled to the same visitation rights
as those acquired by a foster parent who has formally adopted a child,
if not the same rights as those to which a natural parent would be entitl ed. "104
Lindsey E. Harris in the Willi~mette Law Review (Fall, 1981) has
provided an excellent overview of various cases which pertain to the
different aspects of A.I.D.

One of the earliest cases brought to

court involving artificial insemination was Hoch v. Hoch.

This issue

was whether or not the wife was involved in an adulterous act.

This

Illinois court found the wife guilty of adultery in the normal sense,
but it determined that the resulting conception by A.I.D. would not
constitute adultery.l05
In the case of Gurskey v. Gurskey a New York State court ruled
that the offspring of A.I.D. was illegitimate.

However, since the hus-

band had consented to the insemination the court imposed a support
obligation on him.l06
104Harris, p. 923.
105Hoch v. Hoch, No. 44-6-8037 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1945).
106Gurskey v. Gurskey 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.

406(1963).
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A ruling in 1968 by the California Supreme Court on the case of
People v. Sorenson, the question of the legitimacy of the child was
evaded.

It held that the husband was the "legal father" and as such

he was obligated to provide support for his "legal chi1d.,,107
The issue of the legitimacy of a child born to a woman whose husband had consented to A.I.D. was established by one state, New York,
in 1973.

In this case, Adoption of Anonymous, the court held that a

child born of consensual A.I.D. is a legitimate child entitled to the
rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same
marriage. 108
Adultery is an issue in which the courts will declare a child i1legitimate if it is proven on the part of a woman.
jurisdictions is said to constitute adultery.l09

A.I.D. for most
The court in the case

of Orford v. Orford rejected the traditional definition of adultery
and placed its emphasis instead on the fact of impregnation.

Justice

Orde believed that:
The essence of the offence of adultery consists,
not in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to another person
of the reproductive powers of faculties of the guilty
person; and any submission of those powers to the ser-"
vice or enjoyment of any other person other than the
husband or wife comes within the definition of adultery.110
107People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280,437 P.2d 495,66 Cal. Rptr.
7 (1968) .
108Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (Sup.
Ct. 1973).
109Pau1a Diane Turner, "Love's Labor Lost: Legal and Ethical Implications in Artificial Human Procreation," University of Detroit Journal of Urban Law, 58 (Spring, 1981): 464.
1100rford v. Orford, 58 D.R.L.

251, 258 (1921).
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The English case of l v. l held that the child of A.I.D. was
illegitimate because it was "not the result of normal sexual consumation."lll

A contrast to this decision was established by the Scottish

case of Macl ennan v. Macl ennan,112 in 1958.

It determined that A.I.D.

did not constitute adultery and that the resulting child was not illegitimate.

Accordingly, it stated that insemination is not necessary

for adultery and that "the placing of the male seed in the female ovum
need not necessarily result from the sexual act, and if it does not,
but is placed there by some other means, there is no sexual intercourse. 11113
A.I.D. is not the only area of controversy to make its way into
the courtroom.

One such controversial case involves a surrogate mo-

ther and has been compared to the setting of Solomonhs judgement.

It

involves Denise lucy Thrane who contracted with a childless couple,
Mr. and Mrs. James Noyes of Rochester, N.Y., to be inseminated with the
semen of Mr. Noyes, give birth, and surrender the baby to them.

Since

the birth, Mrs. Thrane has changed her mind and wants to keep the
chil d.
Judge Robert Olson has been asked by Noel Keane, attorney for the
Noyes couple, to allow Mr. Noyes the same right to seek custody as any
other father under California law.

Mrs. Thranets attorney countered

l11l v. l, (1949) 1 All Eo. R. 141 (Probate, Divorce and Adm. Div.
1948) .
112Maclennan v. Maclennan, (1958) Sess. Cas. 105 (Scot. Outer
House) .
113Turner, pp. 465-466.
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by stating that under California law semen donors have no rights to
resulting offspring.
tion.

Judge Olson admits that he doesn't have a solu-

He has allowed Mrs. Thrane to name her baby after it is born.114
Noel P. Keane has been involved in several court cases involving

surrogate motheri ng.

He says,

II

I have fil ed a 1awsuit in vJayne County

(Michigan) to make payment of a fee to surrogate mothers legal and
plan to pursue this landmark litigation all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court, if necessary ... Binding agreements ... will require
legislation and state regulation, which is the long-term goal for surrogate parenti ng. 11115
In his case, Doe, Doe and Roe v. Kelley and Chalan, Keane contends that the natural mother CRoe) and the couple (Doe) are free to
"conceive a child, bear it, and raise it as they agree among themse 1ves because these acts are guaranteed by the ri ght of pri vacy.

II

The oddity of this particular case is that Mary Roe has been employed
by John Doe for three years.

This case is still pending in the Michi-

gan Supreme Court. 116
Another case with which Keane is involved is Syrkowski v. Appleyard.

The Attorney General of the State of Michigan is arguing in

this situation that since Mr, Appleyard consented to the artificial
insemination of his wife, Cormae, by the semen of Mr. Syrkowski, the
114 Whose Baby Is It, Anyway?" Newsweek, 6 April 1981, p. 83.
l1

115Keane, The Surrogate Mother, pp. 18, 19.
116S ee Appendix 2, 3, and 4.
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resultant chil d is the 1egitimate chil d of Mr. Appl eyard.

At this

present time the case is sti'll pending. 117
The Attorney General of Kentucky, Steven L Beshear, has challenged the legi'timacy of the practice of Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc., the organization founded by Dr. Ri'chard M. Levin.

His conten-

tion is that the contracts prepared for and signed by the participants
of the surrogate mother process are illegal.

The business operated by

Dr. Levin is stated to be in violation of certain Kentucky statutes
which pertain to the buying and selling of children.

The Attorney

General also states that Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., is
guilty of an abuse and misuse of its corporate power, privilege and
franchise which is detrimental to the interest and welfare of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.

His objective is to seek an invalidation of

the corporate powers and franchise of Dr. LevinLg corporation. IIB
Mr. Beshear has a well documented case.

In his opinion he writes:

In conclusion, it is the opinion of this office that
because of the existence of the above-mentioned Kentucky
statutes and the strong public policy against the buying
and selling of children, contracts involving surrogate
parenthood are illegal and unenforceable in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.119
No aspect of the artificial reproduction of human beings bas es ...
caped its day in court.

The process of in vitro fertilization came

117See Appendix 5.
IIBKentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. Bl-CL-0429
Franklin Circuit Court (March 12, 19B1). (See Appendix 6.)
119Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky.
"An Opinion on Surrogate Parenting,1I (January 26, 19B1) OAGBl lB:
p. 7. (See Appendix 7.)
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before the bench in the summer of 1978.

The case was John and Doris

Delzio against the Presbyterian Hospital, Columbia University and
Raymond Vande Wiele, M.D.
Mrs. Delzio had undergone two operations to correct a blockage
of her Fallopian tubes.

After the second qJerationin 1971 failed, the

possibility of in vitro fertilization was discussed between her physician, Dr. William Sweeney, and Dr. Landrum Shettles of Columbia Presbyterian Hospital Medical Center.

Mrs. Delzio was a patient at the

New York Hospital Cornell Medical Center.

Columbia Presbyterian is

located at West 168th Street and Cornell is at East 70th Street.

Dr.

Shettles (the in vitro expert at this time) could not come to Cornell
to do the work.

After discussing the project with Dr. and Mrs. Del-

zio, she wanted to proceed immediately.
On September 12, 1973, Mrs. Delzio entered Cornell Medical Center.
She was taken to an operating room, where follicular fluid was obtained
from both ovaries after great difficulty.

Sealed in a sterile container

it was shipped immediately to Columbia Presbyterian to Dr. Shettles.
Dr. Delzio provided the necessary sperm and the in vitro fertilization
culture of the ovum was begun.

The culture was then placed in an in-

cubator at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital Medical Center.
The next morning the culture was removed and opened by Dr. Raymond
Vande Wiek, the Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology
at Columbia Presbyterian.

He was assisted by Dr. Duane E. Todd.

That

afternoon they called Dr. Shettl es and informed him that 1) there was
an N.r.H. ban against this type of experimentation; 2) both Dr. Shettles and Dr. Sweeney were unqualified for this; 3) it was immoral and
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unethical; 4) no experimentation had been conducted on sub-human
primates; and 5) there had been no clearance given by Columbia Presbyterian for the procedure.

Dr. Shettles then called Dr. Sweeney to in-

form him of the happenings.
informed him.

Dr. Sweeney then called Dr. Delzio and

Mrs. Delzio was recuperating from the operation and was

in such pain that she was not informed until the next day.
When informed the next day, Mrs. Delzio was extremely upset.

La-

ter that day she went into a profound depression and remains so to
this day.

Dr. and Mrs. Delzio filed suit and the case finally came to

trial on July 17, 1978.

The trial lasted for five weeks.

After thir-

teen hours of deliberation, the jury found for the De1zio ' s first
claim of mental anguish and awarded Mrs. De1zio the amount of $50,000
to be awarded in the amount of $12,500 from Presbyterian Hospital,
$12,500 from Columbia University, and $25,000 from Dr. Raymond Vande
Wiele.

Dr. De1zio was awarded a total of three do1lars. 120

Although there are negative issues involved in all of these cases,
the phenomenon of surrogate parenthood is receiving positive promotion
from the coverage afforded these trials by the media.

This is one

more means by which the proponents can keep the issue in public view
thus prompting acceptance by society.

Those who oppose it are exposed

by the media as being anti-life and anti-happiness.
Summary
Current efforts to further interest in surrogate parenthood are to
120Wil1iam J. Sweeney, III, M.D. and Lee S. Goldsmith, M.D., LL.B.,
"Test Tube Babies: Medical and Legal Considerations," The Journal of
Legal Medicine, 2 (April, 1980): 1-12.
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some extent successful.
to gain financially.

Each of those who are involved are seeking

Baby-making is big business!

Venture Magazine pointed out:
be unlimited.

As the article in

For a small investment the profits can

This type of exposure will soon bear the news of surro-

gate parenting to the business world.

In the past year Americans have

seen the deregulation of certain commodities.

The surrogate parenting

business is presently operating without any regulation or control and
seems to be enjoying good success.

Shall it be allowed to continue?

Dr. Philip Parker states, Ult is time to seriously consider the direction that public policy should take in this matter. N121

121Parker, IISurrogate Mother ('s Moti vation, II p. 6.

CHAPTER IV
Public Policy Implications of Surrogate Parenthood
There are no laws anywhere controlling surrogate mothering.

Only

twenty-four states have bothered to enact statutes concerning A.I.D.
Presently, neither the United States Constitution nor any federal statute prohibits the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
from conducting and supporting in vitro fertilization programs.
Those who favor the unregulated use of IVF claim
that regulation would hampe\r "free scientific inquiry,"
and that because of the complexity of the issues involved
in IVF, and because non-complying scientists could evade
government regulations or perform experiments outside the
United States, the only rational approach would be selfregulation by the scientific community ... Legislation
will ensure that until research has reached a point
where little or no legal and ethical problems remain,
the scientific community will strive to conform to the
highest possible standard of legality and morality.122
Public policy or legislation, as preferred, must originate with
the people.

The hindrance to the formulation of public policy is a

lack of knowledge by the majority of the population concerning the
present escalation of human reproduction experimentation.

As mentioned

in chapter three, the media is the means whereby the most people will
be informed.

It tends to display only the positive "look what great

accomplishments for the good of mankind science has performed today,"
aspects.

Public policy cannot be properly formulated until both the

122Turner, "Love I'S Labor Lost," p. 477.
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pos itive and the negative, have been given equal acknowl edgement by the
media and presented in an unbiased manner to the population.
Numerous issues have been posed for each of tne menti'oned areas
of surrogate parentnood,
mothering.

A. r~D~, in vitro ferti'l i'zati'on ~ and surrogate

Some are summarized as follows:

First, are the new conception technologies an intelligent effort to aid and abet nature to achieve its goals?
Or are these unwarranted depersonalized incursions into a
reproductive process that should be naturally linked to
the interpersonal physi~al act of married physical love
alone?
Second, is the zygote, albeit human-like, less than
fully human? Or i's the zygote a fully human person from
the moment of conception?
Thirdly, do surrogate mothers and male sperm donors
positively serve the family unity of married couples by
helping them have children they so desperately long for?
Or are these third party surrogates and donors to be
viewed as intruders who sever the interpersonal bonds of
married love?
Fourthly, as for the potential of psychological
harm to surrogates, parents, and their children, there
is no disagreement that every precaution should be taken
to forestall such harm.1 23
The formulation of

publi~

policy in a free land has never been

given over totally to those who hold legislative positions.

Every

section of a population is given the opportunity to voice its opi'n.,.
ion.

Inevitably almost every pi'ece of resulting legislation has

been derived from some aspect of some moral code or guideline expressed
in Scripture.

To properly arrive at any law of the land, the views

of the nationLs religious leadership must be given an airing.
Religinus, Moral and Ethical Views
The religious views of the various aspects of surrogate parent123Edward Stevens. Making Moral Decisions (New York:
Press, 1981), pp. 55,56.
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hood differ from group to group.
ticular sect.

Opinions may even vary within a oar-

Opposition to the whole idea of artificial conception

is rather vehement from certain theologians.

Paul Ramsey, Professor

of Religiori at Princeton, voiced his stand like this:
I'd rather every chil d were born illegitimate than
for one to be manufactured. Already women think of themselves as machines of reproduction. Look at the ease
with whi'ch young women have abortions, so sure they can
have another child any time they want. And now women
are selling thei'r bodies for nine months and people
are talking about freezi'ng fertilized eggs. Pretty
soon, a woman will be able to go to the supermarket
and pick out an embryo.124
Dr. Ramsey has been involved in many debates on the subject of
human reproduction and its moral, ethical and religious issues.

His

points of view have been taken into considerati'on in legal writings
such as the University of Detroit Journal of Urban Law.
The Roman Catholic Church is the first relioion to denounce the
artificial experimentation.

In 1959, after Or. Daniele Petrucci announ-

ced to the world his experi'ments with in vitro fertilization, the Vatican~

semiofficial daily

and dessist.
the work.

C~Observatore

Romano, ordered him to cease

Petrucci became very distraught over the implications of

His conversations with Vatican officials implied that he

may have committed a double sin; creating life and then destroyinq it. 125
The underlying methods of the artificial reproduction process are
the cornerstone of the varying theological viewpoints.

These include:

1) masturbation, 2)coitus interruptus, 3) coitus condomatosus, and 4)
124Keane, p. 261.
125Francoeur, p. 57, 58.
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semen obtained after normal coitus.

All of these have a vital role in

the practice of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and
surrogate motherhood.
Catholic theologians look upon masturbation as an act against nature and extremely evil.

IIWasting of the seed ll is also considered a

grave sin by the Orthodox Jews.

For the most part, the Protestants

are not so dogmatic on the method of obtaining semen.
As for coitus interruptus and coitus condomatosus, the various
sects examine the motivation for obtaining the semen.

Few, however,

would have any objection to removing semen from the vagina for analysis.

If the semen were to be used for artificial insemination, it

would be of great concern to the different faiths.
The Catholic viewpoint on artificial insemination was set forth
by Pope Pius XII in 1949.
1.

2.

3.

4.

He listed the following:

The practice of artificial insemination, when concerning
a human being, cannot be considered, either exclusively
or even principally, from the biological and medical
view, while ignoring that of morality and of right.
Artificial insemination, outside marriage, is to be
condemned purely and simply as immoral.
The Natural Law and the Divine Positive Law lay
down that the procreation of new life may be the fruit
of marriage only ...
Artificial insemination in marriage, but produced by
the active element of a third person, is eaually immoral, and, as such,.to be condemned outright.
The husband and the wife have alone a reciprocal right
over their bodies in order to engender new life.
As to the lawfulness of artificial insemination in
marriage, 1et it suffi ce for the moment that we reca 11
to your minds these principles oT the Natural Law:
the mere fact that the result envisaqed is attained
by this means, does not justify the use oT the means
itself, nor is the desire of the husband and wife
to have a chi 1d - in itself a very 1eaitimate des ire - suffi cient to prove the 1eqitimacy of havi nq
recourse to artificial insemination, which would fulfill this desire. It would be wrong to hold that the

,
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possibility of having recourse to this means would
render valid the marriaqe between persons incapable
of contracting it because of impedimentum impotentaie.
On the other hand, there is no need to point
out that the active element can never lawfully be
procured by acts contrary to nature.
11.1 thouqh one cannot excl ude new methods Ila pr;ori simply'because they are new, nevertheless, as
reqards artificial insemination, not only is extreme
caution called for, but the matter must be absolutely
dismissed. In speakinq thus, we do not imply that
the use of certain artificial means solely destined
either to facilitate the natural act or to cause the
natural act normally accomplished to attain its end,
are necessarily forbidden.
Let it not be forqotten that the procreation of
new life according to the will and plan of the Creator,
alone brings with it and to an astonishinq decree of
perfection, the realization of the ends pursued.
Donor insemination would be considered adultery
if one or both parties were married and fornication if
both were single. Even though no physical pleasure
were obtained such actions are contrary to nature and
consequently are forbidden. The Holy Father has also
forbidden any attempts to unite sperm and ovum in
vitro.126
ll

For the Catholic, who is true to his faith and reverences the leadership of the Pope, any form of A.I. is morally and ethically wrong.
Pope Pius XII made this statement at a convention for Italian midwives:
liTo reduce the cohabitation of married persons and the conjuqal act
to a mere organic function for the transmission of the qerm of life
would be to convert the domestic hearth, sanctuary of the family, into
nothing more than a biological laboratory.1I127
Pope Pius XII is not the only Pope to speak out aqainst the efforts of science in behalf of human reproduction.

Pope John Paul II

has this to say:
126Wilford J. Finegold. Artificial Insemination (Springfield:
Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1976), pp. 80-82
127Turner, p. 463.
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We are well aware, ladies and gentlemen, that the
future of man and mankind is threatened, radically threatened, despite very noble intentions, by men of science.
And it is menaced because the tremendous results of their
research and their discoveries, especially reoarding natural science, have been and continue to be exploited -to the prejudice of ethical imperatives -- for ends which
have nothing to do with the prerequisites of science, but
with the ends of destruction and death ... This can be verified as well in the realm of genetic manipulations and
biological experiments as well as in those of chemical,
bacteriological, or nuclear armaments. 128
Ironically, the attorney who is the spearheading influence for
surrogate mothering is a Catholic.

His basic attitude toward the pre-

ceeding statements and views of the leadership of his faith is somewhat defiant.
There are those who do not like the idea of surrogate
mothers one bit.
One is Pope llohn Paul, II ... He attacked the harmful
effects of progress IIthat cares more for itself than for
man for whom it must serve. Scientific progress cannot
pretend to place itself in a sort of neutral ground,"
My reaction to the Pope is ... For a million years
mankind has progressed by learning to master nature in
one respect or another. Are we now to draw a line and
say, IINo farther ?129
ll

Keane also includes the opinion of his pastor.

He states that the pas-

tor says it is too early for the church to have an opinion.

Reoardless

of what the Church decides, Keane says it will not bother him, he will
follow his own conscience.
Bishop Thomas C. Kellogg, general secretary of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, believes the position taken by him on
128Nicholas Wade, IIPope Issues Warning to Scientists,1I Science,
27 June 1980, p. 1441.
129Keane, p. 20-21.

92

test-tube babies also applies to surrogate parenting.

He states,

"Christian morality has insisted upon the importance of protecting the
process by which human life is transmitted.

The fact that science now

has the ability to alter the process significantly does not mean that,
morally speaking, it has the right to do so.11130
It

is a well known fact that among "good" Catholics, when the Holy

Father gives an encyclical announcement it is an accepted law to the
members of the faith.

Could it be that those (Catholics) who are deep-

ly involved and committed to the surrogate parenting phenomenon would
indeed defy all that is holy to conduct their business?
The overwhelminq view of the Catholic leadership is that surrogate parentinCJ in any form is morally and ethically wrongl

Dr. Charles

J. McFadden is extremely dogmatic in his view and states:
... It is repulsive to every decent tendency of human
nature, and it certainly bears witness to unnatural
extremes to which science based on materialistic philosophy will go ... It is impossible to imagine a
Christian woman submitting to such an unnatural act."
According to the teachings of sound ethics, it is a
principle of Natural Law that a woman has no right to
receive i'nto her vagi na the semen of any man except her
husband ... Institution of marriage is primarily sosocial in its objective, and for this institution to
achieve the adequate and proper conservation of the
race, offspring must be born only of couples united
in marriage. The fact that some couples are incapable of having children does not confer upon them
an authorization to infringe upon the divinely-established unity of marriage. 131
Another Catholic authority is Gerald Kelley, S.J., who claims that

130Ibid. p. 262.
131Finegold, p. 82.
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there neither has been nor can be controversy among Catholic moralists
concerning artificial procreation.

He says, "They are definitely and

certainly immoral because they violate the natural law, which limits
the right to generate to married people and which demands that this
right be exercised personally and not by proxy."132
The Catholic Church leaves no room for a loose interpretation of
its position.

However, this is not true of the Jewish sect. Rabbi Sey-

mour Sigel of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York
City contends, "if the Cjoal is to provide an infertile couple with
children, surrogate motherhood is morally unobjectionable,,,133
In contrast to this opinion, another Jewish scholar, J. Jakobouits,
summarizes the rabbinic attitude as:
By reducing human generation to stud-farming
methods, A.I.D. severs the link between the procreation of children and marriage, indispensible
to the maintenance of the family as the most basic
and sacred unit of human society. It would enable
women to satisfy their craving for children without
the necessity to have homes and husbands. 134
Rabbi Emanuel Rachman interprets the Jewish as being extremely
liberal in their view of A.I.D.

He states that a woman would not be

guilty of adultery nor would the child be illegitimate.
ted in his view by Dr. Solomon B. Freehof.

He is suppor-

They both agree that the

possibility of incest throuCjh marriages between offsprinq is very minimal and should be viewed as a practical problem rather than a moral
one .135
132Ibid.

133Markoutsas, p. 72.

134Turner, pp. 461, 462.
135Ibid.

94

The difference of opinion among Jewish leaders is the result of
the division of the faith - Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform.

Rab-

bis of each persuasion will interpret the Jewish law differently.

Dr.

Freehof writes:
As for the Orthodox point of view on the question,
it is veering increasingly toward disapproval. The
chief element in the negative attitude is not the status of the woman or the child, but the process of obtaining the seed. Most of the more recent discussions
consider the taking of the seed to be a sinful act,
and the fact that some of the seed is bound to be wasted
is also sinful .
... The Orthodox scholars generally admit that
the injection of the seed of a stranger is not an adulterous act, and therefore the woman IS relationship to
her husband is not thereby impaired ...
Since the operation is not deemed to be adulterous,
the child that is born of it is not illegitimate. Furthermore, even if the seed is not taken from the husband
but from some donor, the child is not deemed to be the
child of the donor but of the woman, and therefore belongs to her family ...
... Artificial insemination is therefore favored
if both the husband and wife wish it. It is preferable,
of course for the seed to be taken from the husband,
but even if a stranger is the donor, there is no objection.
Nor is the insemination objectionable even if the
donor is not Jewish. Actually, there may be some advantage in that fact. For while legally the resultinq
child is not deemed to be the child of the donor but
of its mother, nevertheless there would be some biological, hereditary kinship between that child and
the children of the donor in his own marriage. In
that case, if the donor is Gentile, the likelihood is
far less that the child born of the insemination might
some day marry one of his own blood kin ..• 136
With these divided opinions on surrogate parenting, individual
rabbis will advise couples to follow the dictates of their own consciences.

Orthodox rabbis base their opposition on grounds of adultery

(donor and doctor as well as husband and wife are included in this
136Finegold, pp. 84,85.
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charge); in addition, they hold that the offspring is illeqitimate and
that the child's genealogy is in doubt.

The most crinservative main-

tain that the husband should leave the wife and that she has an obligation to forfeit the Ketuah, the money settlement that would be owed
her in the event of death or divorce. 137
The Protestant sect is just as diverse in its opinion as the Jewish sect.

In 1945, the Archbishop of Canterbury appointed a thirteen

member commission to examine fully all the theological, moral, legal,
social, and psychological issues surrounding human artificial reproduction.

Every member of the commission except one confirmed that A.I.D.

was immoral.

They stated that the practice contravenes the personal

character of procreation, the essential nature of marriage and the
family, as well as the best interest of society.138
An opposing opinion has been voiced by the American Anglican
Church priest, Dr. Joseph Fletcher.

He contends the A.I.D. is not a

violation of the marital bonds, and lists his objections:
1)
2)

3)

Marriage is not a physical monopoly.
Mutual consent by husband and wife protects against
the accusation of broken faith.
The donor~s relationship to the wife is completely
impersonal. 139

Concerning surrogate motherhood, the executive secretary of the
American Council of Christian Churches, B. Robert Briscoe states:
The parties involved have not sought God~s will in
the matter. To circumvent God's law simply so that cre137Blais, p. 138.
138Turner, p. 462.
139 Tbi d.
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ation may come about and to say it is scientific progress,
that it is better to have a little than none (of the birth
process) is wrong. God may have seen fit that none was
the better part. We would raise our voice to protest the
surrogate mother, and would pray that the Lord qive understanding to couples involved in childless marriaqes, and
that scientists and practioners within the field of genetics be aware of the grave responsibilities of turninq
the events from what may prove to be God's choice for
barren individuals to man~s choice, to which there is
no comparison. 140
Varying opinions of clergymen were set forth by Finegold as a result of a survey he conducted regarding A.I.D.

An Episcopalian priest

believes there is a divergency of opinion among Protestants because the
Bible does not specifically address A.I.D.
is not solely to achieve pregnancy.

He states that the marriaqe

Scripture nowhere condemns a man

or his wife for failure to conceive and produce.

The core of the mar-

riage is the love and devotion of one to the other, and a third party
would break that bond,

The use of donor semen would split the relation-

ship and the resulting offspring would be illeqitimate,
Another Protestant minister declares A.I.D. to be adultery.

His

belief is that although a childless marriage is a misfortune for a
husband and wife, it is compatable to the Christian life.
and partnership should not be alienated by a donor.

He believes to be-

come a father by proxy is disrupting Godts order of life.
couples must accept grief as

God~

Their love

Sterile

will, understand this and content

themselves with a childless marriage.
A Protestant scholar expressed his opinion as, "God presents a donor with procreative powers, but He did not intend that morals should
140Keane, p. 262.
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taint this Lord-given potency to be utilized by an abnormal procedure
such as artificial insemination.

This action on the part of a supplier

of spermatozoa, therefore, deserves severe moral condemnation,"141
Finegold relates that the opinion of liberal Protestant Church
leaders in the Pittsburg area was quite different.
position was the intent of the couple.

The thrust of their

Science has fashioned a new

method for infertile couples to Hfind the joy God intended them to have
with children who are really their own.
for motherhood.

The Lord has encouraged women

Science has been helped by God to find a new way to

grant to wives the glory of conception (A.I.D.) and procreation.

No

church and no law should be permitted to take these God-qiven riqhts
away from these women. "142
Joseph Fletcher, author of The Ethics of Genetic Control'. is a
strong advocate of the liberal viewpoint.
not at conception but at birth.

He argues, "A person beqins

Artificial insemination and surrogate

mothering are tasks of tenderness,

Why shouldnkt we share our repro-

ductive resources, just as we share our educational and economic ones?
We ought to love our neighbors, we ought to help them.
portant part of our humaneness,

That is an im-

Now we are able to give help of a far

more intimate and personal sort. N143
Some Protestant churches have not committed themselves on the issue.

The American Lutheran Church has elected to wait until more in-

formation is available.
141Finegold, p. 87.
143Keane, p. 261,

142Ibid .
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The ethical and moral questfons of the surrogate parenting would
involve such aspects as "celebrity seed,lI

A man and wife would select

a sperm and an egg from a favorite sports star, actor, actress, or any
favorite personality.

The egg and sperm would be cultured in vitro

and then the embryo could be implanted in the womb of the wife,

Or,

if the wife did not want to be troubled with the pregnancy, a surrogate
mother could be hired to carry the embryo to term, give birth and then
surrender the infant to the adoptive parents.

This would lead one to

ask, "Who gets the Mother IS Day Card? I,
One doctor writes:
The moral and ethical values of both doctors and laymen are changing so fast that it is hard to know what will
be accepted or condemned 10 years from now,., Until 25
years have passed. ,. the rightness or wrongness of A.I,O.
will not become clear ...
. ,.r believe 0ithout reservation that the future of
the potential child should be of first consideration ...
Unjustified A.I.D. can lead to unhappiness and feelings
of inadequacy on the part of the husband and may negatfve1y
affect the marriage as well as the husbandks relationship
with the chi1d.144
The concern for the outcome of the child is foremost in the whole concept of surrogate parenting.

What is implicated is the integrity of

that individual as a unique entity.

How will that person relate to his

own physical being and to his history?

A human individual to some ex-

tent, believes himself to belong to himself, to be responsible to himself, to be determined by things that are uniquely his own,
" .But this sense of individuality is related not only
to uniqueness but to randomness, to the unpredictable materialization of that particular one out of a great many
144Herbert W. Horne, Jr. "Artificial Insemination, Donor~ An Issue of Ethi ca 1 and Moral Values, II New Eng1 and Journa'l of MeMci ne 293
(October 23, 1975):873,874.
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possibilities which both produces and expresses the uniqueness. These concepts converge to make up the notion of an
individual as a "self" who had not been totally programmed
or fabricated, who is unique. 145
"What is becoming of the human race?" is a questi on whi ch coul d
become a real concern for future generations.

With the scientific

knowledge now available and the attitudes of some of those (individuals and organizations) herein mentioned it is possible that humanity
could become so depersonalized that the human life would be of no va1ue.

It is conceivable that the demand for surrogate mothers, reqard-

less of the fertility status of the couples, could be

~reater

than the

in vitro intramarita1 process.
Leon Kass made the following argument before the Ethics Advisory
Board of the Department of Health, Education, and

~Jelfare:

The principle truly at work here is not to provide
married couples with a child of their own, but to provide
anyone who wants one with a child, by whatever possible
or convenient means. 146
Kass' main concern is that "making babies" this way will further
deva 1ue the "humanness

U

and change the meani ng of "our embodiment, our

sexual being, and our relations to our ancestors and descendants."
child would be uncertain about his IJfather" and his Hneage,

The

"Clarity

about our origin is crucial for self-identity, itself important for
self-respect.

A donor egg or sperm makes for confusion for the child. II

Kass contends that the use of surroqate mothers severs the covenant
145Charles Fried. "Ethical Issues in Existing and Emerqing Techniques for Improving Human Fertility,1I Law and Ethics of AID and Embryo
Transfer. (New York: Ciba Foundation Symposium 17, Tne Netherlands by
Movton & Co., 1973), pp. 42-43.
146Moore, "Human In Vitro Fertilization," p. 444.
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which united sexuality, procreation and love.

Beyond the issue of

the commercialization of the procreative function is the deeper denial
of the meaninq and value of one~s own body, the using of ft as a mere
incubator for another, and the breaking of the bond among sexuality~
love and procreatfon. 147
The outcome of the child is a real concern fn A.I,D. one donor
said:
They Ire not my chil dren. But, they are in a way, I
guess ... 11m Catholic. I was going to be a priest ...
I believe in God. I belteve in Jesus Christ ... I don~t
te 11 my male fri'ends. I don ht trust them enough. It
mtght come out at a party ..• I always wonder how many
babies live produced, but I"ve never asked. After this
fi rs t time 1 was here, the gi rl in the 1ab said, tlWe I've
had a success.
Wow, I didnlt think in terms of myself
as a father ... Later, you~d be sttttng down and wondering, "How many times have I been a father?H I wish one
day I could see them, If you have a child, even if itls
just an affatr, you want to return to see. I always
wonder if my son or daughter will turn out to be a great
athlete. 148
1I

The concern of a father for a child ts present in the donorhs thinkinq,
There will always be that psychological ~spect which wtll bear upon the
question of the moral tty or the ethics of surrogate parenting.
Another area of the surrogate parenting ethics involves the sinqle
person.

Single parenthood is becoming a real tty as unwed pregnant

young women decide to keep their children rather than offer them for
adoption or to have an abortion.

The divorce rate is addtng to thts

total because the seperating husband or wife, for some damaging reason,
has been IIturned off ll to marriage but not to parenthood.
147Ibid.
148Fleming, p. 23.
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One divorcee in California, a thirty-seven-year-old nurse, dectded she wanted a child and has been looking for someone who would
inseminate a single woman.

She is now doinq herself with the help of

the Feminist Women IS Health Center in Los Angeles.

She pays thirty-

eight dollars for a syringe frozen in dry ice at the Southern California Cryobank, a commercial sperm bank.

She relates:

Every time I make this trip, 11m terrified of being
stopped by the highway patrol. What could I say? "Gee
officer, live got this sperm here and its melting and
I've got to get home.
But I like doing it at home, in
my own bed.149
1t

Another single woman, Joyce Newton, who is a principal of a
school in California has a son who is the product of donor insemination.
I would like women to know that this is definitely
an alternative to marriage. I never rule out marriaae,
but I don~t need to be married, I own my own house, I
maRe over $30,000 a year ... I am going back to try again ... I don~t care if its the same father. Ihd just
feel comfortable if my son had a brother or sister brouaht
into the world the same way, That would give them something to share. 150
Artificial insemination provides parenthood for almost anyone,
Single women can become pregnant without the act of sexual intercourse.
Single men may become fathers without sexual intercourse by hiring a
surrogate mother who will submit to the A.I.

But, A.I. has also open-

ed the moral and ethical situation for homosexuals to become parents,
It is estimated that more than one-hundred, fifty lesbian women
conceive through A.r.D. each year.
I49Ibid.

I50rbid.

Although many clinics will not
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perform the operation if it is known that they are homosexual.

A

group of lesbians in Northern California formed a support organization and produced two ci rcul ars entitl ed,

II~Joman

Controll ed Concep-

tion" and "Artificial Insemination, an Alternative Conception for
the Lesbian and Gay Community.

II

These pamphlets were distributed

to others with instructions of how it could be done with turkey basters and eyedroppers.

They have had Npositive N results and many

are pregnant from the sperm of homosexual men.

The men have aareed

to be available should the child ever want to see them.
One homosexual man tells of his feelings about A.I. and his donating sperm.
The most important reason to me is that, being a
homosexual man, I donht want to feel that I~m not part
of procreation. It I,S very exci ti ng to me to think my
attributes can continue and in a very exciting way, not in
the traditional nuclear-family context, but at the frontier of new kinds of famiHes. Also, some day I hope to
have children, if it becomes more acceptable for lesbians
to become mothers, then perhaps the next step is for homosexual men to be fathers. Perhaps in the f~ture some woman will donate her womb for my child.150
If there were a public policy controlling these types of arrangements,
would it be considered a violation of his rights to be a parent?

It

is evident that in his definition, the family is a community project.
From what he has said, one could conclude that homosexuality is a
Ilrace" of people rather than deviant people.

His idea is seeminfjly to

procreate homosexual men with homosexual women, thus, keepinq the
blood line pure.
150Ibid.
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Some lesbians argue that they would like to experience the joy
of giving birth and motherhood just the same as II straight ll ladies do.
Artificial insemination has made it emotionally easier for them.

One

Oakland couple, a black woman named Bobbi, and a white woman named
Lynn secured donor sperm from Lynnls brother and inseminated the IIwife"
Bobbi.
a baby.

Lynn says, IlTherels just no way I would ever be able to have
That IS for women, I mean for Bobbi.

But T knew I wanted my

own blood."152
Regarding the ethics of single parenthood through A.I"
can Medical Association has not taken a stand.

the Ameri-

However, for most doc-

tors, the question of the childl.s well-being is of the utmost concern,
Dr. Wayne Decker, New York Fertility Research Foundation, says,

1I, • •

to

me, the kind of family community the child will be born into is more
important than the mother I s or father I'S sexual preference. 11153
Another physician, Dr. Simon Henderson, Chief of WomenLs Health
and Fertility Clinic at San Francisco General Hospital, states, III have
personal reservations.

We donLt know enough about the rearing of chil-

dren in a lesbian household. N154
Medical science has unleashed upon this world an alternative to
procreation as lethal as the atom bomb.

The sad part is that a nation

can stop the production of bombs, but there may be no means by which
surrogate parenthood, artificial insemination, single parenthood. or
in vitro fertilization can be stopped.

The demand is so greatl

152Di ane K. Shah wi th Linda Walters, "Lesbi an Mothers, II
12 February 1979, p. 61.
153Ibid.

154Ibid.

Leqis-

Newsweek.
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lation may be too little, too late,
Legislative Proposals
Noel Keane, the Detroit attorney, has stated that he intends to
press the issue of surrogate parenting in the courts until the Supreme
Court of the United States makes a ruling.

The legislators, both state

and national, would be compelled to formulate and adopt laws for the
regulation of the procedure.

He even advocates that people want this

so badly, that each "s tate would make it widely available by paying
for it and by regulating it. "155
Mr. Keane may well get his wish.

One lawyer says that the law

will not be forced into a hasty, premature decision.

He states that

lias with all other scientific achievements, the law response to artificial insemination has been, and will be, 'perfect horror; skepticism;
curiosity; and then acceptance ."156
I

The Yale Law Review has stated:
... Donor insemination comes to typify a broad problem for church and court and leqislating men, It is a
case study in the techniques of change. The hap-hazard
legal treatment it has received illustrates the need for
creating some system for measuring the effectiveness of
our social regulation and for better adjusting it to the
phenomenon of change. " Clearly the ensuing struggle will
be rife with danger for doctor and for patient until artificial insemination shall have made its peace with the
law. 157
For many legal authorities the lack of legislation in these early
stages is positive.

They feel that science would not be free to prove

its hypotheses if it were regulated by law.

Neither would it be allow-

ed the opportunity of quiet failure and abandonment.
155Keane, p. 264.

156Finegold, p. 65.

Some contend that

157Ibid., P. 64.
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the only guide necessary for this procedure is the conscience of the
husband and wife and the attending physician.
A few years ago during a joint session of a joint medical-legal
conference in Chi cago, a 1awyer stated, IIWe need no special 1aws.
less said about it the better.

The

If people want children and are satis-

fied with them, whose business is it how and when they were begotten?1I158
At present, the illegal procedures resulting from surrogate parenting are mountainous.

Falsified medical reports, falsified birth

certificates, falsified hospital records. and falsified insurance
claims have all been produced to cover up the surrogate parenting, baby-selling phenomenon.
Dr. Stuart Abel has suggested various steps to create adequate
legislation and suggested the following:
Any child conceived and born as a result of the impregnation of his mother by artificial insemination by a
duly licensed physician or under his advice and direction,
and upon the written consent of herself and her husband,
shall have all rights, privileges. and obligations of a
child conceived and born as the result of impregnation
through sexual intercourse of the husband and wife; and
no evidence concerning such artificial insemination shall
be received in any action at 1aw, inequity, or other
legal proceeding which in any way may impair his rights,
privileges, or obligations. 159
Another legal expert, Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher, favors the adoption
of legislation.

He states:

.. . But since there is no sanctioning statute the
threat constantly hangs over the head of patients and
doctors that according to the interpretation of some
158Ibid., p. 65.

159Ibid., p. 66,
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antique statute, even as old as the Ten Commandments,
some reacti~nary jurist will rule that an illegal aci
is being performed. If so, the woman becomes an adulteress, the child illegitimate and perhaps the doctor
an accomplice in an illegal action. 160
In any discussion of the legal questions of A.I.D, and surrogate
mothering, the pre-eminent issue is that of the child.
centers around the legitimacy:
real mother.

The concern

who is the real father, or who is the

In the U.S., California, Georgia, and Oklahoma have

passed legislation which declares the child to be the legitimate child
of the wife and her husband provided the husband has given his written
consent.

Legislation for this purpose has been rejected in Indiana,

Minnesota, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Ohio rejected a bill

which declared the whole process to be a criminal act.161
Many European countries have begun to adopt legislation for both
A.I. and surrogate mothering based on medical research:

England has

already made declarations which could provide guidelines for U,S, declarations.

In England, a child born to a married woman by A.I.D. is

declared to be the child of the wife and a man, whose identity is unknown except to the doctor, and not of the husband and wife.

The birth

certificate will state that the child is illegitimate and the husband
and wife must apply to adopt.

However, this cannot be done immediately.

The mother cannot give consent for adoption until the child is six
160Ibid., p. 67.
161This Bill was introduced in 1955 and was tabled. It read as
follows: "No woman shall undergo donor artificial insemination, nor
shall any person execute artificial donor insemination or assist in it
with any woman in this State.. Any chil d so born is ill eqitimate. Whosoever violates this law shall be subject to a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars and to a term of imprisonment of not less than one
year and not exceeding five years. (Finegold, p. 71).

107
weeks old.

Also, the adoptive parents must have the child in their

continuous posession and care for at least ninety days after the child
is six weeks old.

In this situation, the child is nearly five months

old before the adoption can take place.

When the child is older, he

must be told that he is adopted. 162
In America, the outstanding case attempting to legitimize A.I.D.
children is People v. Sorenson.

This was the nation's first case in

which a divorced woman's former husband was charged with the criminal
non-support of their A.r.D. chi1d. 163 This case was tried in California.
Another state, Oregon, has adopted what is possibly the most comprehensive legislation of any state.

Under ORS 677.360, only licensed

physicians or persons under their supervision may select semen donors.
The semen must be analyzed at the outset to determine the quantity,
normality, and motility of the sperm cells .
ORS 677.370 provides that no person who suffers a known
disease, genetic defect, or venereal disease may donate semen to be used in artificial insemination.
ORS 677.365(1) The written consent of a woman and her
husband, if she is married, is required before she may be
artificially inseminated.
ORS 677.365(2) Upon the birth of the child the attending physician must file this consent with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. 164
The most significant Oregon artificial insemination statute is
1620liver M. Stone, "English Law in Relation to A.I.D." Ciba
Foundation Sympos ium 17: p. 71 ..
163Turner, p. 466.
164Harris, pp. 927, 928.
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ORS 109.243, which provides as follows:
The relationship, rights and obligations between a
child born as a result of artificial insemination and the
mother1s husband shall be the same to all legal intents
and purposes as if the child had been naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother1s husband if the husband consented to the performance of artificial insemination. 165
Another important aspect of the Oregon law is Section 109.243 which
makes the child as legitimate to the consenting husband as one of his
natura 1 offspri ng.

It prov ides for the chil d the 1ega 1 protecti on as

a natural child.
ORS 109.239 serves to sever any and all legal relationships between the donor and the offspring.

It negates any rights, obligations,

or interests the one may have in the other.

This is done because no

chil dis entitl ed to the parental support and nurturing of two sets of
parents.

Oddly, even though this Oregon law is quite thorough, it does

not provide any guidance where the insemination of an unmarried woman
is evident.

However, it is implied in ORS 677.365 which reads:

HArti-

ficial insemination shall not be performed upon a woman without her
prior written request and, if she is married, the prior written consent of her husband.166 At the time of this writing the Oregon State
Law herein stated is receiving proposed statutory amendments.
Concerning surrogate mothering, Oregon has no laws expressly addressing the issue.
which involved the

There is one case of note in Oregon, however,
surrogate~s

165Harris, p. 930.
166Ibid., p. 934 .

registration in the hospital under the

109
adoptive wife "s name.

In thi s case, Cutts v. Cutts, the coupl e had

paid for all medical expenses and the child was turned over to them.
They later divorced and when the origin of the child was revealed, the
custody which had been granted Mr. Cutts, was revoked, and the child
was made a ward of the court.

Custody was later returned to him.167

It should be noted that Oregon law does not address itself to
the contracts which may be drawn between the surrogate and adoptive
parents.

Once the surrogate is obtained, however, nothing prohibits

an attorney from handling documents which pertain to adoption.
As for compensation, Oregon does not presently have a statute
that forbids payment to any person involved in an adoption.

However,

based on the rulings of the Michigan Courts and the opinion of Kentucky's Attorney General, Oregon's public policy demands that no compensation be paid to the surrogate mother.

Any payment to the surrogate

impairs her initial consent to adoption.

Therefore. compensation for

the surrogate induces baby selling and damages the adoptive

couple~s

rights to the child. 168
Oregon is probably making the greatest efforts to establish legislation.

However, California is also examining proposals for regulation

of surrogate parenting.
Until 1981, there were no completed surrogate arrangements known
in California.
interest.

Early in that year there was an increase in the public

It was brought to full attention when a surrogate mother

167Ibid., P. 942.
168Ibid., p. 947.

110

living in Los Angeles, refused to relinquish her baby to the New York
couple for whom she bore the child.

Again, the court decision in Ken-

tucky and Michigan greatly influenced the California legislature.
Under California law, the surrogate mother, as the natural mother,
may place the child for adoption by the

donor~s

wife.

In Kentucky and

Michigan a donor can establish himself as the father, but, in California, the laws not only fail to provide a means whereby he can declare
himself the father, but effectively preclude him from doing so.169
Because he is not married to the surrogate and does
not intend to be, the donor can establish his paternity
by only one method. Subsecti on 7004 Ca)( 4) presumes him
to be the natural father of the child if he receives
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child. This method invokes two potential
dangers ... First, the surrogate may refuse to relinquish
custody at birth so that the donor may not be able to
receive the child into his home ... Second, despite the
fact that the donor does receive the child openly into
his home as his own, if the surrogate is married or was
married within 300 days prior to the birth, her husband
is also presumed the natural father. 170
Another obstacle which would hinder a donor's adoption of a child
through a surrogate relationship is that California's artificial insemination statute denies parental rights to the donor of semen used in
the artificial insemination of a woman other than his wife.
be circumvented if the

surrogate~

This may

husband did not give written consent,

or, if after the birth he denied the child was his, the donor could
then establish his paternity.17l The existing California statutes are
now being revised to accomodate surrogate mothering.
169Ellen Lassner Vanltoften, USurrogate Motherhood in California:
Legislative Proposals," San Diego Law Review 18 (March 1981): 347.,
170Ibid., p. 357.

171Ibid., pp. 367,368.
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Compensatiun for surrogates in California amounts to selling babies.

However, as long as the donorhs payment to the surrogate is in-

dependent of his wifeLg adoption procedure, it would be permissable.
This involves California Penal Code Section 273{a) and Section 181. 172
Since neither the Constitutional nor judicial precedent calls for
permitting payment to surrogate mothers, Amending sections 273{a) and
181 could cast judicial and social dissatisfaction upon surrogate motherhood itself. 173 The surrogates presently volunteer for a variety
of non-financial reasons.

Legislation providing for their compensa-

tion may encourage a host of women to become surrogates simply for the
money.
Van Hoften suggests the following in regard to the California Pena1 Code:
Although a number of legal obstacles presently
discourage surrogate motherhood in California by ham~
pering the semen donorLs efforts to establish his pa~
ternity, minor legislative modifications would enable
infertile couples to have children through the use of
a surrogate. The repeal of Evidence Code Section 621
would remove a major barrier to the donorLs claim to pa~
ternity, while its policy objectives would be met by the
rebuttable presumptions of Civil Code Section 7004(a),
The donor should be given standing to rebutt those presumptions and the opportunity to introduce appropriate
evidence to do so. Under a new section of the Uniform
Parentage Act, he could acknowledge his paternity before or after the child~s birth. Under an amendment to
the artificial insemination statute his written agreement with the surrogate would manifest their intent that
in this case the semen donor be treated as the legal and
natural father of the child. Modifying Penal Code Sections
273(a) and 181 is neither necessary nor desirable. Because the current practice of surrogate motherhood suggests new, as yet unanswered questions, the legislature
172Ibid., p. 372.
173Ibid., p. 379.
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should leave the details of each transaction to the parties
involved. The proposed amendments are sufficient to permit
surrogate motherhood as a legal childbearing option. 174
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, through the office of the Attorney
General, Steven L. Beshear, has been involved in a long, standing
battle with Surrogate Parenting Associates over the legality of IIselling babies. H Mr. Beshear has provided a brief survey of those Kentucky
statutes which may be interpreted to pertain to surrogate mothering.
He contends that the contract between the surrogate and the adoptive
parents is illegal and unenforceable as a result of three Kentucky
statutes.
KRS 199.500(5): NIn no case shall an adoption be granted
or a consent for adoption be held valid if such consent
for adoption is given prior to the fifth day after the
birth of the child. Nl75
This statute would negate any contract which is processed during the
arrangement stage of the procedure prior to the insemination or any
time prior to five days after the birth.

Although a contract drawn

up prior to the five day waiting period might be considered, the strong
public policy would prevent it from being enforceable.
The parties concerned may choose another avenue which has been
followed by Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.

This involves a con-

tract in which the surrogate and her husband agree to terminate their
parental rights at the end of the five days.

This is covered under

I74Van Hoften, p. 385.
I75Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky,
"An Opinion Concerning the Legality of Surrogate Parenthood," (See
Appendix

n.
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KRS 199. 601-199.617.

However, there is a penalty clause which is

found under KRS 199.900(5), and which states that in case of willful
violation there is a fine of not less than twenty dollars nor more than
two hundred dollars or imprisonment for no more than thirty days.
Mr. Beshear believes that the strongest legal prohibition aqainst
surrogate parenting in Kentucky is the strong public policy aqainst the
buying and selling of children.

He cites several cases in other states:

Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957); Matter of Adoption of a
Child by LT., 307 P 2d 341 (N.J. 1978); In re Shirk"s Estate, 350 P.2d
1 (Kan. 1960); Rennche v. First National Bank of Nevada, 512 F. 2d 187
(9th Cir. 1975).176
In Kentucky, much of this public policy has been
embodied in statute. KRS 199.590(2) states:
"No person, agency or institution not licensed by the department may charge a fee or
accept remuneration for the procurement of
any child for adoption purposes. N
The penalty provision for violation of KRS 199.590 is
found in KRS 199.900(4) and states that any person who
violates the statute shall be fined not less than $500
nor more than $2,000 or imprisoned for not more than
six months or both.177
Accordingly, Mr. Beshear points out that no business, person, or organization can advertise children for adoption.

Included also is the warn-

ing that if they carry ads for such, a newspaper or publication which
is published in Kentucky, they are in violation of statute KRS 190.590
(1).

His conclusion is:
... It is the oplnlon of this office that because
of the existence of the above-mentioned Kentucky sta~
176Ibid., p. 4

177Ibid.
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tutes and the strong public policy against the buying
and selling of children, contracts invo1vinq surrogate
parenting are illegal and unenforceable in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.178
A proposal for the leqa1ization of surrogate parentina contracts
submitted in the California Law Review .
... Contracts to bear a child, if properly requlated,
pose no serious threat to social interests and should be
permitted ...
As a cond it i on of 1ega 1ity and enforceabil ity, a11
contracts should be required to provide for adequate life
and health insurance. A copy of the contract, a doctor~s
report on the physical condition of the carrier, and the
results of a blood test, should then be presented for review to an official of the State Department of Health,
This official should witness the signing of the contract
and ffie it with the court. Once the agreement is sign~
ed, the consent of the mother to the u1 timate pl acement
of the child according to contract terms could not be
withdrawn except by court approval or by mutual consent.,
After the baby~s birth, the court could order a
finding of the parent-child relationship between the contract couple and the child. A copy of the order which
would be sent to the State Registrar, who, upon app1ica~
tion of the contracting couple or the carrier, would issue a new birth certificate.
The proposed system wou1 d not require extensive
statutory modificati·on. If the contract was provided
for in a independent enabling section, that section
could also provide that the contract, conforming to
the statutory requirements would be valid and enforceable,
not withstanding conf1 icting provisions of law, In order
to facil itate proof of parentage ~ the conclusive presumption of secti on 621 of the Evid91ce Code shou1 d be modified to except the baby contract situation, and section
700s of the Parentage Act should be modified to exclude
situations where the donor provides semen specifically
to father the child,
The proposed modifications could also be implemented with minimum expenses by using the existing procedures and personnel of the State Department of Health
to supervise the contracting process~179
178Ibid., p. 7.
179Elizabeth A. Erickson, "Contracts to Bear A Child,1I California
Journal t 1978) : 621-622.
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California is not progressing in legislation pertaining to surrogate
parenthood as rapidly as the phenomenon is growing.
The state of Michigan, on the other hand, is making some proqress
in the legislature.

Noel Keane states that there is now support to

draft bills on surrogate parenting in both houses of the Michigan Leqislature.

He has been asked by State Senator George S. Hart (Dearborn)

and State Representative Richard Fitzpatrick (Battle Creek), as well
as the Family Law Section of the Michigan State Bar Association to
help draft proposed legislation,l80
On October 16, 1981, Representative Fitzpatrick introduced House
Bill No. 5184 to the Michigan House of Representatives. 181

He noted.

"We know that passage of such a law will be controversial, but it is
time to begin."

House Bill No. 5184 is proposed to amend existinq leg-

islation as it pertains to adoption.

The specific legislation to be

amended is sections 44 and 54 of Chapter X of Act N. 288 of the Public
Acts of 1939, Act No, 296 of the Public Acts of 1974. sections 710.44
and 710-54 of the Compiled Laws of 1970.
The Bill establishes that the ages of both the surrogate mother
and the biological father must be at least eighteen and either of them
can be single or married.

It provides guidelines for the examination

by an agent of the adoptive parents to guarantee a proper home for the
child.

180Keane, p. 267.
18lS ee Appendix No.8.
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Section 75(1) (C), liThe Permanence As A Family Unit Of The Petitionerls Home," seems to be an area which in itself will provide controversy for the Bill.

Section 76(1) establishes that a Nsing1e natu-

ra1 father may enter into a surrogate parenthood agreement.
II

Does

this mean that the courts will be forced to define a Ifami1y"?

Will

the "family unit" be established as a single parent household?

It

is

foreseeable that this section could create as much furor as the concept of surrogate parenting.

The Bill could be interpreted as a

double threat to the sanctity of the traditional family by (1) allowing for the legality of surrogate parenting, (2) allowing the court
to define what constitutes a family, and (3) allowing the court to
determine what would constitute a "home l'.
Section 77 of the Bill provides for a deed to be drawn between
the surrogate and the natural father acknowledging the paternity of
the child in the same manner as a deed is drawn for the exchange of
real estate.

This would seem to define the child as a piece of mer-

chandise to be bartered.
Section 81 states that:
At the completion of the surrogate's sixth month of
pregnancy, the judge of probate shall issue an interim
order granting custody, care, and control over the child
to the natural father ••. The interim order shall grant
to the natural father and his spouse the exclusive authority to consent to all medical, surgical, psychological,
educational, and related services for the child. The
interim order shall be effective immediately upon the
birth of the child.
This section poses three questions:

(1) Does it imply that the surro-

gate maintains the exclusive right to make decisions concerning the fetus?

(2)

If, upon birth, the child required immediate medical atten-
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Hon of some nature -:- toe adoptive parents not being present and un.,.
avatlab.le for consent -

is the surrogate then permitted to make the

decision or is it toe responsibility of the attending physician?

(3)

Does this imply that the adoptive parents will assume full responsibility, immediately upon birth, of toe child regardless of its physical, emotional, or mental condition?

These questions will be of vital

concern in any surrogate parenting situation,
Section 87 establishes toe medical guidelines to be followed by
the surrogate.
uations.

These include complete medical and psychological eval-

The surrogate. in this section, is also required to assume

all ri'sks, medical, physical, psychological, which accompany pregnancy.
It allows for abortion, only upon the recommendation of the insemina-

ting physician, if her health is threatened.
Section 88 establishes the guidelines for the natural father and
states that the surrogateks fee is to be deposited in eScrows on the
date the agreement is signed by all parties.

The fee, plus all inter-

est, will be paid to the surrogate upon birth of the child,

However,

this section does not state whetoer the condition, at birth, of the
child will have any bearing upon the fee.
The coverage of all expenses for the surrogate is to be the
ponsibility of toe natural father.

res~

But, tois also allows that the

surrogate's present medical insurance may be charged for all or part
of the expenses.

It becomes the primary source,

Section 91 gives the natural father the legal responsibility for
any child which is born to the surrogate.

This section also states:
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(c)That if the natural father or the adoptive parent,
if the natural father is married, di es prior to the termination of the surrogate~s parental rights, the surrogate
parenthood agreement sha 11 remai n in full force and effect
with respect to the surviving party: That if both the
natural father and the adoptive parent, if the natural father is married, die prior to termination of the surrogatels parental rights, the surrogate shall be entitled
to her full compensation and expenses and may elect to
keep the child or execute a consent to the adoption of
the child or a release of the child for adoption.
It is implied by this section also that the child is only a commodity

which may be disposed of in any manner by the surrogate or natural
father.

It would seem that, since the documents

ackn~l~ging

the

child to be born to the surrogate is indeed the child of the natural
father have already been made a matter of legal record (Sec. 75 (2))
and the adoptive parent has already been approved and is a matter of
legal record (Sec. 75 (3}), in the event of the death of the natural
father, the child would be a legal heir to the natural

father~s

estate.

Also, in the event of the death of both the natural father and the
adoptive parent, i'f there were no other children from the marriage,
the child would seem to be the sole surviving

heir~

House Bill No, 5184 is not adequate for the situation and could
create more problems for tne legal system.

Any legislati'on which is

proposed would be useless unless it provided for the child,

Also, the

proposed legislation would need to define natural father, adoptive parent, family, and home, in a manner which is acceptable to the public,
This Bill does not.
Summary
At the present time, there is. a concerted effort among those attor-
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neys and doctors who are involved with surrogate parenting for meaninful legislation to be formulated and adopted,

Many of these are

not sure that what they are doing is moral and ethical.

They are

looking for legislation which might help to ease their conscience,
Conservative religious leaders view it much in the same way as
abortion.

They feel it is an intrusion into GodLs creative process

for humanity and as such, must be abandoned.
Liberal theologians view it as an aid to childless couples to
help them find happiness.
philosophy.

Their motives lie in the social gospel

They believe that the means justifies the results.

Legislators are not sure what to do.

Of those states which have

enacted legislaUon regarding A.I,O" the laws are extremely porous
when interpreted.

There is no uniformity among the states regarding

legislation to control and regulate surrogate parenting.
Before legislation is proposed, each existing law pertaining to
adoption, A.I.O., and the proposed legislation for surrogate parenting
shoul d be thoroughl y researched..

The arguments from the re 1i gi ous

viewpoint should be closely adhered to, and the potential harm to the
enUre human race should be the deciding factor.

CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The issues presented herein will present counsellors, both biblical and non-biblical, with numerous situations in the Christian context and secular setting, where informed direction may result in the
saving of a marriage.

Infertility is becoming more and more prevalent

in society and an uninformed public, in its effort to alleviate the
problem, will become more and more tolerant of those llalternatives" to
childlessness.

At present, an estimated twelve to seventeen percent

of the married couples in America are involuntarily childless and the
medical experts say it is increasing.
Inferility, in most cases, is the result of the freedom of choice.
Today many couples are postponing parenthood until they are past the
age of optimal fertility.

Also at fault is venereal disease, birth

control pills, complications from abortion and the use of IUDs, which
are nothing more than abortive devices rather than contraceptives.
In addition, the sharp decline in the number of available infants
for adoption has also left couples childless.

However, it is known

that fifty percent of those couples who are treated (medically) for
infertility eventually have children.1 81
Medical science seems to be burning the candle at both ends.
18lDan Kaercher, flWhat Can Be Done About Infertility?"
Homes and Gardens, September, 1979, p. 86,
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Better

They
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are conducting extensive research into human reproduction under the
guise of seeking better ways to alleviate the problem of infertility.
But, according to a recent news clipping, they are striving to find
ways to control and reduce fertility.
The \AJorld1s population - about 4.5 billion last
year -- is expected to grow over the next two decades
to between 5.9 billion and 6.5 billion, according to
a congressional study.
Improved birth control methods and greater support
of international family planning programs could keep total population toward the lower projected figure, an Office of n echnology Assesment report on the study says.
The report, released Sunday, (March 28, 1982) said
that during the next decade more than 20 new or improved
contraceptive methods will become available. They include safer oral contraceptives, improved intrauterine
devices, new hormonal chemicals, long-acting steriod injections and implants and better barrier devices for
women, including disposable, one-size-fits-all diaphragms,
the study said.182
The thought of spending tax money (and many of the research programs are underwritten by government grants) to decrease infertil ity
while at the same time spending vast amounts to decrease fertility is
ridiculous.

According to the above mentioned article, family planning

assistance will have to increase 10-fold by the year 2,000 -- to $10.7
billion annually -- to supply needed levels of the contraceptive methods and services which are now being developed.
It appears that the above research is in contrast to surrogate
parenting efforts.

Could it be that surrogate parenting actually has

an ulterior motive, (a forerunner of medical scientific efforts to produce a super-human race)?

The major concern about surrogate parenting

should be its ultimate effect upon the human race.

Francoeur expresses

182 11 Population Explosion May Be Slowed," The Daily Advance, 29
March 1982, p.3.
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his concern in the following manner:
... That mankind, men and women together, are stan.,.
ding on the brink of a major revolution far more serious
than that which began a century ago with the emancipation
of woman from the hearth and nursery. The eternal mystiques of masculine and feminine that have guided Western
men and women for centuries are evaporating. Their death
1's bei'ng accelerated by a very short-fused, ready-to-explode biological 50mb: mankind"s newfound ability to control, manipulate, and direct his own reproductive processes. Techniques of arti'ficial insemination, frozen
germ cell s, the artificial womb, embryo transpl ants, prenatal monitoring and mani'pulations, genetic engineering,
and asexual cloning of human beings: these developments,
many of them already a reality, will have great psychological, emotional, and religious repercussions. After thousands of years during which reproduction depended on the
union of male and female, man stands ready in the next
decade or two to reproduce his own image independently ...
More than any other modern technology, the research
into new modes of hUman reproduction now going on in
thousands of biological and medical laboratories around
the worl dis creating a dil emma for man. It stri kes at
the very heart of human society because it cuts to the
quick of the human family and the relationship between
husband and wife.
The Creator has somehow shared with us his omnipotence. Having created us in his own image, he now asks
us to share with Him in the ongoing creation of mankind
and man. But we are mere neophytes in the task of creation. We lack wisdom and experience and thus often end
up as bumbling, confused gods. 183
Has God allowed man to gain the power over the procreation of humanity?
Thi s woul d seem then that God had contradicted Himself.

Has God failed

in His process of procreation and is now going to allow man to improve
himself?

Romans 9:20 states:
" .... Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it,
Why hast thou made me thus?"

ManIs improvement of his kind rests in the finished work of Christ!
Francoeur mentions that the scientific reproductive processes will
183Francoeur, p. vii, viii'.
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cause psychological problems.

In Chapter II, the Psychological Moti-

vations for Surrogate Parenthood were discussed.

The primary "exuse"

given for support of the surrogate mother is the Biblical account of
Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar.

In every instance Hagar is portrayed as

the willing handmaid of Sarah who wanted to do nothing but bring happiness to her mistress.

To quote this story and use it as a motivating

factor for surrogate mothering is a "psycho10gical" farce.
The Genesis 16 account is a beautiful story.

Filled with sin:

adultery, anger, hatred, bitterness, and malice, it is a real motivation for compassion.

Hagar did not willingly surrender to Abraham.

She was a slave and had no recourse but to obey
was not motivated by love.
have children.

Sarah~s

wish.

Hagar

Sarah was not motivated by a desire to

In verse four, Hagar became angry when she found that

she was pregnant and hated Sarah.

Sarah had her driven from the home.

Those who support surrogate mothering with this verse should read the
whole story.
Some of the surrogate mothers expressed that they felt they were
giving the childless couple a gift.
nancy as Hharboring a gift".

One described the surrogate preg-

Is not her own child a gift to her?

Would she be willing to give up one of her older children to some
childless couple just because they wanted a child and happened to like
one of hers?

The argument that they are doing it as a gift is a weak-

er motivation than that drawn from the Genesis story.
more to the motivation than is being revealed.

Thus, there is

It is evident, as the

various accounts are read that the main motivation is SELFISHNESS.
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The Texas midwife, Carol

Pavek~

makes a clear statement to the

fact of selfish motivations when she states,

~It

would be wonderful to

keep having babies without the responsibility of raising them. Nl85
All of mankind is basically selfish.

To a mother, the reward for all

the pain and deprivation of privacy encountered in giving birth is being able to hold her very own newborn child to her breast.

Since sur-

rogate mothers forego this privilege, they must have a substitute re . .
ward.

To have done a good deed for others can only be a surface ex-

cuse offered to cover up her selfish desire for money and recognition.
Another motivation for surrogate mothers is to rid themselves of
guilt brought on by abortion or having given up a child for adoption
as the result of a teenage pregnancy.

This is viewed as a weak moti-

vation because one wrong cannot be corrected by doing another wrong,
The surrogate mother is going to compound her guilt after the baby is
born and she has to give it up.

Her guilt needs to be dealt with

scripturally and she needs a fresh outlook on life which can only come
from God.
The psychological motivations for becoming a surrogate mother are
far outweighed by the psychological effects the surrogate must endure
during and after the pregnancy.

One surrogate relates, IIPm not kid-

ding myself that I will give up the baby without qualms ... That's what
my fri ends are worried about.. 11186
The premier example of those aspects of surrogate mothering which
traumatize the surrogate and those close to her was exemplified in the
185Seligmann, p. 72.
186Fleming, p. 24.
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case of Elizabeth Kane.

Mrs. Kane had replied to Dr. Levinls ad

without the approval or consent of her husband.
nothing of it.

Her husband, David, was totally opposed to it but she

managed to convince him.
apart-"

In fact, he knew

His first reaction, "It will tear our family

Surrogate mothering is wrong because of the negative impact

upon the family of the surrogate.

The husband will never be able to

reconcil e himsel f to the fact that hi s wife had another man IS baby.
The husband alone has exclusive right to his wifeks body because in
the sight of God the two of them are one.
Ephesians 5:31 - Genesis 2:23,24: And Adam said, This
;s now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall
be called woman, because she was taken out of man. There.
fore shall a man leave his father and mother and shall
cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.
The sin against the family and against the husband goes further.
Mrs. Kane relates, liThe day 1 was inseminated, it was a strange feeling
in bed that night watching
bed that night." 187

~Johnny Carson~.

There were three in the

Even the surrogate cannot escape the psychological

fact that the sacredness of the marriage has been altered and the intimacy of the husband/wife relationship has been violated,
Ephesians 5 :22: Wives. Submit yourselves unto your own
husbands, as unto the Lord:
Colossians 3:18:
husbands.

Wives.

Submit yourselves unto your own

I Peter 3:1: Likewise, ye wives be in subjection to your
own husbands ...
Genesis 3:16: . "and thy desire shall be to thy husband,
and he shall rule over thee.
187Anna Quindlen, I'Surrogate Mothers: A Controversial Solution
to Infertility,fI Hie New York Times, 2] May 1980, p. B12.
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However, the psychological trauma goes beyond tile husband/wife
relationship.
gettable

The impact on the children of the surrogate is an unfor-

experi~nce.

In the movie, "A Gift of Life," one of the chil-

dren of the surrogate mother asked her if she would sell her also.

If

she could have one child and give it up for a price, it would follow
that her other children would question the sincerity of her devotion
to them.

It will be there to haunt them forever, "Did my mother really

love and want me?"
Elizabeth Kane found it even more traumatic for existing children.
Her four-year-old son suddenly found himself witll no one to play with.
Her two daughters, aged thirteen and eleven, were ridiculed in school
and taunted because, °your mother is selling babies."

Further, Mrs.

Kane rel ates after the birth of the chil d, that her chil dren "are sad
because they never got to see their brother - and he is their brother."188 This statement proves that Mrs. Kane finally awoke to the
evil of what she was doing.

During the first few months after the

insemination she had a different attitude toward the baby.
ted, °1 never think of it as mine.

It's the father's child.

She sta1 am

simply growing it for him. "189
Being a surrogate mother is a psychological sin against the husband and the children, both those of the marriage and the one which is
to be given up.

But, the effect does not stop with just the immediate

188"Surrogate Mother Explains Why She Had Baby For Couple," The
Daily Advance, 4 December 1980, p. 6.
189Quindlen, New York Times, p. B12.
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family.

Mrs. Kane says that her family, father, mother, sisters, bro-

thers, inlaws, cut her off.

When the surrogate in the movie. IIGift

of Life,1I informed her family, she was ridiculed for her thoughtlessness.

Her sister reminded her that, although she was pregnant by ano-

ther man other than her husband, when she gave the baby to the other
couple, she was giving away something that was a part of all of them
and had a genetic link to everyone in the family.
statement.

This is a true

The child remains a descendent of the surrogate mother1s

fami 1y.
There is a snowballing effect with surrogate mothering.
ma reaches beyond the family setting.

The trau-

Mrs. Kane relates that only one

neighbor in her home town of Pekin, in Central Illinois, will speak to
her.

The people she worked with were horrified and some reacted with

hostility when she told them what she was doing.

Many of them consid-

ered what she was doing as lIadultery of a heinous sort,lI

Another one

invited Mrs. Kane to her home, then announced that she was going straight
to hell.

Mrs. Kane says, IIShe accused me of selling my body.

That real-

ly shocked me. 11190
It is a form of prostitution.

A man has allowed his wife to per-

form with her body those services which are reserved exclusively to him
and has received compensation for it.
Noel Keane1s statement:
process.

lIThere~s

This is clearly the meaning of

not a baby there when we start the

r think the surrogate is being paid for the use of her bod-

y. ,,191 The service which she is going to perform is basically a sexual
190Quindlen, B12,

191Casti110, B6.
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service and historically falls into the realm of adultery.
One couple in Detroit has used a surrogate to bear two children
for them.

Both times the infertile wife has done the inseminating.

This has resulted in a broken relationship between the couple and their
inlaws.

With these growing conflicts they sought help from their

priest.

He told them "Your children have not sinned but you have.

You have used Michael's sperm in another woman IS body, II

The priest

labeled their act as adultery.192
The psychological effects will never cease for the surrogate mother.

Her problems are not only within her family and her friends

but her personal trauma begins immediately at birth.
mother says, "Tt

I

S

not easy.

One surrogate

I feel the baby ki ck and move, yet I

know the baby is not mine. M193
Although it may sound simple to have a baby and qive it up, it is
something that is never forgotten.

Testimony after testimony has ap-

peared in columns like "Dear Abby" and others, from women who have done
so.
ago.

Many still remember the child they gave up fifty or sixty years
But, those women were not doing so for the sake of financial gain.
Again, Elizabeth Kane relates that during the labor, while on the

delivery table she asked herself why was she going through with this.
She also says:
Three days after the birth tears started flowing. I
decided to go to the nursery and say a final, private farewell to him. I didn~t want to hold him. I thought lid
192Markoutsas, p. 74.
193Ibid., p. 73.
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better not. .. In 18 years if they a 11 (her chil dren and
the baby) want to get together someday, that~s fine.
His parents that he has now said if he wants to see me
in 18 years, that~s fine. 194
One aspect which is almost totally overlooked which will have a
great psychological effect on womanhood is the fact that women will be
lowered to the status of "breeding stock."

No one has made mention

that several years ago this procedure was introduced among farmers as
a method of improving the livestock breeds,
There are always plenty of second-rate cows around
a herd, so that with superovulation and inovulation with
a single prize cow and frozen semen shipped from elsewhere
a dairyman can end up with three dozen prize calves in.,.
stead of one .•. 195
The fact that the status of women is being lowered is clearly stated
when Dr. Richard Levin dehumanizes the surrogate with this statement:
III wouldnht consider this buying a baby.

ILd consider this buying a

receptacle, so 11m not sure you would have a problem with the compensation per se." 196
Looking back on all the negative remarks which El izabeth Kane en.,.
dured, she says, "pm a rather narrow-minded person myself.

And if

someone else was doing this I might feel the same way.1I197
Equally traumatizing is the introduction of A.I.D. into the marriage of a childless couple, where the husband is infertile.

Many of

the pxychological effects of surrogate mothering carryover to this
194The Daily Advance, 4 December 1980, p. 6.
195Francoeur, P. 96.
196Quindlen, p. B12.
197Ibid.
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area.

One woman who was impregnated by A,I.D. says the experience was

awesome for her husband.
When you have a baby sometimes you say ~My babyh,
My husband would ask, ~hat do you mean, your baby?~
He was frequently upset...
-~She contributed 80 percent~ says that husband
today. ~A donor contributed 20 percent, and 1 contributed nothing. 1198
Many of the women submit to A,I.D. because they want to "give"
their husbands a child.
carryon the family name.

They feel that the husband needs someone to
This psychological problem of the husband

may not be relieved by the birth of an A.I.D, child,

The child may

serve as a constant reminder of his incapability and intensify feelings
of resentment.

Other possible psychological results include a develop-

ing affection by the wife for the donor, if the donor is known.

This

would be especially serious if the donor were a friend or relative.
There would then be another image on the scene.

The donor could poss-

ibly demand a role in raising the child or might resort to blackmail
in order to keep his silence,
There is also the possibility of the wife transferring all of her
love solely to the child..

She could develop a resentment toward the

husband and shower the child with her affection.

Yet another problem

could arise if both the wife and husband developed resentment for the
child,

The child could be viewed as an intruder and a trouble maker.

This would be brought about by the changes which are necessary in life
style when children are born into a home. 199
198John Stossel, "One Answer to Childlessness - Artificial Insemination," Science/Digest March 1980, p. 23.
199Perkins, p. 18.
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A.T.D. is psychologically traumatizing to the woman also.

A

young wife relates:
When you~re at the clinic being inseminated, you
don't actually comprehend what"s going on. You see the
syringe and you have to remind yourself, ~Gee, there"s
a baby in there.
And then you have to lie there on
the table for 10 minutes after they do it with this
strange sperm in you, but you think about other things.
It does melt out of your mind in daily living, But
youhre going to go through your life knowing you did
this, knowing that there~s somebody out there who·s
part of you. Somehow. 200
h

This young woman is relating this as she is trying to conceive
her second child through A.I.D.

She says it is no different than it

was at first, and there is no enjoyment.

Since A.I.D. does not gua-

rantee pregnancy with the first insemination, it is necessary for her
to make several trips, twice monthly, which costs sixty-six dollars
per insemination.

She says that as a result of going month after

month trying to conceive, she felt so hollow and that sex at home was
not satisfying because her husbandHs touch reminded her of the doctor.
The young woman adds that her children will never learn that they
were A.I.D. children.

The secret will go to the grave with her and

her husband. 201
There is always speculation by the wife about who the donor is.
One states that it could be any man in her community.

This is true.

In a survey of A.I.D. Clinics, Dr. Curie-Cohen found the following
concerning donors:
200Fleming, p. 14.
201Ibid., p. 20.

132

Of those who answered, most (77.1 percent) had
never used a donor for more than six pregnancies, where~
as 5.7 percent had used a donor for 15 or more. One
respondent had used a single donor for 50 pregnancies.
Although most doctors (50.7 percent) used each donor
for an average of one or two pregnancies, 10.3 percent
used each donor for an average of nine or more pregnancies. The multiple use of donors was usually pragmatic
since most doctors (88.4 percent) had no policies concerning the maximum use of a donor. The doctors who
did restrict the use of a single donor usually limited
the number of pregnancies to six or 1ess. 202
The above survey involved seven hundred eleven physicians.

This

survey could lead to even greater psychological problems as the women
begin to ponder if other somen have borne children of the same donor,
who would be a sibling of their child.

Since the doctors seem to have

little regard for use of a single donor, inbreeding will be a natural
result.
Another young woman tells of her feelings about A,I.D.:
I have an ideal husband. He never swears, never raises
his voice. I love him and I wouldnLt leave him for anything
in the world - but I do blame him. I am the one who has to
bear the embarrassment and the aggravation of going in twice
a month. HeLs the one with the blocked duct, I was a virgin
for him. It hS almost as if I have been raped for him. I
cried on the table the first time I went in for insemination,
... 1 have been a nervous wreck at times because of this ...
You see a guy in a white jacket (young medical students or
interns), and you think, is he the donor? You see another
guy - is it him? They have appeared in my dreams. You
worry ... what if the donor belongs to some fraternity, and
as a prank he replaces his sperm with a black guy ' s.203
A.I.D. is a life-time choice and couples need to consider that
what they are doing is out of the will of God for the family.

Nowhere

202Martin Curie-Cohen, Ph.D., Lesleigh Luttrell, M.S., and Sander
Shapiro, M.D., "Current Practice of Artificial Insemination By Donor
In the United States," The New England Journal of Medicine 300 (March
15, 1979): 587.
203Blais, p. 134.
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does the Bible permit for the entrance of a third party into procreation.
a child.

In Abraham and Sarah's case, God had already promised them
There was no need for

Sarah~s

plot to have taken place.

Childless couples should ask themselves if they are actually seeking
God's will and could it be, perhaps, that His choice for them is childlessness.

Should a deformed or handicapped child be born, could their

marriage stand the strain?
No matter how devoted and loving a couple we may be
now, the time may come when we shall no longer love one
another. If we should ever wish to end our marriage,
would we, in despair and frustration, lash out at each
other, blame one another for this decision, or use it
as a weapon to hurt and destroy? A man may well ask
himself, "Will she one day confront me with my inadequacy? Will she use it to hurt me or mock me or injure our child?" A woman may wonder, "Will he one day
reject us both because we are not truly his?H The
decision to use A.I.D. lasts forever, and the possibilities exist that may one day be regretted.204
The use of A.I.D. is a potential t'bomb" in the midst of a happy
marriage.
results.

There is no guarantee that everyone will be content with the
The husband and wife will still have to acknowledge the fact

of his or her infertility.

The child from another source does not re-

move that fact.
Public policy should be formulated based on the moral, ethical an
religious standards.

The fact that the backbone of our country, the

family, is threatened should be motivation enough to outlaw surrogate
parenthood.

One writer states:

The law should, therefore, play neither a reactionary
role nor a revolutionary role. This means that the practice should be legally permitted but cautiously regulated,
204Blais, p. 149.
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and morally tolerated but carefully scrutinized. The
psychological ramifications must be studied in the most
rigorous scientific manner possible. 205
I disagree!

The material presented herein gives evidence to the

fact that the practice of surrogate parenthood is highly unethical.
At the present rate, twenty thousand births per year through A.I.D.,
incest is inevitable.

Although it is not necessarily a lucrative bus-

iness, it has the potential with the right menls sperm (well known
celebrities and professional persons).
Surrogate motherhood raises even more subtle moral questions.

It

also has the potential for economic exploitation and psychological
harm and moral confusion to the surrogate mother, the adoptive parents
and the offspring.

It should be banned!

If the processes of A.I.D, and surrogate mothering are allowed to
continue, pimps and prostitutes will become more involved and may
change their "business" to this more profitable route.

The lucrative

aspects have already been presented with some lawyers and doctors earning in excess of three hundred thousand dollars annually just for
arranging surrogate mother situations.

Women will be exploited as

"baby-making machines and will be dehumani zed much as they were in
II

the days of Aristotle and the Greek philosophers.
Any legislation which is considered should be to deny its practice on the basis that it is anti-man, anti-woman, anti-family, and
anti-God!

205Winslade, p. 153.
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PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION OF WOMEN IN A SURROGATE MOTHER PROGRAM
By:

Darrell D. Franks, M.D.

Each of the 10 applicants was interviewed by me before insemination in a freely structured interview and was given the MMPI.
I found no specific profiles or patterns in these women other
than routine trends. Of the 10 women, 9 had been married at least
once, 4 were divorced, and 1 was a single parent. Their average age
was 26 years. Each subject had from one to three living children, a
requirement for acceptance into the program.
Nine of the women were of modest to moderate financial means.
All were either self-supporting or maintained by husbands or boyfriends. One was the wife of a professional and also held employment
of her own.
All had discussed the program in detail with close friends, boyfriends, or husbands. Most had major difficulties and conflicts when
presenting the plan to parents and other older family members. All
gave similar reasons for entering this program: a history of easy
pregnancies and labor, love for their own children, the desire to
share this love and pleasure with others who had not been able to
conceive their own child, and a need for the financial remuneration
to stabilize their personal lives and to provide for their own children's needs.
All had given serious thought to the difficulty of signing over
custody to the biological father, and all understood that this act
was essential to their participation in the program, In this way
the fee becomes a custody settlement between the biological mother
and the biological father, and the problems of baby selling are
avoided.
Most viewed this process somewhat like that of an unwed mother
placing her child for adoption, but these women felt assured that
the background and characteristics of the family who would be rearing the child were good. Almost all wished to see the infant one
time to assure themselves that the child was normal.
The average education of these 10 women was slightly more than
high school. Their intelligence appeared normal, and little psychopathology could be detected during the initial interview.
Individual MMPI profiles revealed that they had little additional
underlying psychopathology. One woman had a hypomania score elevated
above the upper limit, but she showed no signs of other difficulties
either on the test or during the interview. She had the only abnormal score. Indi'vidual profiles showed a high degree of honesty in
answering the questions and generally showed high feminity scores and
high social extroversion scores.
The composite MMPI profile was not notable; all scores were within one standard deviation of normal (see table 1). Of special interest
were the low scores on the hysterical and psychopathic deviate scales,
The subjects appeared to be feminine women with slightly increased
energy levels and social extroversion tendencies. The hypomania scale
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PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION OF WOMEN IN A SURROGATE MOTHER PROGRAM (Page 2)
By:

Darrell D. Franks, M.D.

score was probably elevated because of the one abnormal score already
mentioned.
Discussion:
This initial survey suggests that women applying for the surrogate mother program have relatively normal personalities. Their reasons for wishing to enter such a program seem to be an interesting
mixture of financial and altruistic factors. This study does not reflect any follow-up on the women~s role as surrogate mothers, and it
does not address the issue of their adjustment to the process during
or after pregnancy. These areas will require additional stud~
Reference
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TABLE 1
ComQosite MMPI Scores of 10 Women Who Applied to be Surrogate Mothers
Score
MMPI Scale

~1ean

Median

SO

Standard

Lie
Infrequency
Correction
Hypochondriasis
Depression
Conversion hysteria
Psychopathic deviate
Mascul inity-femininity
Paranoia
Psychasthenia
Schizophrenia
Hypomania
Social introversion

4,3
2. 8
14.6
10.8
20.4
19.1
22.4
39.3
8,6
26.2
24.3
20.5
24.5

4.5
2.2
15 . 2
10.5
19 . 5
19,5
22.3
40 . 5
9.0
27.0
22.5
20.0
20.5

2.1
2.5
4.3
2.4
4,4
2,6
2.3
4,0
2.3
4.3
3.7
4. 2
8.2

4.0
3.0
12.5
13 .0
19.5
23.0
19,0
34.5
9.0
25.0
22.5
17.0
25.0
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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED
1.*

WHETHER THE ACTIONS PROPOSED BY THE DOES AND
MARY ROE OF PURCHASING/SELLING AN ADOPTION
CONSENT MAY BE PROHIBITED BY THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN?
Defendant-Appellee Attorney General answers
"Yes. 11
Plaintiffs-Appellants answer "No."
The trial court answered "Yes."
The Court of Appeals answered "Yes."

11.**

WHETHER THE PROBHIBITION AGAINST PAYING A
NATURAL MOTHER FOR CONSENTING TO THE ADOPTION
OF HER CHILD IS SUFFICIENTLY NARROW IN I'rS
SCOPE?
Defendant-Appellee Attorney General answers
IIYes~"

Plaintiffs-Appellants answer "No."
The trial court answered "Yes."
The Court of Appeals did not address this
issue, having concluded that the transaction
proposed by the Does and Mary Roe did not
involve fundamental interests protected by
the right of privacy.
III .

WHETHER THE PAID-FOR ADOPTION AGREEMENT
PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IS VOID
AS BEING AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY?
Defendant-Appellee Attorney General answers
IlYes .. "

Plaintiffs-Appellants do not address this
question.
The trial court answered "Yes."
The Court of Appeals did not address this issue.
NOTE:
Plaintiffs-Appellants' proposed issue I alleging
gender discrimination was not argued in the Court of
Appeal~ and, thus, has not been properly raised by Appellants.
Proposed issue III of the Plaintiffs-Appellants appears
to restate in other words their proposed issue II.

*

Relates to Plaintiffs-Appellants issues II and III.

** Relates to Plaintiffs-Appellants issue IV.
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Counter-Statement of Facts
Appellants seek to have the Adoption Code sanction the
deliberate conception and relinquishment of children outside of
wedlock for money by a declaration that
288, Ch X, as added by 1974 PA 296,

§

§§

54 and 69 of 1939 PA

1, MCLA 710.54 and 710.69;

MSA 27.3178(555.54) and 27.3178(555.69) are unconstitutional.
Copies of these provisions are attached hereto as Exhibits A and
B respectively.

The trial court upheld the constitutionality of

the foregoing statutes in its order of summary judgment of
February 19, 1980.

The Court of Appeals affirmed on May 5, 1981.

This Counter-Statement of Facts is based on answers to
interrogatories supplied by the Appellants, John Doe, Jane Doe,
and Mary Roe.
1.

Those answers fall into four categories:
Answers to the Attorney General's interrogatories

dated April 6, 1979, which were filed on approximately May 17,
1979 ("Initial Ans\o/ers");
2.

Affidavits of the Appellants, John Doe, Jane Doe,

and Mary Roe, referred to on page 1 of each of their Initial
Answers (the "Affidavits");
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3.

Revised answers to the Attorney General's interroga-

tories dated April 6, 1979, which were filed on approximately
June 6, 1979 ("Revised Answers"); and
4.

Answers in response to Memorandum on Behalf of

Defendant Kelley Regarding Additional Discovery dated June IS,
1979, listing various unanswered questions on pp 6-11, which were
filed on approximately June 27, 1979 ("Additional Answers").
John and Jane Doe have been married for fourteen years
and have two sons, ages twelve and eight.
Does. )

(Affidavits of the

The Does would like to have a third child, but Mrs. Doe

is physically incapable of having further children due to a tubal
ligation (endometriosis).

(Revised Answers, No.7, page 1.)

Although the Does have made no effort to adopt a child,
they do not believe children are

avail~ble

want a child related to one of them.

for adoption; and they

(Additional Answers, No.8,

page 2.)
Mary Roe has worked for John Doe for three years and
draws a monthly salary of approximately $1,400 from John Doe.
(Revised Answers, No.8, page 1; and Additional Answers, No.3,
3rd subpart, page 2.)

The Does propose to have Mary Roe conceive

a child with John Doe through artificial insemination administered
by a physician.

(Additional Answers, No.2, page 1.)

After

birth, the Does would take custody of the child once he or she
leaves the hospital; and Mary Roe would consent to the adoption
(Revised Answers, No. ll(q) (4), page
,
Mary Roe would receive $5,000, plus medical expenses, from

of the child by the Does.
4.)

the Does for surrendering custody of her child to the Does and
for consenting to the adoption.
1, and No.5, page 2.)

(Additional Answers, No.1, page

In addition, Mary Roe will be covered by

sick leave, pregnancy disability insurance, and medical insurance
from her employment while she is off work having the child and
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recuperating from the delivery.

(Revised Answers, No. ll(s),

page 4; and Additional Answers, No.3, 4th subpart, page 2.)
To date, the Does and Mary Roe do not have a proposed
written agreement specifying the exact mutual obligations of the
parties.

(Revised Answers, No.9, page 2.)
Mary Roe, a divorcee, would be having her third child.

Her children are nine and twelve.

(See Roe Affidavit.)

Mary Roe would retain rights to visit her child at the
Does both before and after the adoption by the Does.
Revised Answers, No. ll(g) (4) and No. ll(r), page 4.)

3

(See
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ARGUMENT
I

THE ACTIONS PROPOSED BY THE DOES AND MARY ROE
OF PURCHASING/SELLING AN ADOPTION CONSENT MAY
BE PROHIBITED BY THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.
The Appellants privacy claim is based on the argument
that the proposed arrangement is their individual prerogative,
free of any State interference, to bear and beget children and to
have and raise a family.

On various occasions, as noted by the

lower courts in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
the having of children and the raising of a family are fundamental
personal rights.
However, an examination of the proposed transaction
discloses that the Appellants seek to engage in other activities
which go far afield from the having of one's own children and the
raising of one's own family.

To briefly review what each of the

Appellants desires:
1.

John Doe
He wants to deliver his semen to a doctor, not to
beget a child. l

He wants to pay Mary Roe for an

adoption consent severing all legal ties to her
child.
2.

Jane Doe
She wants to pay Mary Roe to give up her child by
adoption.

3.

Mary Roe
She wants to be paid by the Does for her agreement
to consent to their adoption of her yet unborn
natural child before the child is conceived.

lThe cases on whether artificial insemination outside of the
married couple (where an anonymous male donor's sperm is used
when the husband is sterile) are divided as to whether adultery
is involved.
Exhibit C is a list of references to the legal
literature on artificial insemination. No Michigan cases were
located on the question.

4
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Appellants argue that in matters of marriage, sexual
intimacy, and family life, a constitutional right of privacy or
"personal autonomy" should permit them to be "let alone" to do as
they wish without any interference by the State.

In fact,

however, Appellants are not complaining of interference by the
State.

Rather, Appellants seek the intervention of the Probate

Court into their relationships - to legitimitize the natural
child of John Doe and Mary Roe, to declare that this child is
adopted by the Does, and to sever Mary Roe's legal ties as the
natural mother.

The adoption process with its applicable rules

(including the prohibition against consideration) in no way
involves uninvited state interference in areas of sexual intimacy
or family life in which there is a legitimate expectation of
State non-involvement.
There is no fundamental right either to adopt or to
specify the terms of adoption of one's child.

Adoption laws

provide an orderly mechanism for the care and protection of
children and their. natural parents in those cases where the
natural parents are unable or unwilling to assume the parental
obligations and privileges of caring for and raising one's children.
These laws are a proper exercise of the State's police power for
health, safety, and the general welfare.

The constitutional

standard for laws enacted in the exercise of the police power has
been summarized as follows:
" ... Insofar as the police power is utilized
by a State, the means employed to effect its
exercise can be neither arbitrary nor oppresive but must bear a real and substantial
relation to an end which is public, specifically, the public health, public safety, or
public morals, or some other phase of the
general welfare."
(Footnote omitted) . The
Constitution of the United States of America,
Analysis and Interpretation (Library of
Congress, 1973), P 1318.
This rational basis test has been applied to statutes
outlawing homosexuality.

Doe v Commonwealth's Attorney for City

5
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of Richmond, 403 F Supp 1199 (1975), aff'd United States Supreme
Court, 425 US 901, 96 S Ct 1498, 47 L Ed 2d 751 (1976).

The

district court held that the practice of homosexuality was not a
fundamental constitutional right.

The opinion also noted, in

dicta, that adultery and fornication are not within th~ scope of
fundamental rights protected by the constitution.
The following purposes, interests, and goals are served
by the prohibition of payments to the natural mother in connection
with her consent to an adoption; and these public purposes can be
shown to be applicable to the transaction proposed by the Appellants
as well:
1.

Prohibition against a commercial market for babies _
whether involving an unwed mother facing the agonizing
decision of retaining or svrrendering her child, a
woman arranging to conceive a child anticipating a sale
of that child or in performance of an agreement to
conceive a child, or as a result of a contract for her
participation in an extra-marital union to bear the
proposed adoptive father's child.

2.

The best interests of the child.
natural parents should decide what is best for the
child, with adoption as an option of last resort,
without being influenced or coerced by offers of
money.
avoidance of any economic incentive or reward for
giving up a child for adoption.
avoidance of possibly traumatic discovery by the
child of his being separated from his mother by
adoption under the terms of a monetary arrangement
agreed upon before his conception.

3.

Recognition of the inestimable, intrinsic worth of each
person.

6
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4.

Protection of family and marriage relationships mother and children, wife and husband - from disruption
through the wife and/or mother becoming involved in
conceiving and bearing a child for some adoptive father
in a monetary arrangement, or in anticipation of a
commercial market for adoption.

5.

Avoidance of conflicting claims of parental rights and
custody.
natural mother might renegotiate the fee by withholding consent to adoption, or resist if the
probate court reduces the fee to be paid to her.
natural mother might resist adoption either before
or after it is ordered out of guilt or out of the
strong bond which quickly develops between parent
and infant.
conflict and uncertainty of those caring for the
child over the status of the child would be detrimental to the child's development.
The system of having court approval of payments to the

natural mother permits the payQent of reasonable hospital and
medical expenses connected with the birth of the child, as noted
by Judge Lincoln in his memorandum of March 2, 1977 concerning
these matters.

(See Exhibit D.)

At the same time, § 54 of 1939

PA 288, supra, authorizes the probate judge to disapprove any
payment to the mother which would improperly influence her or
make the child an object of commerce.

Such statutory regulation

is neither oppressive nor arbitrary, and it has been correctly
declared to be constitutional by the lower courts in this case.
Appellants also argue that while the adoption code
prohibitions "are gender-neutral on their face"

(page 4 of

Appellant's brief), the prohibitions have a disproportionate

7
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impact on Appellant Roe and other women who want to surrender
their children to adoption for a stipulated fee.

Appellants

attempt to base this argument, not presented in the Court of
Appeals, on cursory speculation as to the prevalence and legality
of the sale of sperm to sperm banks which then disseminate it for
physicians for artificial insemination.

However, Appellant Roe,

as the proposed natural mother in the transaction described by
Appellants, is not seeking to sell ovum to some sort of "ovum
bank," but rather she is seeking to conceive and bear a child and
then turn over that child of hers for adoption by others for a
fee.

Accordingly, this argument of Appellants as to gender

discrimination should be rejected as being without merit.
II
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST PAYING A NATURAL
MOTHER FOR CONSENTING TO THE ADOPTION OF HER
CHILD IS SUFFICIENTLY NARROW IN ITS SCOPE.
Even if Appellants were correct (which is not conceded 2 )
in asserting that the proposed transaction involved fundamental
rights, the applicable constitutional test as set forth in
Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 388; 98 S Ct 673, 54 L Ed 2d 618
(1978)

involving the right to marry would be satisfied:
"When a statutory classification significantly
interfere? with the exercise of a fundamental
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests."
The Adoption Code does not interfere with the right of

the Does to have a child or to raise a family.
Does already have two children.

In fact the

The Adoption Code does not

prevent the Does or any couple from having their own children,
through their own intimate union with each other.

The Does'

inability to have further children arises from Mrs. Doe's physical
condition, not from anything in the Adoption Code.

2 The trial court indicated on pp 10-11 of its opinion dated
January 28, 1980, that Appellants' allegations did not involve
any fundamental rights.
The Court of Appeals reached the same
conclusion at p 3 of its opinion of May 5, 1981, affirming the
trial court's opinion.
8
)
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Likewise, Mary Roe is not prohibited from having further
children, even out of wedlock, by the Adoption Code.
Thus, whatever fundamental rights may be found here,
they are not substantially interfered with by the Adoption Code.
Mary Roe states that she will not consent to the adoption of her
proposed natural child unless she is paid to do so, but this
adoption consent is subject to important State interests.

The

interests of the State in prohibiting the payment of money to
Mary Roe to induce her to give up her child have been demonstrated
above - the prevention of a commercial market for babies, the
best interests of the child, a recognition of the child's intrinsic
worth, the protection of family and marriage relationships, and
the avoidance of conflicting claims of parental rights to custody.
Further interests of the State are in the protection of
the mother from duress and overreaching - such as would be
potentially involved in the employer/employee relationship as in
the proposed transaction or in any case where one party has
influence over the other.

Another consideration is that the

child would already be brought into the world before any of the
terms of this type of transaction would be reviewed by the probate
court, so that the probate court would be presented with an
accomplished event.
The challenged prohibitions in the Adoption Code are
sufficiently tailored in that they are applicable only to those
persons involved in adoption proceedings and relate only to
payments and expenses connected. with adoption.
In light of the various State interests advanced by the
prohibition against fees for adoption consents, and the absence
of any State interference with fundamental rights, Appellants
argument that

§§

54 and 69 of 1939 PA 288, supra, are unconsti-

tutional should be rejected as being without basis.

9

III
THE PAID-FOR ADOPTION AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY
THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IS VOID AS BEING
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
A discussion of public policy serves to demonstrate the
strong State interests which are involved in this area, and the
absence of any fundamental rights of the Does and Mary Roe
implicated by their proposed transaction.

As noted in Appellants'

brief at page 12, the right to privacy is seen by the courts as
including only personal rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."

Paris Adult Theatre, Inc v Slaten, 413 US 49,

65; 93 S Ct 2628; 37 L Ed 2d 446 (1973).

The following discussion

of public policy demonstrates that the transaction proposed by
Appellants is contrary to the "concept of ordered liberty" in
Michigan and other states as well. 3
The general doctrine that contracts against public
policy are void is well summarized in Mahoney v Lincoln Brick Co,
304 Mich 694, 705; 8 NW2d 883 (1943), which quotes from 12 Am
Jur,

§

167, p 664, as follows:
"The question whether a contract is against
public policy depends upon its purpose and
tendency, and not upon the fact that no harm
results from it.
In other words, all agreements the purpose of which is to create a
situation which tends to operate to the
detriment of the public interest are against
public policy and void, whether in the particular case the purpose of the agreement is
or is not effectuated. For a particular
undertaking to be against public policy
actual injury need not be shown; it is enough
if the potentialities for harm are present."
In applying this general rule, the Michigan Supreme

Court has held, for example, that marriage broker contracts are
void as being against public policy.

Attorney General v Marital

Endowment Corp, 257 Mich 691; 242 NIV 297 (1932).

In that case

the court refused to recognize the handling of marriage promotion

3

It should be noted that the Kentucky Attorney General has ruled
that a transaction of the type proposed by Appellants is contrary
to the law and public policy of that state.
See 7 Family Law
Reporter 2246 (February 17, 1981).
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corrosive effect of involving monetary considerations in matrimony
at 257 Mich 694-5 as follows:
" ... The plan is calculated to promote and to
induce on financial grounds marriage of the
members. This commerce in marriage is, on
the part of the defendant, in practical
effect, the promotion of marriage between
third persons, its members and others, and
tends to marriage through ~ercenary considerations. This is against public policy.
Antcliff v June, 81 Mich. 477 (10 L.R.A. 621,
21 Am St. Rep:-533).

* * *
"'Anything which induces parties to enter
into the marriage relation through mercenary
considerations strikes at the very foundation
of human society, and is necessarily injurious
to the community .... '"
Another application of the public policy doctrine in
the area of marriage is found in the case of Graham v Graham, 33
F Supp 936,

(ED Mich, 1940) , wherein an agreement by the wife to

support the husband in exchange for his agreement to quit his
employment so as to be able to travel with his wife was held to
be unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
on the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,

§

The court relied
587, which states:

"A bargain between married persons or persons
contemplating marriage to change the essential
incidents of marriage is illegal."
Certainly the obligations of the parties to mutual fidelity and
exclusivity in sexual relations are as essential to matrimony as
is the obligation of the husband to support the wife.

Accordingly,

an agreement by the Does whereby Jane Doe would permit John Doe
to go outside of matrimony to conceive a child would likewise be
contrary to public policy.4

4 The Revised Probate Code, § 111(1) , 1978 PA 642, MCLA 700.111(1);
MSA 27.5111(1) states in part:
n • • • A child conceived
following artificial
insemination of a married woman with the
consent of her husband shall be treated as
their legitimate child for all purposes of
intestate succession. Consent of the husband
is presumed unless the contrary is shown by
clear and convincing evidence."

This provision clarifies the legitimacy of such children born in
wedlock, but it does not constitute a basis for a married couple
altering the fundamental terms of their marriage as a matter of
enforceable contract right.
11
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Another public policy consideration is the fundamental
principle that children cannot be bought and sold.
rule is stated in 67A CJS Parent and Child,

§

This elemcmtary

16, P 201-202, as

follows:
"Parents have no property rights, in the
ordinary sense of that term, in or to their
minor children, and, accordingly, a parent's
right of control or custody of a minor child
is not a property right which may be bargained,
sold, or otherwise disposed of." (Footnotes
omi tted)
15 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition,

§

l744A, p 88,

states:
"The sovereign has an interest in a minor
child held superior even to that of the
parent; hence, there is a public policy
against the custody of such a child becoming
a subject of barter." (Footnote omitted)
In discussing the related problem of in

fertiliza-

tion and implantation of the embryo in a second woman, the Executive
Director of the Program in Law, Science and Medicine at Yale Law
School, speculates that contracts for "surrogate gestation" are
likely to be held non-enforceable and among her reasons cites the
following;
"In any case, the sale of children is illegal
in all states; therefore, any contract by
which a host-mother is paid a fee in excess
of expenses to gestate the unborn child is
likely to be held unenforceable as against
public policy. That being the case, the
'foster' or gestating mother would presumably
be considered by most courts the natural
mother of the child since she and not the
donor-mother was willing to go through the
inconvenience, discomfort, and dangers of
pregnancy and childbirth.
"It is highly unlikely that a judge, faced
with a conflict between two women, one of
whom has delivered the child and the other of
whom 'should' have done so by normal means
but who was too busy or disinterested, would
resolve the issue of which is the true mother
in any way other than by awarding parental
status to the host-mother, contracts to the
contrary notwithstanding.
"Second, by statute in many states any adoption release executed by the natural mother
before the birth of a child is invalid.
Even
in those states that do not declare prenatal
surrenders to be absolutely void, courts

12
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appear to take a dim view of the validity of
an adoption release signed prior to the birth
of the child." Holder, Legal Issues in
Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine (John
Wiley & Song;-1977) pp 7, 8.
Appellants often refer to Mary Roe's role as being that
of a "surrogate Mother."

This jargon serves to gloss over the

fact that Mary Roe is the real mother, and Jane Doe would be a
substitute (or surrogate) mother if she were permitted to adopt
the child.
Appellants attempt to distinguish their case from baby
selling situations by pointing out that John Doe would be the
natural father of the child, who is the subject of the monetary
transaction.

The fallacy in the Appellants' argument is that at

the time of the formation of the contract, John Doe will not be
related to the child, since the child does not yet exist. Appellants'
calculated, clinical proposal defies comparison with situations
where the custody and care of a child must be worked out by the
parents, married or unmarried, who had the child in the course of
their human non-commercial relationship.
A third reason from a public policy standpoint why this
agreement would be unenforceable is its potential for duress and
overreaching through the exploitation of various relationships,
such as the employment relationship in the case presented by the
Does, and any other situation where one party has some control
or authority over the other.

See In Re Allon, 356 Mich 586; 97

NW2d 744 (1959), wherein the court upheld the consent of a mother
to the adoption of her child where there was no showing of the
mother being subject to duress or overreaching.
The proposed contract is likewise unenforceable because
the subject matter is beyond the Court's competence to adjudicate.
For example, if Mary Roe refused to perform, no court would grant
specific performance by ordering her to accept artificial insemination and to conceive and bear a child as a result.

Nor would

a court order John Doe to deliver his semen to a physician and to

13
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arrange for artificial insemination of Mary Roe.

Matters of

custody and adoption after the birth would be determined by the
Probate Court without respect to the proposed agreement.

Thus,

specific performance of the agreement would not be available to
the parties.
Actions for damages would lead the court into a welter
of confusing relationships and claims.

For example, if Mary Roe

after several unsuccessful artificial insemination sessions,
refused to continue, would she be liable to the Does for the incalculable loss of a child not yet conceived?

What liability for

damages would Mary Roe have if she deliberately terminated her
pregnancy, or refused to give up the child to the custody and
adoption of the Does after the birth?
of the Does insists on custody and

What damages/orders if one

ado~)tion

while the other

refuses to perform - due to divorce, separation, abandonment,
etc?

\\lhat if either the Does or Mary Roe remove the child from

the State and resist participating in any Michigan litigation
concerning the child?
Without specific legislative authorization of this type
of transaction setting forth the legal rights and obligations of
the various parties, the proposed transaction violates Michigan
public policy.

14
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RELIEF REQUESTED
For the reasons set forth herein, it is submitted that
the proposed transaction is not based on constitutional rights of
the Appellants and that it would violate the public policy of th~
State of Michigan.

It"is further submitted that Appellants have

failed to establish any of the criteria for review by this Court,
e.g. major significance to the jurisprudence of this state,
material injustice, or clear error on the part of the lower
courts which upheld the constitutionality of the applicable
statutes.

Appellee Kelley therefore requests that the Court deny

Appellants' "Application for Leave to Appeal to this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. KELLEY
Attorney General
Robert A. Derengoski
Solicitor General
Eugene Krasicky
First Assistant Attorney General

George M. Elworth
Assistant Attorney General
Suite 3, Plaza One Building
401 S. Washington Square
Lansing, Michigan 48933
(517) 373-9100
Dated: June 15, 1981
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
-'\

Books, Articles

Annotation, Legal Consequences of Human Artificial Insemination, 25 ALR3d
1103-1112 (1969)
Clark, Domestic Relations (West, 1968)
Comment, Artificial Insemination - A Model Statute, 24 Cleveland State
L Rev, 341-355 (1975)
. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 65 Cal L Rev, pp 611-622 (1978)
. Hol der, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent
Sons, 1977)

r~edici

ne, (John Wiley

Kinney, Legal Issues of the New Reproductive Technologies, 52 Cal State
Bar Journal, Nov/Dec 1977. pp 514-519
Schlemer, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 32 Michigan State Bar
Journal, pp 44-51 (March 1953)
Smith, A Close Encounter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemination and
an Enlightened Judiciary. 17 Journal of Fami
Law, 41-47 (1978-79)
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1025 E. FOREST AVENUe
DETROIT. MICHIGAN 4!32C'7

JAM!:!;;. H. LINCOLN
Y. GLADyr· BARSAMIAN
THOMAS A. t.lAHEF<
JUPC:;:[!j.

or

ERl"EST C. 80eHM

IRA G, E,;UFf.iAN
FRANK S. 52Y/.I"""SI
JOSEP},1 J. Pi:R;.JICK

PilOOATE

WILUS F. WARD

JVV[NILC DIVISION

JUDC[S OF pnOZlA

PRENTIS EDWARDS
"I.eISTeR

Harch 2, 1977

To:

Niss }Iarr,aret Pfeiffer

From:

JudGe James H. Lincoln

.1

Re:

hrtificial insemin~tion case.
Mr. Noel K~~ne, attorn2Y.

Here is the sit~ation.
""e '\,'cre requested by }!r~ Keune to respond to the following questions:
A murried couple suitable for udoptive parent~ wish to ado?t a child.
The wife cannot hcve u child. The husband would be uscd to ~rtificial
inseminate a non-related woman.

Would the child born as a result of this arrangement be con~idered =s
related to thc adopting p~rcnts so that the adopcinz parents could file
with the Court for adoption without going to an adoption agency?
Ansl,'er:

:~y ans".. er i::; yes!

Second:

Could the ~dopting par~nts pay the woman for having the child or consentiz
to its adoption?

After considerable study and cunsultation I \·JQuld
hold that it make::; no'difference ~hat mcans is used to i~?regnatc a
woman. The father is the person who produced the spe.n that i~prcgna~cc
t~e woman.
He could even be held liable for support.

No!

The law clearly forbids this.

Co~ld the adoptina parents pay the expenses of the ?re~nancy deliv~ry medical - h05pital - doctor - transportation to hospital - attorney
fees, etc.7
Ye5! lhe la~ permits this and it has bcen the custom of all Michi~an
Probate C0urt to allow the payment of such expenditurcs.
personnlly ,~uld not be concerned ~ith p~rmittinG pa~nent of reasonable costs of
transportation to hospital, etc., etc. ] do not care about the canner of :racs?o::,
ation as 10~S as the expense was actually incurred.

I
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Of course I ~ould not npprove ~iving a car, etc.
pay in 3 the ·I.JO:r.::IIl.

That could be reGnrdec as
l\or would I permitp<l}"llent: of lost ""<lGes.

~r. Keane vants me to approve expe~ditures as t~ey arise.
COr.1.-:lcnt:
1 will probably· not bl:: the Juc!ge' I,-ho· handles' this adoption. The petition raay
not be filed until nfter the child is born - this ""ill be early in 1973.
The Juc[.e \,ho handles the case will r.l3ke all the rulin£S nnd will deterrr.inc
I.Jhat expenses to approve or disapprove.
All that 1 c.:.n do is to give my opinion on all of these matters.
Hy opillion is not bindi;).g on the Judge I~ho \,rill hear the petition.

2ppreciate the [<lct th<lt Hr. Keane wishes to clear all matters for his clients
prior to proceeding and I wish I were in a position to give him something·other
than what I ~ould do if 1 were handling the petition.

I
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DOE, DOE AND ROE V. KELLEY AND CAHALAN (CIVIL ACTION)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE

JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, and MARY ROE,
JANE x., JOHN x., JANE Y., JOHN Y.,
JANE Z., and JOHN Z., pseudonyms
,for actual persons,

HONORABLE ROMAN S.
GRIBBS
P-14369

plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 78 815 531

-vs-

cz

I

FRANK J. KELLEY, Attorney General
,for the State of Michigan, and
WILLIAM L. CAHALAN, Wayne County
Prosecutor,
Defendants.

OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' HOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRAN'fING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF W1WNE

JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, and MARY ROE,
JANE X. I JOHN X., JANE Y., JOHN Y.,
JANE Z., and JOHN Z., pseudonyms
for actual persons,

HONORABLE ROMAN S.
GRIBBS
P-14369

Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 78 815 531

-vs--

cz

J. KELLEY, Attorney General
for the State of Michigan, and
WILLIAM L. CAHALAN, Wayne County
Prosecutor,
FR~NK

Defendants.
________________________________1

OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On May IS. 1978, plaintiffs filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment in the Wayne County Circuit Court.

Motions

for summary judgment are brought by plaintiffs and defendants
pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3).

The facts in this case are not in dispute.
Plaintiffs, Jane and John Doe, are husband and wife.
is biologically incapable of bearing children.
joined in their complaint by Mary Roe.

-1-

Jane Doe

The Does are

166

The Does propose to have Mary Roe conceive a child
with John Doe through artificial insemination administered by a
physician.

After birth,

the Does would take custody of the

child once he or she lea"es the hospital; and, Mary Roe would
consent to the adoption of the child by the Does.

Mary Roe

would receive $5,000. plus medical expenses, from the Does for
surrendering custody of her child to the Does and for consenting
to the adoption.

In addition, Mary Roe will be covered by sick leave

pregnancy disability insurance, and medical insurance from her
employment while she is off work having the child and
recuperating from the delivery.

The statutes whose constitutionality is involved
in this matter are MCLA 710.54 and MCLA 710.69.

The former

provides, "as fo"llows:",;

'\

"Sec. 54.
(1)
Except for charges and fees
approved by the court, a person shall not
offer, give, or receive any money or other
consideration or thing of value in
connection with any of the following:
"(a) The placing of a child for adoption.
"(b) '1'he registration recording or
communication of the existence of a child
available for adoption or the existence of
a person interested in adopting a child.
"(c) A release.
"(d) A consent.
"(e) A petition.
"2. Before the entry of the final order of
adoption the petitioner shall file 'VIi th the
court a sworn statement describing money or
other consideration or thing of value paid to
or exchanged by any part¥in the adoption
proceeding, including anyone consenting to
the adoption or adopting the adoptee, any
relative of a party or of the adoptee, any
physician, attorney, social worker or member
of the clergy, and any other person, corporation,
association, or other organization. The court
shall approve or disapprove fees and expenses.
-2-
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Acceptance or retention of amounts in
excess of those approved by the court
constitutes a violation of this section.
"(3). To assure compliance with limitations
imposed by this section, by section 14 of
Act No. 116 of the Public Acts of 1973, being
section 722.124 of the Michigan Compiled Laws,
and by section 4 of Act No. 263 of the Public
Acts of 1913, as amended, being section
331.404 of the Michigan Compiled La,vs, the
court may require sworn testimony from
persons who were involved in any way in
informing, notifying, exchanging information,
identifying, locating, assisting, or in any
other way participating in the contracts or
arrangements \vhich, directly or indirectly,
led to placement of the person for adoption."
MCLA 610.69 provides:
"Sec. 69. A person who violates any of the
provisions of sections 41 and 54 of this
chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty
of "a misdemeanor, and upon any subsequent
conviction shall be guilty of a felony."

Plaintiffs' suit seeks to have these statutes

:i

;i

declared unconstitutional by this Court and to enjoin defendants
;

1:

from prosecuting plaintiffs for proceeding witl) the plan outlined

above.

Discussion
Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge is basically
two-pronged.
vagueness.

Plaintiffs first urge that MCL..li. 710.54 is void for
Second, that the arrangement proposed by plaintiffs is

within the constitutional "right of
'I

Contained YJithin

that second contention are the propositions that the government
does not have a compelling interest to invade that area of
privacy and that the statute as drawn is not

-3-
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:1
1.

.,'I
:1
!

This Court does not agree with plaintiffs" first

:1

I

contention that MCIJ\. 710.54 is void for vagueness.

Plaintiffs

are correct in asserting that a statute is violative of due
·1

,!
"

,j

process if it proscribes conduct in terms so vague that a
person of common intelligence must guess at the statute's
meaning.

connally v. General Construction co., 269 US 385,

70 L Ed 322, 46 S ct 126 (1926).

The dangers involved in the existence and enforcement of a vague statute are set forth by Mr. Justice Marshall
in Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 33 L Ed 2d 222,
92 S ct 2294 (1972) as follows:
"It is a basic principle of due process that
an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague
laws offend several important values. First,
because we assume that man is free to steer
between lalrlful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards
for those who apply them. A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and SUbjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and d
application. Third, but related, where
vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of
basic first amendment freedoms, it operates
to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms.
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens
to steer far wider of the unlawful zone
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked."

-4-
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,

'I

In Grayned, Justice Marshall also enunciated a

,I

I
~; problem involved in all statutes I

even those not void for

"

ii
,l

vagueness.

"Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect

mathematical certainty from our language."

,I

In a footnote to Grayned, the Court cited

!

:i Communications Assoc. v Doreds, 339 us 3.82, 94 L Ed 925,
70

s ct 674 (1950), in which the Court stated:
"There is little doubt that imagination
can conjure up hypothetical cases in which
the meaning of these terms will be in nice
question. The applicable standard, however,
is not one of wholly consistent academic
definition of abstract terms.
It is, rather,
the practical criterion of fair notice to
those to \lIhom the statute is directed.
The particular context is all important."

The statute in the instant case is as specific as is
necessary to give fair notice to those to whom the statute is
directed.
Plaintiffs question the

of the phrase

"or other consideration or thing of value" used in the statute.
Even standing alone, this phrase is sufficiently specific to
give fair notice to persons of reasonable intelligence wha'c
things may not be given in connection with the acts or items
listed in (a)-(e) of MCIJ\ 710.54(1).

The meaning of that phrase

is even more specifically defined when it follows the only
specific item listed, money.

The well-established

of ejusdem generis is pertinent to plaintiffs' contention of
, statutory vagueness.
541 F 2d 949 (1976):

As the Court stated in :::"==:......:~.-:::;~:.o::.~~=.::::~,
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"Where general terms in a statute follovl an
enumeration of terms with specific meaning,
the general terms can be expected to apply
to matters similar to those specified."
(Citations omitted)

It is not necessary that the statute list all

,I

conceivable items of value to be constitutionally specific.

:1
"

II.
Plaintiffs' second basis for urging the constitutional infirmity of the statutes is that they invade plaintiffs'
constitutional right of privacy and further that the statutes
do not comply with the requirements of compelling s·tate interest
and the narrow drafting required of statutes regulating an act
within the right of privacy.

Before addressing the latter two

points, it must first be determined that

I

proposed

agreement is within the constitutional right of privacy.
\1-,

That there exists a fundamental right of privacy is
well established.
Roe v. Wade, 410

The origins of this right were set forth in

us

113, 35 L Ed 2d 147, 93 S Ct 705 (1973), as

follows;
"The Constitution does not exp1ic
mention
any right of privacy. In a line of decisions,
however, going-back perhaps as far as
Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 us 250,
251, 35 L Ed 734, 11 S Ct 1000 (1891), the
Court has recognized that a
of
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution. In
contexts, the Court
or individual Justices have, indeed, found at
least the roots of that
in the First
Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
in the penumbras of the Bill
in the concept of
the
first section of the Fourteenth AmendmenL
(Citations omitted)
-6-
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I

,I

In stating that only "fundamental" rights are
included within the right of privacy, Roe acknowledged that
,; activities relating to marriage, procreation,

:j
!:

relationships and child rearing and education are included in the

:: guarantee of personal privacy.

,

"

"

II
j

II

The right which plaintiffs assert is specific,
narrow and is not of the same personal nature that the constitutional right of privacy protects.

Plaintiffs only attack the

sections of the Michigan Adoptive Code that prohibits the
exchange of money or other valuable cons idera tion.

Although

'I

:; plaintiffs seek to exclude governmental interference with
reference to a portion of the adoption statutes, they do not want
;: to exclude the government altogether.

They vlish to avail them-

selves of other portions of the
i,

to effect a legal adoption.

Code in order

Plaintiffs intend to utilize other

protective provisions of the adoption law; i.e., total control of
the child's welfare as legal parents, preserving the rights of
'i

'I

inheritance of the child, etc.

The right to adopt a child

based upon the payment of $5,000 is not a fundamental personal
right and reasonable regulations controlling

proceed

that prohibit the exchange of money (other than
approved by the Court) are not cons

and fees
infirm.

It is this Court's opinion that a contract to use the
statutory
ij

of the Probate Court to effect the

of a child wherein such contract

for valuable compensa-

tion, is not deserving of, nor is it within the constitutional

-7-
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:protection of the right of privacy as defined by the many cases
i

i

:I of the United States Supreme Court.

III.

Although the foregoing makes further discussion
unnecessary, this Court will assume, arguendO, that the consti-

q
.
.
.
tutJ.onal
rJ.ght
of prJ.vacy

d oes app 1 Y to the p 1 aJ.ntiffs
.
and proceed I

to the ancillary issues.
First, even if the constitutional right of privacy
is applicable, such right is not absolute.

It must be considered

iagainst important state interests in regulation.
supra.

Roe v. Wade.

In determining the constitutionality of l:egulations, the

. Roe Court set forth the following test:
"Where certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest,' and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake."
(Citations omitted)

The State's interest expressed in the statutes at
issue here is to prevent commercialism from affecting a mother's
'decision to execute a consent to the adoption of her child .

,.

.'

I

Al though the case is distinguishable on the facts from the

: present case, the statement of the

rule by the Supreme

Court of Kansas in In re Shirk'S Estate, 350 P 2d 1 (1960). is
applicable here.

-8-
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,

"consequently, this controversy resolves
itself down to the question whether the
contract with respect to the mother's
rights violated public policy.
It is
fundamental that parents may not barter
or sell their children nor may they demand
pecuniary gain as the price of consent to
adoptions. This is so inherent in the
fabric of American lav, that citation of
authority is unnecessary."

.j

i:1

i

"Baby bartering" is against the public policy of
this State and the State's interest in preventing such conduct
is sufficiently compelling and meets the test set forth in Roe.

Mercenary considerations used to create a parentchild relationship and its impact upon the family unit strikes at
the very foundation of human society and is patently and
" injurious to the community.

It is a fundamental principle that children should
not and cannot be bought and sold.

!!

illegal in all states.

The sale of children is

The brief of the Attorney General cites

this elementary rule in 67A CJS

§16, P 201-202,

as follows:
"Parents have no property rights, in the
ordinary sense of that term, in or to their
minor children, and, accordingly, a parent's
right of control or custody of a minor
child is not a property right which may be
bargained, sold or otherwise disposed of."
(Footnotes omitted)

The leading and recognized authority on Contracts,
Professor Samuel Williston, writes that
I~ and has been
~ontracts,

for a child is

He states in 15

t public

3rd Edition, Section 1744A, p 88:

-9-
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"The sovereign has an interest in a minor
child held superior even to that of the parent;
hence, there is a public policy against the
custody of such a child becoming a subject
of barter."
(Footnote omitted)

"
'I
:j

!i

The Attorney General cogently argues t11at contracts
for "surrogate gestation" are against public policy"

He quotes

the Executive Director of the Program in Law, Science and
Medicine in Yale I,aw School, who stated:
"In any case, the sale of children is illegal
in all states; therefore, any contract by
which a host-mother is paid a fee in excess
of expenses to gestate the unborn child is
likely to be held unenforceable as against
public policy. That being the case, the
'foster' or gestating mother would presumably
be considered by most courts the natural
mother of the child since she and not the
donor-mother was willing to go through tl1e
inconvenience, discomfort, and dangers of
pregnancy and childbirth.
"It is highly unlikely that a
faced
with a conflict between two women, one of
whom has delivered the child and the other
of whom 'should' have done so by normal
means but who'YJas too busy or disinterested,
would resolve the issue of which is the true
mother in any way other than by awarding
parental status to the host-mother, contracts
to the contrary notwithstanding.
I

"Second, by statute in many states any adoption
release executed by the natural mother
the birth of a child is invalid. Even in
those states that do not declare prenatal
surrenders to be absolutely void, courts
appear to take a dim view of the validity of
to the birth
an adoption release signed
of the child." Holder,
Pediatrics and Adolescent
Wiley & Sons, 1977} pp 7,

",

f

!'
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The evils attendant to the mix of lucre and the
adoption process are self-evident and the temptations of
"in "money market babies" exist whether the
'I

'or friends.

i

,

be strangers

'fhe statute seeks to prevent a money market for the

adoptlon of babies.

The defendant prosecuting attorney concedes

'that the plaintiff natural mother (Roe) and the plaintiff couple
II
I
C
(Doe) are free to "conveive a child, bear it, and raise it as
!

they agree among themselves because these acts are guaranteed
by the right to privacy."

The defendant prosecuting attorney

argues perceptively when he asks:

i

How much money will it t,ake for:

J

'a particular mother's will to be overborne, and when does her
decision turn from "voluntary" to "involuntary."

In their brief and in oral argument plaintiffs
vigorously argue that they are in this Court motivated 'by good
will and with the best of intentions seek the Court' s approval of
"

·their proposed course of action.

The

at.torney

pointedly responds as follows:
"Plaintiffs seek to convince this court that
the 'surrogate' mother would [act] out'of
altruistic rather than pecuniary motives.
If that were so, no monetary payment would
be necessary because under MCh~ 710.54 she
can still be reimbursed for fees and expenses.
What plaintiffs seek is t.o provide her "lith
a sum of money ($5,000) over and above the
reasonable expenses she has incurred. Even
if some of this money goes for
expenses unrecognized by MCLA 710.54, the fact:
remains t.hat the primary purpose of this money
is to encourage women to volunteer to be

-11-

,

"

177

ii

'surrogate' mothers.
Plaintiffs have
initiated this lawsuit because few women
would be willing to volunteer the use of
their bodies for nine months if the only
thing they gained was the joy of
someone else happy by letting that couple
adopt and raise her child. Thus, contrary to
plaintiffs' exhortations, in all but the
rarest of situations, the money plaintiffs
seek to pay the 'surrogate' mother is
intended as an inducement for her to conceive
a child she would not normally want to
conceive, carry for nine months a child she
would not normally want to carry, give birth
to a child she would not normally want to
give birth to and then, because of this
monetary reward, relinquish her parental
rights to a child that she bore. "

The personal desires and intentions of
are not in question, and their good faIth is conceded.

None the-

less, public policy is established to guide all of the people
of this State, of whatever intent.
A desire to change the established stated public
policy that meets constitutional muster

is

addressed to

the legislature and not to the courts.

IV.

As to the second part of the Roe test, it is the
opinion of this CO\lrt that the statutes here in question are
drawn sufficiently narrmv so as to comply with the test.
statute must be drawn so as to express only the
interest of the State and no other.

timate

If other interests, as 1rJell

as the State's compelling interest, are
then the statute must fall.

The

by the statute,

Here the statute is aimed at

compensation as consideration

-12,

I

an adoption

I

178

Plaintiffs urge that their arrangement is not the
type of action which the statute contemplated or intended to
proscribe

0

The fact that this is not a contract among strangers,

or that one of the adoptive parents would also be a natural
parent, does not alter the fact that the action prohibited

!
i

compensation in an adoption proceeding; that money,
beyond court-approved charges and fees, must be paid to the
biological mother before the parties ,""ill strike an agreement.

The statute is clear in expressing the public policy
of this State that all persons involved in offering, giving or
receiving anything of value in connection with an adoption are

!

controlled by the statutes proscriptions.

Neither the relation-

of persons involved nor the arrangements between the
are an exception but clearly all such actions are
proscribed.

Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, it is the conclusion
of this Court that MCLA 710.54 and 710069 do not violate the
provisions of the Constitution.

In addition, it is clear that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact

Accordingly,

: pursuant to GCR 1963,11702(3), plaintiffs' Motion for SummaryI

Judgment must be DENIED and defendants' Motion for Summary
J"udgment must be GRANTED as a matter of lawo
!
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I

!I
!
;:

I'

'I

Pursuant to the provisions of GCR 1963, 522, counsel
:1
I,
·'are to present a proposed judgment consistent with this
1

:j

within ten days of this date.
;\

,j
,I

!f

i

:1

A TRUE cOPY

_"' DATED:

January 28, 1980
Detroit, Michigan

APPENDIX 4
DOE, DOE AND ROE V. KELLEY AND CAHALAN (COURT OF APPEALS)
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JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, and FlARY ROE,
JANE X., .:JOHN X., JANE Y., JOHN Y.,
JANE Z., and JOHN Z., Pseudonyms for
actual persons,

05

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No.

v

50380

FRANK J, KELLEY, Attorney General for the
State of Michigan, and WILLIAM L. CAHALAN,
Wayne County Prosecutor,
Defendants-Appellees.

Before:

V.J. Brennan, P.J., and M.J. Kelly and D.C.

, JJ.

M. J. Kelly, J.
In this case, we are asked to declare unconstitutional
those sections of the l'iichigan .Adoption Code, MCL 710.54;
MSA 27.3178 (555.54) and MCL 710.69; MSA 27.3178

(555.69). which

prohibit the exchange of money or other consideration in
connection with adoption and related proceedings.

1

The plaintiffs

appeal of right from a January 29, 1980 opinion of the lower court,
denying their motion for sOOilllary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3)
I

and granting the defendants' own motion under the same rule.

The

parties are in agreement as to the pertinent facts in this decision.
Jane Doe and John Doe are pseudonyms for a married couple
residing in Wayne County.

In response to

posed by

the Attorney General concerning the Doe's

and whether any

children were born of the marriage, the Does filed virtually
identical affidavits stating the following information:
"2. That he [shel was married in the
Michigan, on August 20, 1965.

of

"3. That he [she] is the father [mother] of two sons
ages eleven and seven years."

181
From the nonresponsive answer to question #3, we are unable to
say whether the two children were born of the Does' marriage or
are adopted.
It is alleged that Jane.Doe has undergone a tubal ligation,
incapable of bearing children and that

rendering her

the Does "wish to have a child biologically related to JOHN DOE".
Nary Roe is employed as a secretary by John Doe and also resides in
vvayne County.

The complaint alleges that these parties contemplate

and intend to enter into the following agreement:
"(a)
That JANE DOE and JOHN DOE will pay ~1ARY ROE a sum
of money in consideration for her promise to bear and deliver
JOHN DOE's child by means of artificial insemination.
"(b)
That a licensed physician will conduct the artificial
insemination process.
"(c)
That prior to the delivery of said child, JOHN DOE
will file a notice of intent to claim paternity.
(d)
That at the time the child is born. JOHN DOE will
formally acknowledge the paternity of said child.
" (e)
That r'lARY ROE will acknowledge that JOHN DOE is the
father of said child.
" (f)
That AARY ROE will consent to the adoption of said
child by ,JOHN DOE and JANE DOE".
The agreemen"t also provided that

would pay to t1ary Roe

the sum of $5,000 plus medical expenses.

In addition, tiary Roe

will be covered by sick leave, pregnancy disability insurance, and
medical insurance from her employment while she is off work having
the child and recuperating from the delivery.
I

allege that the disputed statutory provisions

The

impermissibly infringe upon their constitutional right to privacy.
This right, first recognized in Griswold v

.:::.:::.:::::c:.:.-=-:=-:":::'::::
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us

479;

85 S Ct 1678; 14 L Ed 2d 510 (1965), was more recently described in

431 US 678,

v

2010; 52 L Ed 2d 675 (1977).

In

97 S Ct

the Court specifically held

that the decision "whether or not to bear or beget a child" "VJas
2

among those protected by the constitutional right of
See also
(1980)

v

us

S Ct

65 L Ed 2d 784

{'"The constitutional underpinning of Wade was a

-2-
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that the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes not only the freedoma:
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal
life". )

and

choice in certain matters of

While the decision to bear or beget a child has thus been
found to be a fundamental interest protected by the right of
see

v

. 432 US 464; 97 S Ct 2376; 53 L Ed 2d 484

we do not view this right as a valid

(1977),

to state interference

in the plaintiffs' contractual arrangement.

The statute in question

does not directly prohibit John Doe and Mary Roe from having the
child as planned.

It acts instead to preclude

ffs from

paying consideration in conjunction with their use of the state's
adoption procedures.

In effect, the plaintiffs' contractual agree-

ment discloses a desire to use the adop-tion code to change the legal
status of the child--i.e .• its right to support, intestate
successsion, etc.

this goal as within the realm

We do not

of fundamental interests protected by the right to

from

reasonable governmental
The plaintiffs also allege that the state has no compelling
interest sufficient to j

the prohibitions embodied in the

disputed statutes and, in addition, that the

are drawn

too wide to reflect any l~gitimate state interests in this area.
Our disposition of the foregoing issue
of this issue unnecessary.
Affirmed.

3-

however, renders consideration
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1
The statutory provisions sought to be declared invalid
provide:
"Sec. 54.
(1) Except for charges and fees approved by
the court, a person shall not offer, give, or receive any money
or other consideration or thing of value in connection with any
of the fdllowing:
"Ia) The placing of a child for adoption.
" (b)
The
, recording, or communication of
the existence of a child available for adoption or the existence
of a person interested in adopting a child.
(c) A release.
(d)
A consent.
"(e) A pe"tition.
"(2)
Before the entry of the final order, the petitioner
shall file with the court a swon1statement describing money or other
consideration or thing of value paid to or exchanged by any party in
the adoption proceeding, including anyone consenting to the adoption
or adopting the adoptee, any relative of a party or of the adoptee,
any physician, attorney, social worker or member of the clergy, and
any other person, corporation, association, or other organization.
The court shall approve or disapprove fees and expenses. Acceptance
or retention of amounts in excess of those approved by the court
constitutes a violation of this section.
" (3)
'ro assure compliance with limitations imposed by this
section,
section 14 of Act No. 116 of the Public Acts of 1973,
being
722.124 of the IiJichigan Compiled Laws, and by section
4 of Act No. 263 of the Public Acts10f 1913, as amended, being
section 331.404 of the Michigan compiled Laws, the court may require
from persons who were involved in
way in
f
exchanging ill formation
locating I
assisting, or in any other way participating in the contracts or
arrangements which, directly or indirectly, led to placement of the
person for adoption."
Ii

f

,

* * *
·Sec. 69. A person who violates any of the provisions of
sections 41 and 54 of thi~ chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon any subsequent conviction shall be guilty
of a felony."
2
Court summarized those previous decisions in
which
0
privacy prohibited unwarranted governmental
interference or regulation and which compelled the Court's conclusion
as to the right to bear children:
"Although '[tlhe constitution does not
mention
any
of privacy,' the Court has recognized that one aspect of
the •
I
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is 'a
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy.' Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 152, 35 L Ed 2d
147, 93 S Ct 705 (1973). This-right of personal
includes
'the interest in independence in making certain
decisions.'
429 US 589, 599-600, 51 L Ed 2d
S
ct 869 (1977).
outer limits of this aspect of
not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the
that an individual may make without unjustified government interference

:
184
!

'.

are personal decisions 'relating to marriage,
338 US 1, 12, [lB L Ed 2d 1010, 87 S Ct 1817]
316 US 535, 541-542, [86 L Ed
1110] (19
Eisenstadt v Baird,
454, [31 L
S Ct 1029]; id., at 460
Ed 2d 349 '
9] '(White, J.,
;
v
, 166, [ 88 L Ed

Skinner v

,

~"""',....-,~

and education,

4)

v

US 510, 535, [69 L
1070, 45 S
,
v Nebraska, [262 US 390, 399 (1923)1, [67

~~.~

ALR 1446].'

Roe v

147, 9 S Ct 705. See also
414 US 632, 639-640,

at 152-

.~-=~~~~~,-~.-

126 (1974)."

,\,

, ,-j.
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE

GEORGE SYRKOWSKI ,
Plaintiff,

HONORABLE ROMAN S.
GRIBBS
P-14369

-vsCIVIL ACTION
NO. 81 122 683 DP

CORINNE APPLEYARD,
Defendant,
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE
OF MICHIGAN,
Intervenor.
and
ROGER APPLEYARD,
Intervenor.

____________________________1
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
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II

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE

GEORGE SYRKOI.;rSKI,
Plaintiff,

HONORABLE ROMAN S.
GRIBBS
P-14369

-vs-

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 81 122 683 DP

CORINNE A PPLE'"fARD ,
Defendant,
and
ATTORl'l"EY GENERAL FOR THE STATE
OF MICHIGAN,
Intervenor,
and
ROGER APPLEYARD,

Intervenor.

OPINION

The Attorney GeneraL as intervening party, has filed,
pursuant to GCR 1963, 116,1(1) and (2), the motion sub judice
for a summary dismissal of these proceedings on the basis that
the Court lacks jurisdiction over the parties and the
matter of the plaintiff's complaint.

Intervention by the Attorne

General was permitted because the issues raised by the
party's pleadings involve significant matters of State interest
and public policy.

See GCR 1963, 209.1, 1919 PA 232, Sec li

MCLA 14.101; I>1SA 3.211.

R.S. 1847, ch 12, Sec

MSA 3.181.
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Summary disposition of plaintiff's complaint is
warranted under the circumstances presented to the Court.
1 Court,

This

today, decides that the Paternity Act was not intended,

and cannot be used, as a mechanism to establish the

II rights of a
I Neither the
I

semen donor in a "surrogate parent arrangement".
laws nor the public policy of the State of

!
'I permit the direct or indirect judicial recognition and enforce-

I'
,I

ment of "surrogate mother" contracts.

The social wisdom and

IJ

II
II
II
I,I

recognition of such agreements are matters of

1ative

concern and not for judicial pre-emption.

!

In June, 1981, plaintiff

filed a

under the Paternity }\.ct, MCLA 722.711 et seq, alleging that
defendant Corinne Appleyard was pregnant with a child conceived
by him on March 23, 24 or 25, 1981.

In July, 1981. defendant Corinne Appleyard (the

I,
'II

surrogate mother) admitted the allegations of the complaint,

II'I
II

adjudging the plaintiff to be the natural and

IiI

her child.

and asked the Court for an appropriate order of filiation
father of

I
Thereafter, the parties proposed a consent order of

I filiation which requests the Court to declare that:
Syrkowski is the natural. legal

father~

(1)

tiff

(2)

is awarded custody and is responsible for care, support and
education of the expected child;
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(3)

the expected child's birth

:1
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II
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certificate shall show plaintiff Syrkowski as the father; and
(4) plaintiff Syrkowski may specify the child's surname.

In support of the proposed consent order was an
affidavit of a physician verifying the artificial insemination
of defendant Corinne Appelyard and an affidavit of Mr. and Mrs.
Appelyard relative to the artificial insemination and their
abstention from sexual intercourse during this period.

In support of the motion for accelerated judgment,
the Attorney General argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction
over these parties under the Paternity Act because the pleadings
indicate that a child is being born to a married couple through
artificial insemination of the wife with the husband's consent.
Pursuant to the Michigan Public Health Code, MCLA 333.3821(6)
and Michigan Probate Code, MCLA 700.111(2), the Attorney General
argues that the child born to Corinne Appleyard as a result of
artificial insemination is presumed to be the legitimate child
of her marriage because Roger Appleyard consented to the
insemination.

The Attorney General contends that the consent is

manifested in the affidavits filed in this matter which assert
voluntary and willing abstention from sexual intercourse by
defendant and her husband for six weeks before and four weeks
after insemination.

Though the Attorney General's claim for summary relief
has merit.

this argument advanced in support thereof is untenable.

Basically, his position is that the child conceived by and
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il born

1

of the defendant during marriage is conclusively presumed

/1 to be the legitimate child of the defendant and her husband.
Neither the law nor the facts in this particular case support
this proposition.

The statutes cited raise presumptions that

are clearly subject to rebuttal.

Upon the initial filings,

counsel for plaintiff and

defendant advised this Court in chambers that substantial sums
of· money were to be paid by plaintiff to defendant for bearing
the child and, upon birth, relinquishing custody to plaintiff.
To the extent that money or other consideration is being
furnished by plaintiff Syrkowski to defendant Appleyard in this
"surrogate parent arrangement", the Attorney General argues
that I'Hchigan public policy is being violated.

In support of

this contention, it cites this Court's opinion in
Attorney General et aI, Wayne Circuit Court No. 78 815 531

ce,

dated January 28, 1980, Affirmed, 106 Mich App 169 (1981).

Based on the foregoing arguments, the Attorney
General submits that the petition for order of filiation filed
by plaintiff in this matter is beyond the scope of the Paternity
Act.

1.

The Court has been apprised that the defendant gave
birth to a female child On November 22, 1981.
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To the contrary, counsel for plaintiff argues first

I,

ii

:I" that the Paternity Act permits the Court to determine paternity

I

position that MCLA 333.3821(6) and MCLA 700.111(2) were designed

II

for an infertile husband who submits to his wife's insemination

I

so that the child shall not be designated as an illegitimate

I
II

child.

!

affidavit and "Statement of Non-Consent".

under these circumstances.

Secondly. it is the plaintiff's

Plaintiff argues that he did not consent to his wife's

insemination and in support of this contention offers his

I
At the outset, it should be noted that this appears

plaintiff and defendant is whether the Paternity Act may be
utilized as a procedural device to validate a contract for a
I

I

I

I

"surrogate parent arrangement".

Stated another way, was the

Act intended to establish a procedure to determine and legalize
the paternity of a child born to a "surrogate mother" who was

II
IIII

voluntarily impregnated with male semen solely for the purpose

II
II

of relinquishing the child to the semen donor and his wife

I
I

under a pre-existing agreement.

The Paternity Act is silent

on its face with regard to such a situation.

Thus, this Court

is obligated to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the Legislature in determining whether the Paternity Act was
intended to encompass such circumstances.

-5-
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Under the general rules of statutory construction,
it has been said:
"There is always a tendency * * * to construe
statutes in the light in which they appear
when the construction is given.
It is easy
to be wise after one sees the results of
experience. The true rule is that statutes
are to be construed as they were intended
to be understood when they were passed.
Statutes are to be read in the light of
attendant conditions and the state of the law
existent at the time of their enactment.
The words of a statute must be taken in the
sense in which they were understood at the
time when the statute was enacted." Wayne
County Commissioners v Wayne County Clerk,
293 Mich 229 (1940); Powers v City of Troy,
380 Mich 160 (1968).
(Underscoring supplied)

Ii'I

II
II

II
Ii

Ii

Ii
II

II

Accordingly, the Court must determine the purpose of the enactment
in light of the circumstances existent in 1956 when the
Act was enacted.

II

The Paternity Act and its predecessor the "Bastardy

I; Act" were enacted to impose financial responsibility of
"

Ii

illegitimate children upon those who fathered them and to

If

protect the children from becoming a public charge.

I

People v

I'

\1

Stoeckl.

II Waite

347 Mich 1 (1956); Sutfin v People. 43 Mich 37 (1880);

v Washington, 44 Mich 388 (1880).

This intention is

manifested in the preamble to the Act, which provides:
"An Act to confer upon circuit courts
jurisdiction over proceedings to compel
and provide support of children born out
of wedlock; to prescribe the procedure for
determination of such liability; to
authorize agreements providing for furnishing of such support and to provide for the
enforcement thereof; and to prescribe
penalties for the violation of certain
provisions of this act."
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Pursuant to the Act, this Court has jurisdiction over
paternity proceedings for the limited purpose of determining
financial responsibility for a child "born out of wedlock".
Plaintiff's petition requests this Court to go beyond this
limited purpose--it asks this Court to recognize and endorse
the terms of a "surrogate parent arrangement" by declaring
that plaintiff is the legal and natural father of a child
conceived through artificial insemination of a surrogate.
A careful reading of this Act reveals that there is no indicia
of legislative history or intent that when the Paternity Act
was enacted (1956), or any time ?rior thereto, the Legislature
intended it to apply to the situation presented herein.
Further, no amendment to the Act has altered the general
purpose and intent of the Act to such a degree that it encom-

II

passes the circumstances in this case.

I'
II

The legal and public policy considerations associated

'I with the relief requested by plaintiff, and from surrogate
I
arrangements in general, clearly go beyond the scope of the
II
'I Paternity Act and the jurisdiction of this Court. Existing
authority demonstrates that "surrogate parent arrangements"
are contrary to public policy.

See, discussion in

v

Attorney General et ai, supra, wherein the Court held that any
contract by which a mother is paid a fee to bear a child is
violative of public policy.

If changes in the law and changes in

the established public policy are warranted, such changes are

il

II
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II primarily within the province of the
II
'I branches of the State of Michigan.
Ii

legislative and executive

If the State of Michigan is.ultimately going to
recognize "surrogate parent arrangements", comprehensive
legislation is needed to resolve profound societal

concerns

relating to the rights, obligations and interests of all parties
affected by the arrangements.

In passing, it may be observed

that steps have been taken to introduce legislation dealing with
the subject of surrogate parenthood 2 .

This Court cannot circum-

vent by jUdicial fiat the legislative process by enlarging the
intended scope of the Paternity Act to encompass circumstances
never contemplated thereby.

Based on the foregoing,

it is the opinion of this

Court that the relief requested in plaintiff's petition is

I beyond

the scope and purpose of the Paternity Act in light of

I the factual setting upon which the complaint
I Accordingly. this Court lacks subject-matter

is based.
jurisdiction in

I

l.thiS matter and intervenor's, the Attorney General, motion for
i

I accelerated jUdgment is granted.

I
I
2.

House Bill 5184 was introduced on October 26, 1981,
and seeks to amend the Probate COde to "govern
surrogate parenthood".
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Pursuant to GCR 1963. 522, counsel for intervenor,

IIiI Attorney General. is to present an oreer for entry by

II

Court consistent with the above opinion.

I

I
I

~/

;CW;~U~T

DATED:

November 25, 1981
Detroit, Michigan

-r{

JUDGE

,

~
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BESHEAR V. SURROGATE PARENTING ASSOC., INC.
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FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
DIVISION NO. ~
CIVIL ACTIOH NO.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL.
STEVEN L. BESHEAR, ATTORNEY GENERAL
and STEVEN L. BESHEAR, ATTORNEY
GENERAL

PLAINTIFFS

COMPLAINT

vs.

Ji;IUED

SURROGATE PARENTING
ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED
Serve: Karen M. Zena
MAR 121981
Suite 222
Doctors Office Building
250 Eas t Liberty Street
EUN'CE MOORE
Louisville, Ken~ucky 40Q'11I franklin Circuit Court

DEFENDANT

Comes now the Plaintiff', Commonwealth of Kentucky, ex rel.
Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, and Steven L. Beshear,
Attorney General, by counsel, and pursuant to KRS 271A.470 and
415.010 brings his complaint for the involuntary dissolution
of the Defendant, Surrogate Parenting As'sociates, Inc. and states
as follows:
(1)

Plaintiff, Steven L. Beshear, is the duly elected,

qualified and acting Attorney; ·General of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, and brings this

act~on

in his· official capacity as

chief law officer of the Commonwealth and for and on behalf of
the Commonwealth, its citizen$, residents and taxpayers.
I

(2)

The Defendant, Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.
!

is a domestic corporation doing business in Kentucky and organized
,

pursuant to KRS Chapter 271A.:

(A true and correct copy of the

Articles of Incorporation are· attached hereto,made a part hereof
and marked Exhibit A).

198
(J)

Inc. ,Lit
il

The Defendant, Surrogate Parenting Associates,

fllrthc~rance

of its stated business purpose of operating

wcdical clinic designed to assist infertile couples in ob-

taining a child through the process of artificial insemination
of a surrogate mother has in the past and continues to enter
into contracts for monetary

consider~tion

to the president of

the Defendant, Richard M. Levin, M.D., with couples who arc
seeking a surrogate mother for the selection of a suitable surrogate mother to be artifically inseminated with the semen of
the infertile wife's husband.

(A true and correct copy of a

sample contract is attached hereto and made a part hereof and
marked Exhibit B).
(4)

The Defendant, Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.,

has in the past and continues to prepare and furnish contracts
to be entered into by and between the surrogate and the surrogate's
husband and the natural father by which the parties agree that
the surrogate will be artifically inseminated with the semen of
the natural father by the president of the Defendant, Richard M.
Le~in,

M.D., and further that the surrogate and her husband agree

that on the fifth day after delivery, or as soon thereafter as
is medically possible, the surrogate and her husband will institute proceedings to terminate their parental rights to the child.
The agreement further states that monetary consideration will
be paid to the surrogate by the natural father upon entry of
judgment terminating the parental rights of the surrogate and
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the surrogate's husband, such consideration to be in an escrow
ilccoul1L at the Lime of the signing of the agreement until the
duties anu obligations of the surrogate and her husband are
fulfilleu.

(A true and correct copy of,a sample contract is

attached hereto and made a part hereof and marked Exhibit C).
(5)

The Plaintiff, Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General,

for the Commonwealth of Kentucky hereby states affirmatively
that said contracts heretofore designated as Exhibits B ilnu C
are in contravention of the laws and public policy of this
Commonwealth as enunciated by and through the duly elected legislative body of this Commonwealth.
(6)

The Plaintiff, Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General,

for the ComE10nwealth of Kentucky, hereby further states affirmatively that regardless of the approach taken, or type of contract
or agreement drawn for use and executed, that one or more of the
following statutory provisions

~vill

be violated: KRS 199.500(5),

KRS 199.601(2), KRS 199.590(2), KRS 199.990(4),(5); that these
violations are in addition to the proscription engendered by a
strong public policy against the buying and selling of children; and
that no 3l1Ch contract or

agreement relating to surrogate parent-

hood in Kentucky is legal and enforceable.
(7)

The Plaintiff, StevenL. Beshear, Attorney General,

has rendered an official advisory opinion regarding the legality
of the surrogate parenthood process in Kentucky, OAG 81-18.

(A

copy of this advisory opinion is attached hereto and made a part
hereof and marked Exhibit D).

The defendant through such process

will thereby abuse and misuse its corporate power to the detriment
of the interest and welfare of this Commonwealth and its citizens.
I
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(8)

The Plaintiff states that the Defendant, Surrogate

ParcntLngifsi\ssociates, Inc., is guilty of an abuse and misuse of
iLs corporate power, privilege and franchise which is detrimental

to the interest and welfare of the Cormnonwealth of Kentucky and
its citizens pursuant to Article II, Section 1 of its Articles
of Incorporation, to-wit: "To form and operate a medical clinic
designed to assist infertile couples in obtaining a biologically
related child through the process of artificial insemination of
a surrogate mother."
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, Cormnonwealth of Kentucky ex
rei. Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, and Steven L. Beshear,
Attorney General hereby prays this court to revoke the corporate
powers and charter of the Defendant, Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc. or in the alternative that this court grant a
permanent injunction against the plaintiff to prohibit it from
engaging in any business in connection with the surrogate
parenthood process.
/-Respectfully submitted,
/

(

)

/

f (.

.. ,

~

.-!~ j irf;tJ~~ -'- '._-._
I'

~rt

L. Chehbweth
Deputy'Attorney General

/ .dY3,

J s
R. Jo nson
H sistant Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Attorney for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
Stcvcn L.

Bc'silear, Atto 1_-ncy General, C0I1Il11011WeaLLh of

Kentucky, states that he is the Plaintiff in the foregoing action
and that he has read the foregoing Complaint for declaration of
rights and the statements contained therein are true and correct
to the best of his knowledge and .b-,lief.

~

,_

./")

/ ~><:1f -'
/7
' /-- / ~)G/~~-L

Steven L. Beshear
Attorney General

Subscribed and sworn to before me by Steven L. Beshear,
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, this IJ c.L day of
Mar c h, 1981.

'1 ~ ~I
cf}g ~I
~~/l~ Ul0L Y} I,u.f:#
~otary

My Conm1ission expires:

~~2f;

tit'l

Public - State at Large
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lrJC()HP()I~I\TION

1\i(','lCLE5 OF

QF ,,'

SUHROGATE PARENTING ASSOCIJ\'fES,

'h, J,',",

"

,

INCOHPOHA1'£D

J1:

I

Ii I

l

,

I<NOI-lN BY ALL I'IE~ :~~ Tll~SE PHESf~TS:

..~

J'

!.

,

I '

,,

The undersigned, pelnn a natural person of the age of
I,,;, (\ ,

,

':,,' :

,~

'

\

,

eigh teen (18) years or n,10r.1~ Ii pps,ir,ing J~ :form a corpora t ion, [or"
, ,
j: ~ l'l L ",
profit, does hereby certify.
~ L'.1 j ' "f
' I. '
1\';

I

'

, I,

, ,\'

I

I

"1

'" 'f

,. I';;

ARTICLE I
"

The name of the c~rporation shall be Surrogate Parenting
I '", (' ! ! : : y : I'!
! ,I'
I ' ,,
\
Ass 0 cia t e s, Inc 0 r par ate d, ' f~\ ' \
'
1 " !\;
JI~,,, ,\ , i
AHTICLE II"
,'\,

i
I '

"I \

\

"

The purpose for which the corpora tion

:p, ' , ~ I "'~J.
\'
:, ,

.' ' as [011 ow s :
I,,'

, '~~~' ,:"

1.S

formed is

.'1

'I

'I
',; ,

,",

' .

i

t'

,)

t r

"

" I:'

To form and ',?p,~ra,~e,a medical clinic designed
'4,'

~

':,'.1:'\

"

(1)

\ ,"

t"

.': jli"

"

'1 \ .},
1

,

to as 5i s t i nf er ti Ie couples :~+.n ,ob~ainirywa biolog ically re 1a ted, "I': '/
.,~ ,~ f,

'

~f' artifiqia~Yinseminatioll

child through the process

i

1'

To rnanufacture I

, " : •'

of a

:".!,
1, '

(2)

'\ '

",:

I~

; t"'!

surroCJate mother.

'

purchas~ or acqui,re in. ~ny,;

:~": ,I ,

I"I"~~':

I,

, " IJ"
, ,t.,'1
;!",

:

~i.ii!,i},:::

o~n,V'm~~':~aCJe:,\I~led~e: sell,,<trans.fer,'J~~!;:::~

lawful mtllll1Cr and to hold,'

I"

" . 'J'

'

I :

'.

~ I :'

or. in ullY mallner dispose of.'l 'and to deal and trade in goods,·

.,:~i:,'

war e s,

..I,",'

III e

r c I w n cl i

SC,

and pro Pl2, r t y
" i

l~,

0

fan y and e '( e r y c 1 ass , i::l n d
,~

1

'

~,

"

description, i::lnd i.n cJny par,,~jof' the '·world.

!I

()

i,·'

":.' i

:;

EXHIBIT A
".

, ~

'

1\

'

.
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TI) :I('quirc Llle ,~,ll()d \-1ill,

(J)
Co ulldt'l"t;d~~

tll'a

LIJ(~

in cash,

slltne

"

rigllts and pruperLy, and

""hulL: or any pan: of lhe <ls!;eLs or ii;lu.i.iici.cs

the fltock of ,t;his company, bonds or othenvise;.

to hold or in any n1clnl1er to dispose of the whole or any part of,

I'

I

to . ,~onJuc t in any lmvf u 1 malme r the

the propc r ty so purchas ed i

whole or any part of any business so ,acquired) and to exercise
all the POi-f(o! r s necessary or convenient in and about the conduct

,

,,

and management of such

bus iness .* '

,"

.,1

•

(4)

To apply for, purchase or in any manner to acquire,
•r,

and to hoi d, mvn, use and

0

per ate, <:m d to s e 11

0

r ina n y

r:1 ann

I",

"

,J

\ ....

er

'(1, .

dispose of, and to erant license:.o~ other rights in respect of,

.

'.

j'

and in allY manner dea 1 with, any, and alI r igh ts, inven t ions.

..

, ,

,

,

improvements and processes used~·.in connection;; i-lith or. secured
:

under letters patent or copyrights
of the United States or other
,.
countries

I

1 •

or otherwise I and to;,;Hork, 0rJerate or develop the

same and to carryon any business; 'manufacturin~ or otherwise,
I.

'I

a',

which may directly or indirectly,!'"~
effectuate these objects or
., it
.

any of them.
(5)

~J

.

' "

., ,I, I. ,I ~ "J

"

,, .
,

1

,

,

,.n·r
To Guarantee, purchase, hold. sell, assi3 n ,

..

transfer, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of the shares
.

'~"''''

;'"

I

.

of the curltal stock of, or any~bonds, secu~ities or evidences
'.

(

of indebtedness created by any ,other corporation or corporations

,,

"

I

of this C(JllUllOllvlcalth or any other Commonv:ealth or State, country,
'1,1

'

t:

nation or government, and 'vhile~'o\vncr of said stock may exercise
of ownership. including; the
all the r ighls, pOvlers and privileees
'.
.

a('
yi r'
"

. .1:
.,'

,;

'

.. :' ~
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d.ght Lo voLe Lllen~()I1,

to

the

extent au natural persons Might

5illll(.!

or coulJ do.
.

f' 'V

(1

l.Y

(G)

I I

Toe II t e rill to, . [ll c1 k c a [l d per. f 0 nn co lit.: r ;J c t.s

k i. Hd \ lit t~ a 1\ Y I' e t' son

f 1. rill,

I

<l :3

0

fl .. "

' ..

s u c; i aLi uno reo r p 0 1.' a t ion,

l\Iuldclpality. botly politic, country,' t~rritory. State, Govarnmor t
or colony or dependency thereo~" and,.without limit as to amount:
,

to draw, make, accept,

, .,,

,

endors~, ..:discount.

execute and i.ssue

promissory notes, drafts, bills.,.of exchange,· warrants, bonds,
'I'

deb e n t u res and

•

the r neg 0 t i a b ~ E?,:

0

,

"

r \ t ran s fer a b 1 e, ins t r um e n t s .

0

and evidences of indebtedness .whether secureel by mortgage or
. 0

therw is e, as vie 11 as to s eculju., the.;same, bYI mor t{1age or

0

the r:-;

i;'.!

"I

as vlell as to secure the.isame by.mor,tga 0 e or ,pther-wise, ,so
I.)
, "Ii .
far as may be pennitteel by, the:\:laHs ,of.r.,the,)C;;olTunonweL\lth 0'£ Ken.tucky.,,!
wise,

,

,

"

(7)

:

its

0

bj e c t s

vI i

.,

\

,'\',

Tol1ave .of fice~r, conquc t . :i ~p, I bl\s ines sand, r,romo te
t It ina n el

District of Columbia,

III i

,.r
t.~. Ken t

tho u

u c k y " , in,

0

the r S tat c s,

•• 1

the

the .. tcrIji',tor ies and, ;e,o lonies.. of the Un i ted

States, and In. foreign
or amount.'.
(U)

to the

S

To do any or ~n\.~,' of I. the' lthings . s e t,t:y~ th ,above:

':lIne extent as natural ~ersons m:i.ght' or could elo anel'

'.: (9)

In, ~;eneral tovc'orry ~:Jl1\any..'i other bustne~~. ~n
,; "'

connee tiOl1 l he revl i til whe tJlerol!llanuf ae turipG .. or L () clH!;rw,i..s 0" "n9 t .

;

forbidden by Lhe I lavls of, Kentucky, and vlith. ,all .. the, pOVlCrs ..

. yr'

,

~

I .

'\.-,,',

,

1

,,~,~.,r~·"'·1
.
,r
J

'f
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J' '" j"~'"

"'I'

"

':'

':':';.

t "d.l,
;

rtF

,

",.'l.t--

'I

,-3"\

''''/'/

"

....

..'

,

."./ ..';1,,:

.,,1,11' ,

",1;1;

. '!

,

"

./.11',: ~ ,; d.! r, .'

.:

"

. ':;,-, ~
J

,

\

•

LU::>

/\1\'1'I.CLL

Ill.

rdr!' JeLL:

1v

" Ii.
"

,

The registered office of the COl:poratiol1 in tile
Conunonweillth ~)hC11.l be suite 2~2, [)oclor~; Off.i.ce ollilc1ill(],
'

,

250 East I,iberty Street, Loui~vill(), Kentucky, 40202,. C1nd the

,

,

,',

process agent .i.s Karen M. Zena, suite 222, Doctors Office
I

I.

-,l

'

.

Building, 250 East IJiberty S~;eet, Louisville, Kentucky, 40202.
,,
l\HTICLE V

.'

"

,

The authorized cap~~~al of' the CorporLltion slwll be ONE
\'

THOUSMlD (10 a0)

.

,; I

sha res of comt;'l'on stock having a no par vill ue, wi tl1
J 1'1\11"

,

.. '

i-

each outstLlncling share entitled ,to one (1) 'vote and each fractional:,
"~fl(ff"~

.

~i.s

I·.I~

shilre thereof to its equivalent fractional vote.
l\HTICLE VI
"I,"'fr,'
0 (

The nc:une and I, addre,5s,

,

,;'

"
,I

',I,

, '~,

'! "

i

I

the Incorporil tor and the number,' "~I,

of shares of stock sub s c rib e dl~ for her is: ~l.tll
•

I

,;.

~I:'

"',

~r'

".,.j", t.::,'
,,'I~' ~

I·'

.I 'I

I,

l\HTICLE~VII

" ""I

I

,

:

I

~

f \

"":j"
I \

~

, j

• I'

••

'j',

,,.,;,,1,,
Suilo. 222, Doctors Office .. ouilding,
250 E(1st Liberty Street' 1 "
Lou i s viII E!, ,K. e n t u c ~ ~' 4 0 ~ ~ 2 'l1 f'\. \ tit' d

500 Shares
I,

ZEN/\

.'

'

,

.IJ'

), ,I'

1'''','', ,. ,

','

"

'
The number or, qi.r~q,tJ.ol'S to be <:1t,I.e~,ted,: at ,the first,
, I
~

•

" ..

',II!

the Shareholders'f ~'f",,·
sQp,ll'be two.
Therearter,
,I' .
of [)irectors to be elected sha,'
~Ibe~at"
the discretion of 'a
t Jv·1? .. "'.
'.

mE.!etirFJ of

,

I

I

"

III

Iniljority vote of the ShureholcJrrs..;i::Thei~itiill
,
"tvfl'• '
\

•

, r

"I

" 'JJ'

',1 'I .
,~,~

,

,

"
'\

- 4 -,~,
'I'

,I

"

.,'

I,
i

,

, 'I

,
I

I~ "\ ~, '\

'

I, ," ~'I :

•. I,'

••
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Ljl)r~rly St.rc(!L,
KoHen M.

ZCllu,

Louisville, Kentucky, 4IJ20;l,

Dnd

Secrotary.

Suite .222, Doctors Office lJuilding, 250
,

1

t:u~;1

Liberty Street, Louisville, K~ntucky, 40202.
ARTICLE VIII
The SharehoWers of the Corporation shi)ll not be 1

.,

for the deb ts of' the ~?rporu t ion.
"

l' !

"

,

•

t I

,

;.~"",JII

IN TESTIMONY

"
~WJlEREOF ,"'wi

/
I "C-)'~'"

Incorporator, the

\'

\ (A-" ; ' « ( .,

_~,~_dily('of
~i I"
II

\~'~ .
'I':"

, " ,'I~i
I

.

)

., I '

I II'''''''
\'
,'......
,~

,
...

I

\

'"

\

_' •

)

, ,-

~-. -,-,,~.

'"

j

",II
\

'~)

'\

',''''/

"I-:
-: .~ /".. ) '/ /(
("''! .., L .~-: _ _ _
I .. ; _----L..:".....::....::-_..!. ,..,-c_ '-:'=-''''':''''..,--_>-0-=~'---'..::....~..:.-_ _ _ _ _ __
\

I

I

.,

Karen H. Zena'

'
"

i \

~

\.'\,

,

." " ,;1

•

,

,~,'

1900.

;'

, ,

1~t'

\..

~

\
\"

I)' 1

tness the signature of the

It

L..' "

:,',~'~.~,~J~ " '
'\

I~

1,\1;"

l:

,I.

,./ .,

'"

~

!' ,,',

,I' \,

','I,'

\

,

,

"

~

",

\

.

I':

:

I

I

'I

,

,/,'

207
~;Tr\T!': (II-'

!\l':tJ'!'UCl<Y
r' f '
... ) )

...

(,

,

, ','
"I'

'/ ' , H,

I,

the undersiyned Notary Public, in illld fot- the

\'t
I
,

"\

,

,
StaLe Clnd County aforesaid,:1 certify

I

,',

'

'.'

,

that KI\T(EN N. ZCNA did

i ~

I

personally appear before mc." i n so. id S to. te <1 nd
: 'j

.1

"

COUI1

ty, and she

is known to me to be the p~~son ~ho. executed, the foregoing
instrurnent, <1nd acknow ledgefl~', the "-same to be her free ac t and
I~

~

: I
\ ::,

deed.

,', h

!

day of
,'" ,1\
•• , •• 1

I

I:

I

,

!,

I

, t,

I :

I'

'It'
,

"

,

,

, 1,1

\

.'

"

I

(~

/. I I
f

",

;

.;)

: 'I
.

,

,j

"I

t

'.

,

"

I, "

,,(
"1,\

'",',

,

,1'

,

, I' f'l,~,

,

This Ins LruPlen t Pre oared Uy::',

'

I

,II'

",1

'\

,

"

AI ~"

,

"

"

I

,,'i ,::'

IIi""I,

"j. '/ \

,'A

"

,

>-,'

"

I"

\.

I'

,/:'

:/':

\ ,",~,

!

",I( "

,;,'./;;i
'; "~I r•

~,,

?I

1'"

',' ii'

I

,

'\'1,,1

1 "\.1;1::
J',~, "I,

, .'

1,'l"1

I

t

~

,\

,

:/",:;"
"\
"

;

,

,

, I

,)

~"

,

1'1,

,

,.r~l·'
'I'

•

I~;,~

,

'

"

:

I

,
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",

.

;,,',

"

'~,

1 ,.',

"I: :.,'

';'1'\,"e '
•

';
,'j

,I

.\

"

and I,ll's.

I-:r.

1.,

I ~ \' ,

\,

"'!<:,

"
~::

,

J

'l,.;~ ,

;:E:CITl\LS

~ , '\ '

of

,

'j'

L')uisvillc, Jefferson County,;,Kentuc;ky hereby rct:ain Richard
,

II.

Leo/in,

, 't'
.,
,

to assist them'l~n",se~cqting a suitable "Surrogate

t-1.D.

'

I '

iI'

l'lother" ''''Ilo wlll elltet- into a contract
with Hr. and
/

1-11'5.

,I,

1'4,"

,__~_____...,___.-;.:..~~___-----\.;h ere by a

'(

,

",.' I

Surrogate Molher will be art i ti,i cia 11 y ,. ins em inc ted with the
,

. j'lf'

semen of 1ir,
I

~,"

"'

.,r', 'f'

'~

,

~.1

Up 0 n del i v e r y i t i s e Y. pee led i ~.h () t

',' Ii

.

'

, I,

,

'

"

,

'I' :1'
,', \

,

,

...

I,
"'1;-"
'W"1

the Sur roC] ate 1< 0 the r
,

,

,

il n d

1

,

'I

~

I 1

,I

,

child by Hr. a:--.d

.

Mr~.
"

, ,I

,:

1'1'

'\'

1 :

I','

,

, ,I
,

.

.

,

,I. •

,

\

'

i I /.
" '
i ~

I

"

, :',,1,1

. t I, f ~ , ~

(1)

t'lr.

and i'lrs.

.

,4" .

h'2reby pCly to Hichard f-1.
s(!:-vic'2s

hc:rcund~l-

, ,
,~

a,s compen sa t ion for his
Levin, !-1.D
,t, •.
I

h

l'

, .'

\II' .

,

I

" 1

'

•

expressly un~erstood thut nichurd H.
I

t'.,

I

. ('

", 'r'~ f

I

'i

"

I

f;;,':j

Lev.ln, /l.D·Vi:!,h

does not guarulltee or wal"rant/~that 'the Surrogute 1'1othcl" will
, I

I 'I"

i&':,
, , ( ;,1'1 \

...

I

I-

I, \

','I

~-------------------------------------,':

lS

!~

I"""
\q,~,
,(',40"

the sum of '$

1

It

"'fl'I"
'
~ I

I

,

(2 )

~

I,

,: ,i"

1

I'

i'i \ I
I. ~

• t'
,

in [<lct conceive a child [uther,cd
by r-lr.
,'JI'I\'\

',"
"j

,
'. i

[Jor does HichiHJ 1'1. Leyin, 1'1.0. gU<lrantee
I~'"

thut if said child is conceived it will be a he.:llthy child free of,
,

)i.

\,

,~

, I

'j

j.\.

\"

.

r:XllIBIT B
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,
I,'

u~J

it

(3)

flJrLhcl'

15

paid Lo P,ichard

Levin,

(-j.

UnG0rstoOcJ tllilt

/10

!)ortion of

the fce

is refundable fp.gard1css of

f·i.D.

1/

"

------------------'-----------eve r

between
and

t o t he COil l r (J e t c n \: ere c1 i n t 0

r e c e i v c c1 chi 1 d i' lll' sua n t
/·~r.

and '·lrs.

tile S 1I r r

/·1r.

(t;)

/·1 0 the run d

0 l];l t C

her ,,'h1 usb llll tl .
i
I ,

,

'fi,

(lnd i'll's.
if'

,,'

[ u r the r

cJ

C h.1 r d ':1.
Lev in, r-1. D. h tJ r mI:
liabi1iti~s '(I~~soc,iclted \",1ith the SurrO(,!c1te

t. hey w ill h C'l d n i

9 fee t h L1 t

'I,'

'",i'

ll:?ss from ully and all

!.

I.

'
Hother procedure and tlle expcctedadoptioll.
i/o" \
It~
',. . ~ I

, I

/·1 r.

(5 )

h c1 vel:; '2 C 11

<1

t1

n cJ J.1 r 5 . '

cJ v .:. sed

0 [

"IWL,

I

;'dl

i '\',

,

I

""

"

,

------------------,',-.'~I~I~~----------------------

and ace e r ~; , the • r i

5

,"

kin h pre n t i n in e (; n c1 n c y

" , ',", ~

,

i1 n d

chi J ubi r t h

5urrO~iL)te

11 n d

of

I-jollicr will

1I )(' r i

}~I~ l hilt ,t 11 c . c!l i 1 d

oS

(;O::1indnt or rc:c(:~;si\.'c.

,),,"

In lhc event oflitigntion by or bct~een Hr.
.... ".\' ,/,1
. I ~'KII/li'1
'. ,- (

,~J

llotllcr aIld

. I.

'"

-----------------------------. .'

t·1r s .

her

:1\lslJillld

HicllilrfJ

f'1.

either

and

",]hd the Surrogate

I

+",'

vlecJlth or l<cnt\lcky and/or any other stZltc,

gove'!:niIFJ bocJy,

.

t

fl
J

Levin,

J1rltion,

or other

M.D. will be compenslIted at

I

j

I

'I'

cJn hour 1'1' ri) tc of

~,

_ _ __
"
"

I,
'1,1,

I

I

L

.

'I'

their [C1milj; 'uncl/or the COl11ll1on-

(Jlld/or

,',j

, ,I;!
",

.",'~ ': ).

.

Attached E>:hibi t

(Sec

,

(0)

born to' t 11 c

pos~cs~ '~fll<Jcnit~l ab'~ormcJlities

,I

,'I,

nu
f '..d'

d:lj'

,:,),.

reI ;1 l (.' ' 1 I:.

~x:c:··

d

I ,)' ~

I I

'HI,J

i ,-,

1 \""ud.

Oil'}

i

III.'

I

w: i :)1:\

Lr: S l ill,UIl::

(lrlci/or

c; u r: l~ i ') r 1 •

OJ ~~ltln~ signed by all parties.

, I,
I

,'( i

,.'.1

I';,

'I,

";

/i

.)

IF

I

',t

"

;·lr.

:1

Date

I,

. J,'

~.,'

Mrs.

.. _---._------

Dcl

,r.

.&, ...., •••

te

JI'

--------------- - -

,'"

DcJ to

.
;

,t ~I~'\'"

S t i) teo f }; e n t u c k Y

/

"~r'I""

"( hi

of Jefferson

,.~,

,~II,

\,~t;

,

I

\

/JD

county

--_._._---

,.
,

'I, .

t/~

.,', J

, ~I/

I)

, I·,

I

/ "

II,'

1 •

",
;1

The

. ,

foregoiny instrument was acknowledged before me

this _ _ _ _ clLlY of

,'I"

_ _ _ _ _-'--,J.J.t1'

,

,

,

I

t,

'

:r '

1 9 a 0,

t

II

y,

.

I

lJ Y
.\

,

unci

~

I

I'

,

,
"

",
.

lJo L cJ
fly

ii '!ju l~ p.~c ~-:-~; i:.-~IL(!-=-ii·i.: -= Lel1:~; c',-- r;eIl t lie ky-,

\,

cornm iss iO,ll
I

I

i

,
,k"

~al.'
.

19

,

,
,,

CXIH

res tile

cluj' of

,; \

/

,

<::11

,

I

';',

: \ I';,

. q ':,
"

1900,

','1

lJy and bc l'..JcclI

- - - - - - _ . ______ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,____ .. __ .-J. _ _ _ _

La

uS

"Husbi1nd")

illHI

(hcrr~ ,lll'l

[to r rc Ee r ned

--_._.. _----_._--------------

(h(!rcln<1[lcr re[crreu Lo d~; "N,ltural l'i1l1lc~r")
!' ..

HEC]
Tf\[,~;
,
_
__
,._~If

}:ll

"

1\

'

"/

TillS l\r;n[~r:;~lUH IS mLluc~y~~ll rC[,,~r.enl~e

Lo the followillq

'I'

(

"

,'I

(.lctS:

"1(1
(1)

1

The Nature1 Father! is r1 mar.ried inc1ividuill over the
'flrC

iHJC

of eicjllt.een (UI)

[ollowinCj

\.,

yc'tlrs wlJo is11desix'ouB of, cnLl?rincr into L1w
",{

-

' /

l.I!Ilrlr'·" :'

. /1

aCJ rcemCl1 t.

(2 )
biolo',llcolly rcloJLc:cl

lo him.

\

(10). yCill~r. who Ll1'C desirou9 of

, f!II!~"

clILcrinq intu thc /01101vil1'1 r1qrccfTlcnU; :in"con~jiclt:'!riltion of

.

.

,~~'

the fiJlancldl t'C'lllllIlCl'ilLioll incident ill'l-f to •
.,;1''''

Nuw Lherl~(or(~,

\,

'

ill considcrilLi,.?Jl"lot tile fTlut\lcJl I?romi~e~~

.',1
,

cOlltllincd
ll(~rcuy

thc~

Ilcrc~il1

':llld \vith

pClrL.Lc~;

iHjH'C

Llle
il~)

int6;~tioJ1s

o[.ucin<j

"

lCCj<1l1y uoullcl,

'

[allows:
,

,

'".( I

I,

I

'EXHiBIT C

"

212

conceive pursu.Jnt to Lhe provisions of this contract ulld shall
[ r eel y u n cJ r e iI cJ i .1}' w i L11 i n u r e u son u b J c

t e un i n il t c

U_ me,

.:l

11

ptlrental riCJllts Lo srlid child purSlIclllt to tilL; flqrecment.
11.
Slllce

have been married

TIle SurroCfute und her husband
I:

------------

onl!

with tile pllrp()~;es, inlcIIU;,
und
and uCJrec~; lIidt IllS wifc,

n
~

the

II\lsblllld is ill <1,:]r(2CInent

r 0 vi,., ion
s [) f
I

t his

the SurrollL11:0., shall
:f,:

-

1)0

I: I

i] q

'

r e (: III c n t

u r l i [ i cia 11.,.

ins'C?mintltcd pursuant; to Lhe pl:ovisioll:i o[ 1IIi~;
lIusbilnd 'vlill not

TIle

.:,'1,
'f'

.

forlll Cl fJur(,llt-c~lld'

t: c

I

,'f'

child and Lhe SIJr}'()9atc llIol)' c(Jl1c~iv(!
o

,

1> Y

1 uti 0 n !~ hip wit 11

il II Y

0'0

<l

r t.i [ i c i

,1

l i n s c rl1 i 11 iJ t ion

t~JI'Ll.'c(~ly LlIIU rf?ddiJy lcndl1ilte

hel:cill illlcl olqree.s

all [Jilrent..:il ri!j1Jl!; Lo sil.i.d child ~llld ackllOw1edqe5 he will clo
,

all acts

ll!!ce s sa ry

provided under
J II .

KHS

to rebu t
,

40J

ill C

TIlL! NcJtural

r 0 9 (J t e

l:

oJ

Father~.Ls lJe~(!b,~~
I

fj

,

' . II

1 u ell,nf9' l") 1 (l or. I t cst .1. n 9 .

written contractual aCJrecment
,S u r

:1

with

0,'

,i"'"

",

'j

enjterinry into w

1

Ii e r l! i

11 (l

f LL' t

,I' ;:
0·,'1

;!

,I'

I
. 1,1

~I

.

Tlw

.

reI err (' d lo il S "c hi 1 d 1/)

, :'1,

1111 l;

cart')' s<lid embryo/fctus (s)

i 1 • de l.i v (! r y .

"f1"" ,

The Surro<ja te

.,~p ~

or

ilS

1,0011

thC),C,1fl(,l" ;I!;i~j rllctlically po:,~)ihll',

in!Jtit:ut,~ pr()cc(:tlincp.;

ill LouisviLle, Kentucky to l(:rminatc lllei,r respective p<ln.!C1tal'ri'jllts

"
\

\,;)
I

Sl10111

.,,

.I I)· ~ ~ .

,

I ~.

prCCjnilll~~fl'

.J

,

'll,/

tile scmen o[ the NiltUl',ll Father,&y HICIIAIHJ M. LEVIN, fLO.
up0J) beCl)l11jrHf

i.

jj

the Surrogate wnd her husband,

I'~

.'

"

h cJ 11 be a ~t i Ei cia 11 yin S CTTl ina ted, wit 11
•

SUrroqCltc,

"
, ';','

'

the pre~ju/l1ption of pel lerni ly u,,,

,

w11 e r c IJ y t h (!

~~.I'

, I

I

•

(' Lc.

ill (lJder

tl)

fLlt-LIl!~r

Llle .intcllt. clnd /lurJlf-l!;r~s of LIli5j

iH-jlCl.'l11cllt.
·1

I"i

prior to Lhe birth of the child in ot:der to hllve th<! Natural
FLllher'n

J)alIle

pLlccd

TIICrc.~Clttcr,

I

,

" oJ:

sClid child's birth ccrtificate as tile

(Ill

• .&!

:

biological father PU1-!iUtlllt to I<RS 21J.OSO

Sec. 1.

1,~

. II

(1)

and 901 J<AH 5.070,

UIC SUt-roCJCl~e andd1Ct: hUSIJ<l/ld sh.:d1 do <111

acts necesscJq' Lo pennit the adoption

,

qf

said child by ,1n'/ party,

upon reOllest by the Natutal Father.
IV.

Tile Natut:Cll FClthcrvand the SurrQC)atc and

.)
hCL-

',I

huslJu nd recoy 111 ze ilncl acknow ledCJ~t~.LhCl t
father,

t~c

i.l

t torney

(s)

for the UtJ Lu r ,11

Yatie 13rophy, shtlll i1ct';~~~,;Ip.qcnt for,theNatural Father 111 ul1
,

.

matters pertaining to tllis ayrc'~I~~;rt. in order to muinLaill
C()f1lp~'Cte

confidentiality.

ffl;~:!'" l

, '

~ .1~.

,,', !
.I

1,:-!r,,"I'

V.

The consideration for, t.his Ilyreerncnt, in addition

, Jt\;,r, I ",','

to other fJrovisions cont<1ined herein, shall be as follows:
'I ' !,1/
~:t.'~. '.
<1 .
$
,

'.'\

shall be )J<1id ,to" the .surroy~te and her husuLllld
It!

upon entry of

the

.p

I

,

jlldYll1cnt [ully'~termin<1tinq .,~he parental riq/lU;
\'

d g

dc ri

11 e d

by t lJ C

Ie1 vJ

i n l\entuck'~>'I'jO[ the :~ur~\o<J(1Le and'lIer hushalld,
.

purSllf1nL to the chilu

to

ue

"

I.

•

'

~l

"\.
h
bOrI~~,9' the provl\~.lOI1S Cleth/een t e

Surroqate LInd her husb,lncl uncI the. IJaLut'c11., Father. ,
: ~~!I,." .

U.

her II LI S l) Clll J,
F.:lther .:lL

Lhe

Tile consideration LO"be paid siJid Surroqate <1nu

s 11 cl 1 1 b (!
time a[

I, ,i4~r~1'

~

. ,
d cpo sit c d wit h L h e u t toni e y for

L heN <1 t U t" ,1 1
'11,1('
llle sl<jlliny;,o[ this, aCjrecment and held in

:re,'
,,1 .
"I·

1

(,'

,

214
l~~;CI()W utlli L CUllIpl('tiull of

tho dut il~:' ,111d ol>li<j<lL.ions of Llll:

Thu NiJturill Futllel,- 5h,"\11 pay t.1a(l £.?><PClltH]U

c.

, .,
1 n cur r cub Y t iJ e S lJ r roy ute u 11 d h c r

to h (~ 1-

h u s IJ u n d pur s u u n t

\

prc'}nancy, morc

sl'l~cificcllly

1.

1\ 11 ll1l'd i

defined as follows:

cal, ~ 10 ~; pit- a 1 i

7. tl

t ion

I

i1

n U p h u rrn.:l c e \l I. i c tl 1 I

.,'

Illborator'Y anu tller-upy expcn!.;cs incurreu in the ;jurroY.:ltc I s
prC(Jn':H1CY, /lot covered
fn(!u.i

cal

i.ll S \lr

Ot-

allowed' by her present health und O1uJor

includil19 ull:;extt-ilol dirlilry mcdiCiJl cxpensc~;,

tlllCC,

but c x c 1 LI dill ~J ull Y ex p l~ II S C !.,

[ 0

r

C ITl 0

~

li

011 u

1. /

" tl

reluted

problems

t ,\ 1.

III e n

C () 11 d

i t 1. () II :; /

I

to said pregnancy,

I.ost waqes, or other incidentals,

~'

2.

The /'Iatllrul .futher. shull not: be rcspollsil)le
,:.. ,1,1',

[or lIny laLr;nL TllL'cjictlJ expenses occurring six

(6) ....:ceks subsequent

t.o the birth of Lhe chilu unless'l"tlw meclicul prohlem/ ilbnorll1ulity

inc i uen t

~ ~o ~ hoe x pi r

tow (\ S k 11 0 W11 P r .i 0 r

L her c

(l

t ion

0 [

9

aid six

1

week period.

')1 ~', :

,~1,

.:

Tho totc11 costs~of 'all paternity tostinq.
"

.J

'.

rJ •

The Surrogate's .travel expenses incurred
, .\J:\'~

pursuClnt to this l\Cjreernent.

;J ~

",

1·

I

The Nc1tural Father shall not be responsilJle [oc

5.

"

ii'l

Clny lost wayes of the E1urroyato. or, her husbllnd, child care
ox p e 11 s C S

0

t 11 0

f

[:; u

r roy 01 Lei s chi 1 d r en

0

r c1 ny

0

the t- ex pen s (l n [) t

\ ,I .... '

spccific.:llly CrHIITH'L3tedhcrein.
VI.'

Lhe

1011owill<j

by H 1 C i i l\ i W

~l.

',W;

Ir!UllcrJitltely !wbsequent to tl)O birth o[ the chilLi,

tests 1IIld(~J: the directiol1 o[
L i~ V 1 N,

H. (). :

"
","

,

," !\

,I •

I.

J.

,

,',

1\'1:' I

(6)

,

.' !

c1

l:JLltho.logist design.Jtcd

"
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(JI\II

(I )

1I1110r]

(,')

~ ; (' l' I I III

(;'111'1'
I) r () l c .i. 11 ~;

( 1)
(II)

Ii I' rI eel I I: 11 " ',' 1111: ~;
It/hiL.t' C(~l.J/JI,L,f\,

(U or more of thr..! aforcmelltionr~d tents, Ithis contract I::Jildll

I .

lmmccllat01y terminate, and all monies'llnd/or:':lll olher.con-

.

I.

~.

,

• I'

I'

sidl:!r.ation raid to the Surrogate1and her' husbilnc1, or in their
, t'

(':~

1

'

,

1"
I'

~

behLllf, or expended to screen and/o~ inv(!stiq<lte the f.iurrolJate
Cllld/or her Ilusb,llHl ill contemplation of this Contract by tile
Natllra~ Father shall l)e inuHcdiately returned·'by

und Iter husbund to the f'laturaliFather.
and her Ii usb <:111 d ' ~, II i1 11 P c1 yin t ere s t _(J 11

the SurrolJcJ.te

In' addition,

I

S Cl

the Surroqate

i d m0 n i c s a t Ll w

u.

S.

pl'iml2 raLe existill<.J at the timc·Jsuid surn(s) were expended.

!

Tile Niltutal Father~;;hall!pay the cost of a term

VII,

life inslll'ance policy

011

the Surrbqate's life payable ·to <1 I1c1m(::-d
.

'II~

henef ic ienl' of the SUI: rO~Ju te wi th':' u pOl.icy· al11DLln L of $ _______
: t:~ ~
"iltld ~;llid\ policy' sholl remuin i l l
----~,'~:I."

e

f [ CG t

child.

t

.

./

i)[

the

f

0

,
\
1
the'natural :father shall rnake appropriute

1/\ addition,

run gemellts in his will [or1thcsupport

of~

tl1e'infant child

shoulll lw die prior to the birth of said child alld shall pay tile
cost of u Lerrn life in!:;ural1ce policy on·'his life rc1yable ill trust
, ,~

to saicl ulluocn child.

V1 1 I "

"

I
I

• I

,

•

;,,':' 'JI, . ..t

'~rG'
I

I

,

,,1.1,

,

!'.

I;.

The Sur roy t1 tea n II 1\ e r: ' h II S b i'H1l1 u tl dec s tan cl ; and

i1

9r ec

"

Lo iI~;~jUlrle all risks

incll.ld.infj

lIJC,~;ri!;k

o[ death which arc incident

~, !l

to

COI1CCP

t i.OIl,

prcqll':IIlCY,

childbil'th lIlId postJ.-l.)rLum cOlnplicatlol1s.
'I!

l\

I

copy of sLlid pos~jible r-isks <1nd/or complicatIons is attachl2d

Ill'reto and made

i)

(Jclrt

hereof.:' (See'i.\ttacl1ed'/~xhibit(:I'A") •.
• I

I"

I

\

[or six (6) t,-'eeks subsequen t to the bi rth
ji

I

I

'

1

c.,'.

\',"
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-_.-

[ q () P!' Yc) 10 L0</ .i cuI / p s y c II i

0

t ric

C V i\

LII ,I l: .i 0

by

II

psyclli,lh-ist(s) and

.._--_._---------------_ _ - ..

[1!lycholoqi!Jl (s) desionat(ld by tho

'/""."
I

fI ,I l u r () 1 F 0 tile rue

poy

0

n ,\ <J e n t

l her e 0 f.

•

The tJlIturt11 Filther shull

Llie cost of slIid psyclliiltric and p!,ychologicill reviews.

[01.-

The eVilluutiollS of 5.3id psychiatI-,lst und psychologist sll.311 be
1

submitted to Lhe tLlturl..ll Filtlle!:", tlbscnt i.llly in(orrnution ....·bich
"

would lend La identify or ullow idcnU(ic'-ltion o[ Lhe Sut'roCji.lte:
h(~r

husbiJnc1 shall sirrn prior

r(~lC!dsC

DU1.l1ol'.i.zinq the Attorney

The Surrogilte and
\.

cJncJ her husbc1nd.

,1

to their cVl..lluatiolls,

medical

,/I
t.

,',"

'",,;
, <

[or the

l~i)tur,tl

rclC'u~;e

to seClJre tht:

J'c:ll:hc!l"

.h

ur

~;ilicJ

psychicJLric
','

'~,

:,aid evalu •. ltioll~';.

e v cJ 1 U (J t i 0 II ~3
;\

.

I~

"Child"

<.IS

re(crrcd l to in thi:3 ugrcement shall

include illl childr.c!ll L'orn simultaneously DllrSuilnt to the il18Clnniltiong
ilS

d cfinec1

in the terms .::md provisions of this ilgrecment provided

,

.1

III!

the tests eTlLlmcrilteu

pilril(Jraph~lsix

III

l.,
','I

satisfactory as to each child.
XI.

the fifth
)n

ure completed and

t

, I
,

, Ii,q. ,I"
IgI

I

.',

..

I."

.

In the cvent that the' child is miscClr-ried prior to
If \

(5th) month of vre(fnancy, no compel1siltion as enumerated

Parilgruph

V(a)

t

shall be paid to',the Surroqutc.
"

!:~

expenses cnumerated in PLll~ilgLaph
Lo the Surroljutt.! and hel:
ccuricd, diL'!-l ot- l~; sLi
montl! of

(VI)

pr(~(.ll1iJl1cy

ilnd

,

I

However,

the

'

V(C)

husoilndJ~"'rn

shall be paid or reimoul's12<i
Lhe event Lhe child

i~J

m.Ls-

subsequC'nt to tlw [oll.rLh (4th)
,
. 11-1
t fJUrV1V(~,
'
the Surro(.j.1Lc
cI1l1c')lloL'!;
Ilfl-

LlIJOt'll

,
~;L1ld

I

sllull recei V(~ $ ____.______________. __ ~_ .......:~---.----C'l1l1f11P

ra tc·j ill

!,~

\.,
6

,

piHaq

"

'-,lph V

(il)

only if

.'

,

"
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I 11

I: 11 I ' elf C r1 L () [

mt

il

~; -

",1,1

tll'I\I,ll\~'te

.:mll Twithcr the Surroycll£, /lor the Nalural flltllcr rdll

:-I(

.' .~. f

/

be , utlucC allY further obliyution '11under this agreelilent.
Xl1.
rJ

The Surroqate t.llld t.he Nilt.llrul Filther, shull underqo

, I

.

.,

'.~ ~

, "

complete: pllysicul ulld ycnetic eV('\.luution, u,l1dor the direction
"/1,'

l.

ilnd supervision o[ HICl/I\IW M. LEVIN,I'1.D.,

to, uoLcrmine whether

,~,

l he 1-1 IJ y sic €I 1 h 0 u 1 Lhun d we 11 b 0 i n 9

e tl chi s sa U s f tl C tOt" Y .

0 [

i_>

I.

Suid plJysicol cXfllI:inuLion shall include test.iny for venerCJl
ii\',

discilses,

spoci(icitlly

"

<

.il1cl.\ldin~Jr!lyphilis
1I ,. . ,
,"

and

vonerill diseuse tcsLin<J
"

~.

XI1I.

'

<,Iollorrhea.

,

Silid

It

~Jllilll

be;c)orw
pripr
l.o
et.lch insemination.
,
I
J".
1

•

In the ovent thatl'.!/_p:;tody o[ the cllild is awarded

to the S U 1 l" 0 gilt C

LlIl d / 0

r 11 c r h usb il n d or l h e i r

individu,ll or orqcJnj zution,

[u m.i 1 Y , or allY

Ilot.relatcll La the Ntlturul FaLher by
Ii'

/,,'(,1 -

allY Court decision or otberwise, rthe: NtlLut'ul F.:lther shall b8

,,. 1"

en ti t led to

su In a y tat ion

',1..

•,

,

.

by t h c •~I~ ~ ~ ,0 9 ~t ~ I and/or her h 1I S b Ll n d

: :~

I

f

",

,

I\" ,

.rcla,ted~,expenses

,

•

l'

1'-

I

'.'

il

l: ere i mb U l- S e Tn c 11 t

and her husband. [01.",a11 monies and/or olher
,I \ ) I (.,

.

,~

I

'..

(~t

"

.. '

.

con!iic\cralion p<lid to Lhe surr.o~~~,P pur;sUil,nt'ILo this Clgreclllent or
expended

Oil

bchlll_ [

of

the SurroYi1.,~e t.lnd/or her
husbilnd.
I"
.
t

XIV.
learn llie iUCllli.Ly elf

fLlmily,

Lhe Surro~J8,t9. unci/or hnr· husban<l or their

not advise t.he chile! of ,said, idcntity; if known.
XV.

The SllO-O~Fltc and her 11USUilnd ilvr'eo thilt
,j'<l'.

'

I

','

they will

til

"

110t seck

Lo

"

pursu.:lI1L to

~I t

'·1

';',l.

""1'), ..

, .r,

•

t

(

'i', It"

,

sa ide 0 u r t o r de rail d s hall bee n tit
1 edt
0
i mm.1,'"
qd i
.1~
l
I,., 1_, •
.
~';urro9ate

(.':;

, J ;

.

to pay [or child !jupport or prcyn.:JIlcy

,

,

, I'i

both joinLly and severally, for ilny
nll monies they .:lrc required
, and
','
.
,

from the

\

,

~_.,

It.~(1rllLlle i~lcl1Lity of';L!w uat-ul""l Father of

ilnd will not atL:clI1pt 1.0 COlltLlct r;allH~ j f Lh(~.i.L-

jd~~IlLity

the child

is learned.

,

I , '/,.1

It

'
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Il/VjIAHI' n,

III '-he ("j(:IIL Lilat Pl-<:(JII,]IICY Iws /lol occurred withiJ\

t-LO.,

LI:VLrl,

lfli~ iHlrcf.

l

shall'tclIllin.Jte 1;:/ \yriLten

1llClll

nutlco fl:om the l\ttorncy for t1H);'Nal:urCll Fat~H!r to the SurrogaLo
, ,,,,

iI/ld/or
her husbancJ.
,
XVII.

,

I, i

, ,

1\11 purties llCretolugl'ce' tl1iJt they will not provicJe

,

,

nor allow lheir (j~JCllt~; to provido',uIly·illfonnaLion to the public,
1/

/lews medi,-l or iJlly other individual 01: group which could leiJd
j,

lo I: 11 e 'cJ i " c los u reo r Lhe

,,

I"

"

In Llle (.;Vellt thd Surroqute .. <.II)(J/o'r her husbancJ vi()latt~
•

I.'
l:i

'/1

.
.

,
') I

,1Ily,ot the provisions conLalncd :hereIn,
,

~,

i mrn (~d i ute 1 'I

,

the piJrties hereto or the

chilcJ,
XV I 11.

,

.,1·tI

t c nn j

f'

Ilil

1

led ,1 t t 11 cop t ion 0 f

thi!',fl<jreefllp.Tlt may be

,"
'

,

t !l c Nat u r (j 1 ' Fat her wi tJ IOU t

any [urtllel' liiJoilily here\IIl(Jer~IiL"\ll\' the eVent the tJatural
,

'

1

Father cJoes termilJa te chis ag~eer;wntl
be under

,

the, Nutural Father shall

'It

;

I

t

obli<jation to pay anYl1 '!1onies to the Surrogate or
, /,,:\
[
,
reimuurse rJllY of her expenses or\h.,'f~i" hU,sband "s expenses.
In
/10

~ j

,

addition,

"

,,

,

"!'
I,

" I

I

the Surrogate and her hl-lsband, must "i-eirnburscthe Natural
'

:

f'aUwr and/or DR. HICIl1\HD 11. 1 LEVI~,

.M.D,.

",'for'" all monies expended

on her behalf pursuant to this aqreement"PI:.· :1':4' ", '"
II

'

1

XIX.
pro v i cl e no i

andlh~r\hllBband

The Surroql.lte
~

11

t e r vie w S

0 [

~

iJ n y

I'~

I

agree that theY,',vill

,..

\,

kin d'.J' what so (! vcr , lei tile r

a pub 1 i c

0 [

,/-

or private

Ildtll['C,

willlollt tile p:dor' Wt'ittcll 'c 0 fl sen t
" 1,11

0

tile a t lor n c y

f

/,

[or

the l'Idr)pLive PilrcnU3.

"

.. ("

" I

XX.

I'

~I tI

'I,:, r.'!
,

'

I '

'I

'

Tile ~;lll.-r()CJ(}tc Qgrc,I~,7~;"~lll1t:."She'wl11'not abort the

child once cOlleciv~d excepl, if

lr:t

'1hc'ol'lnion 'Or' the ,1nsol1\inatin'J
~

, :'

r

I

pilysician, slich <,elion i!~ IJCC(!G~j~JTY
,

[0(;

Lllu phY[iicrJl 'lwt31tll of

the Slll-ro<"jdlc 01: t:i1C chi,lf! has bc~n'dcLerr~incd'by said physician
:n'li ~:', '

o

~.,.

I

'

"

1'11'/~iJ(JI()'1j(""lJ)'

to /'"

,J/.JllOrrn.JJ.
!

1 II

XXI.

II (:

I'

,).s:-~l/m('s

Till' NcltUl-dl Father

II p

n I:

0

r

(!.i til ( !

the legal

r

(")

r

re~iPonsiLJility

hovo bee" i'tTViou>;ly odvisod of tlie risk of Such obnotmdlitios.
(Se(] uLL1c)lCcl txllilJit "e".)

f'
I·

XXll.
that the Natural Father

III IJte e.vent

"Ii" 11

the lJir th of Lho ch i ld, soid child
of HICIl1\/W {\1. LJ';VHJ,

Social

f()r.."pl.ZlC(~lllcnt

(\1./).,

prec.1r~ce;,]!;(.:;

be 1'loced in tho

throuqh

<1

Cll 5

Loul'

[JriV,]Le

of the iJppropriute

ilCjCIlCY.

XXIII.
TlJe

SlIrroCjil

tc ilnd her, husbulld botll dc/ree Lhu t they
~I

:

;

will not seck to vicw L'llc infc:mt,·'j.chilc1 oorn purSUlll1l to
,~

,

. \

thi~;

contrcJct iJt anytil'lC', nor will the S~l.~(Oyutc ilncl her hUsLJanc.l
(!Y., '
see k tOil i e w 0 l' me c t wit h the Nat u r a 1. F <1 the r. ~'
;

I,

....

1,1'

f' ;

•

\

~ ,'

.\

XX I V .

Tlw SUrrooa
tc [urth(!r;
aq rccs" to' 'ad here to all
:;
II·
'~,
/'
medical instructions
to hex oy. RICllAHO M. 'LEVIN, M.D.

9iv(~n

iJS

W(~ll

c1grc(~S

"

..

'.

iJS her independent obstetriclcJn.·· The Surrogate iJlso
'

' , ' i'l ""

,,'

"

,

/

not to mnoke ciqurettG5i -.dl:ink

i:llly.

illcoholic beveruges,

IJ.~

use

illly

i 110g.::d dru9s,

non-pre3c;'~Pt.i.011;( mad ica tions

or prescr ibccl

mcdicutions without writt.en consent [rom HIClIlIIW M. LEVIN, t-l.D.
;,.~,J

.

u9rt~(!s to follow a!prc-natul rnedicu1 eXumil1C1Lion
", "/7'
I
cOl1si~;l of no [ewer visits thun: ,One visit pel:" month

The tSurroyate
schedUle to

·.n,I.

uuring the first .';cven months ot.,Pregnal1cy,

.

.

two visits

(each

to occur at two week iIltcrv111s) cJurin9 the eighth month of
I' ~':,

I-n e g n iJ n c Y

cl n d

[ 0 U 1- vis its

dUl:"ing the ninth month

or

( e II c 11

to,

1/"/; 0

prC9nul1Cy.
,:,',

9

'

I

c c U .t' a t wee k 1 yin t e r v iJ 1 8

)

220

nllu

~~ ~iynin.l)

lhe

~;(Ime

freely LInd volulltarily and thllt lloit/1(l};

I,

retl~jOn to oelievc thwt the other (s) did not freely

party has any

~ , 'J

I, '
'\,.

and voluntcJrily execute swid I\greernl~nt.
X;<V I.

III

I

','I

I
I.,

the event <lny' of tlw provisions' of tllis

I\qrcemen t ar.e deemed to be invalid or \lllen[orceable I

the [}wme

shall be deemed severilole from the remai.nder of: this l\(jreernent
wnd slwll not Ciluse the invalidity or

IfL,uCh

rem,1inder of this I\'jrf!ement.

unen[orceClbility of the

prov i s ion slla 11 be de(~med

I

Invul id dlle to i ls scope or breucp:h I such prov is ion shiJ 11 be
deemed valid La tile extent of

p. ,:

the scope or breudth permitted by

\

L.'

1 ill.J •

1

'\

I '

.

A

XXVII.

Tllie I\(}recment may ,be executed in two

(2)

01.-

more

.

'~I,l

Coullterp':lrts, eelell of which 5hw11 be iln ori~rillwl but, illl of

,

;1 'I

which shall constitutc' one ']nd the
,

SClfl18

instrulTlent.

I.

XXVII I.

T lJi ~.; 1\ <] l' C! e men t

'I'

set s . for t: h t ,il e e n t i r C~
!

il Sf r

e em C 11 t

,

.
I

I"
, I

1\11 dyrecnlC'llts, cuvenanLs, rt~prcspnti1tions, alld wurranties,
express

.

and implic'c1, oeal and written,
of the parties are contained
,,\,
'

tJerein.

. 'I,
,'II

"

lio other

uyre(~II1en ts I

.

.

;

covellclll ts I represcn ta tions or

Wilrrllllties, expresfJ or implieu, or']J or written,

-

have Leen made

"~

by nnyparty to the otlwr(s) with ~espect to the subject matter
of this J\y rr~C'lflelll.
!l ego t

i at i

0 11 3

I

L

1\11 prior alJd contemporaneous conversations,

po S!1 i b 1 e

till d

i)

11 e 9 e, ~

i.l

9 l' C C men t

S

i)

n d rep r e (; c n t w t i on 8

I

covenants and wl1rrantie.'J Idth respect to the subject mutler hereof
(Ire wuiveu, lIlere-led 11ereill ,lnd superseded hereby.
lJP';
f:

This is Lin

;'

'

L.L..L

i nl:<..'(./ril t('d

il()

'-(.'I.'m"11 I..

XXIX.
"
"

j

I :, ~

xxx.

J

'1'I1i9 l\<]rcclncnl has !Jeen drafted 1I1ld excel/teu

{,

I'

;, ..

,(

"

in Louisville, Kentucky and shall be governed by, continued
enforced in ilccorcJ<1I1Ce with the laws of the COlllmonwcC:l 1 th
of
:, I
',(P.
Kentucky.
(Jlld

,.

XXXI.

No provision

in this l\yrcement is to be illter-

,

'

'i

preteu [or or against ,any party because
that party or thut
,,
party!:;' legal representative drafted the provisions.

."

, i·,·,
'J, 'J

L PrepC:lrcd ,By:, '.
,

I,'
,1,1:' I

"

,,

"1"

'/r11
1"

.~

':1

,11'\

t

"

"

'; Ri\'l'l c-RATUI:: niioFITY

.
I'

Attorney at LclW
Suit<.~'1\50, 710 ~Y. 1'1ain Stl'C~el
'Louisville, Kentucky 40202
§ 0 2 - 5·B 'jl 8 7 ZF" "
j

,',('i,' 'S~ 13

\ ,I
f ~ \,

,\

';: ¥:t.'"

'

oJ

I.,

'

I', I I ::

,
,,1\'

"~~p.",,

'. \
\,\,,

"

, "~I
,,

.

, 1
'

'. i

),

'k",

';'iitr
,I••

"/
1 )'b'

,I: ,

.

.,I.

r,

,", '~'/'/

'

r

222
h'C,

---

---_._--._-.--. -----_._-._-----

---- -..

- ...... _-..

--

_._-

--

-_ .._- -- - --------------_.-

---------._--------... - . -

I I'r:oqlll

/r~

illHJ

lllUl I:llcrc

if;

.\

Uaturlll Father alld that in order to nlaintain confidentiality,

we will never see any si(jI1Clture of sClid

NCltur<Jl r<1ther,

althouyh

it is our collective intentioll to enl(~r into a llJnLlinq lC~lLll

. L

obligation.

h'
"

Surrogate
'.1
---------- ------ -------

5u r

,11

-- -:-r--

----------

rO<J.:lle 's 11 uslJt1llu

,

,

iJato
. " "-.
J}".
,

------_.-

-------_._--------

.

Attorney for Natural Futhcr

,"

,I,'
;"

State of Kentucky
county of Jeffersoll

..

The [oreqoiTlg instrUIl1Cl~(~1

ucknowledqed before

WuS

inC

- - - -day of

':1

nu

,

-----.-I'f,.,.".".r~-·,
..t

; t1'll

r'ly

l'

•
I ' tf

,,
n

I"
"

"!.
. . ._________
._________

Cummission e>:pires:

':f'

.

\

, c'~1~1'

.,~lfrl'
\' '1

I! '

• J•

-

,

I"

I'

t..t...5

I,

-- "----. - ..--~-~- .. -.--------~. _... _.... _-----_. -------------_._-- ---

ortlerto lflclintuin conf.ident.i<1.1ity, 1 will never see ilny
", I' ,

siynatures o[ said iiul"rogatc and,her llusorJnd, iJlthough it is
our collective intelltion to enter into

iJ

bindiny lcgcJl

,

olJlig.Jtion.

.1

Diltc
~I

i ,"1

,~f

I

,~

, IN\j

.

I'

,..

"

I,.

II'

,

"

Date

I

iJate

State of Kentucky
,

county of Jefferson)

':\

The for.eCjoillC) ins trumen twL.1 8 !'[\e' know ledged be [are
me
,~ft ."

,i
!' "

.
I,:

! '

this

- - -dcJy

of

"

•• !

,1980.by,l,t

- - - - -- ' , , J

1 T"

toO'
, ,

.~fI~~ ,

I

,
\

, a ncl

- d.

------------_.------

,
",'"
,
"

\:

"

,
..

,~.r'1 '.r: ,,'
I ..
"

,~

.,'
,

13

" ,,:I;

w

'f,

• f • ,

'
.

I'~

J

,

APPENDIX 7
BESHEAR LETTER OF OPINION

,

COMMONWeAl.TH or I<FtJfUCKY

,

,

OFFICE OF THE ATl"OnNEY
G£Nf.HAL
,I
5T(V(N

L.

[Jr.<;HEAfl

Anu".19 Cit NI

hAl

J(111U(1ry~,

I,

, '\
C,lI"IrOL BUILOINO " I '
Ip~"'Il'O'1 40801
,I.,: ,I

26, 1981

, I') .'

11..

.'

,:,

"1

1 \ ,

'I','

'1

·,1

I

)1.

, ii,

i

,
,

I

,1

I

"

.1.

r·l r.

J () e W<1 r d
r i (~r JourllCll - Louisv iII e Times
Louisville, Kentucky
40202,

QA G81

COil

18

Dear t1r. Ward:

....

This opinion 18 in response to your letter in which
you inquire about the legality of "surrogate parenthood"
in Kentucky.
Specifically you have asked the following
four questions:
t·

I,

ii,

I

1.

Whether' such a conti-ac t

2.

Whether ordinary custody rules would apply in
the event one or more of the parties to the
agreement changed their minds while the preg~
nancy was in progress.
"1

.,'

:~ f '.

3.

,,

~

.

I'.

Whether surrogate:';transactions can be regulated
by the state.
- "'\l"
II::
I"he ther the couple or the doctor cou 1 d be he 1 d
IiClble if the surrogate died or had her health
impaired by the pregnancy.,,

T1H~ surroqClte parenthood situation would typically
arise \o!hen a couple wants children but the wife is not
phy~Jical1y able to bear children.
Another woman, the
"s\lrro(lilte mother", is artificially inseillintlt:ed with the
~;penn of Hl(~ hUflballd, who becomc!s t.he natlH-al
father",
When the child i8 hOLn and the paternity of· the nature!l
fatht'r 11<'1.8 iW('J1 c~ltr1hli~;hed, the sllrrog<:lt:c mother tcnninates her pell-ental riqhts; the natural father receives the
child, and his wife then adopts it. .
~"~"
~1\ .

:'-'11 1

"

I.

,
, 1
,I

is 1ega 1 in Ken tucky •

oj;'

4.

, 'I'

.,
, '\'
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r-, r. \l< )/ ~
I'd(JI~

VJd I

r1
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III re~;p')Il~;C to yout" fir~;L 'jllCHlion, while severi'll
d l f f 1.\ re n t app coaches may be taken, in gene.nl1 BOlDI;? t.ype
of c'mtract br:!tween the couple desiring the child and tho
surrofjute Tllother would he necessary.
However, re<ji1rdlens
of the uprro~ch taken, because of the existence of at least
thn:0. Kentur.ky sLatl1lc" and a st:J~ong public policy against
"bahy-buyiny", it i" thc opinion of this office tll,lt any
such contract is illegal an~ unenforceable in Kentucky.

First, KRS 199.500(5) states:
"In no case shall an adoption be granted or
consent [or adoption be held v,1lid if such
consent for adoption is given pr.ior to the
fifth day after the birth of the child,"
Cl

The question artsos whether, prior to the establishrnent
of the surro(jate arrangement, the couple can legally contract with the surrogate mother that for a stated consideration from the couple to'the surrogate, the liJttcc con8ent~; or wil] consent to the wife I s adoption of the child.
Inhf~rellt in tll(' f;urrogc'lte's prolnise is that she a<Jn~es
to br~ artificially inseminated with the natural father's
sperrn and to carry the fetus to delivery.
','

'I

ObviousJy, prior to the birth o[ the child the surroya tIC' 1110 ther canna t 9 i ve 1ega 11 y bind ing con sen t for i1dop tj 011
of t.he future child; such consent would violate KRS 199.500(5).
The purpose of this statute1is to give the mother time Clfter
the birth o[ her child to consider whether or not to give
it up [or adoption.
The addition of (5) to KRS 199.500 by
the 1978 General l\ssembly indicates that the legislature
as a matter of public policy intended thal the mother, not
be rushed into making a dec~sion to give consent for
adop t: ion; rather she shou Id Ihave at leas t five days to
think it over.
"I' :
"
',
'

If

Even if the contract might he written to provide
that the surrotJate mother would qive consent in the future,
fivl:! di1ys after the child is' baril l in Oll,r. opinion the
'
contr~act would sLill be illego.1.
Even though such c1 contrllct might not fail for laok of consideration, it would
nnt be en[orceo [or reasons of puhlic policy, for it is
oiJV.lnl18 that stlcll a contr~:\Ot is mercly a subtcrfugc to Slct
n r 0 u n d the 1<'1 n 9 tW tJ e 0 f KRS 1 9 9 • S 0 0 ( 5) , by whi c h the sur r 0.gllte has in effect given consent before the pregnancy even
has begun.
' !~r

nt',
['a()I~

,JIl(~

\'Idrd

J

I 1\
CPIl:-lont

n 1e r t n 01 1/ (} i d (' h 0. d i f' fit: \l 1 tit:' IJ 0 f c () n l.r- act j l) Y [ <) r
tor: adopt.ion, <1n altc['nlltive method haB Oo6l011 d"vieod.

0

This involves the formation'of II contract:. for the termination of parental d,qhts by'the surrogate mother anel her
,
hushand,
Under ~;lICI1 a contract, the termination aqreement,1
is made bebJecn the natural father and the surrogate mother
(and her husband if she is'married); the natural father's
wife is not involved in thisl agreement. 1.1 The surrogate agrees
to he artificially insemina~ed with the semen of the natural
father and to carry the fetus to delivery.
The surrogate
and her husband also agree that on the fifth day after the
birth or as soon as possible' afterward,' they will in[;titut:c
proceedings to terminate their parental 'riCjhts to till: child,
The rwtura 1 father" a(Jn:~es to pay a stated monctary cOflsic1 era t ion i.l t1 d to pay medical J a 11 d other e xp e flf; e s .
I l i r~ our
undcr~3t.llldinq LllCll: this is the method used by Surrogllte
Parenting l\ssociates,Inc."'qf Louisville, Kentucky.
:
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1\ parent may file a petition for the voluntary terminCltion of his or her parental1kights.KRS 199.601(1).
However,
according to KRS,199.601(2)" "No petition may De f,il0.d
~Jlder th~"0 chapter prior to five _(5) days after tfle birth
of a child'"
" ,- "'~"l' ; _
",:,' /" " '
'-';" i
..
,
" \'!;It,!, .Jl'l: ,~' '~J."" ,,';
~,t . \
t ~:. .i l·,) l .. l,· I,; .
'I

"
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Once again, the publici'policy behind'sllch'a"provision
].8 apparent.
The lcgislature1intends that the mother have
time to consider her decision;' to terminate parental rights.
Therefore, the same legal roadblock appears here as in the
sitUAtion concerning consentiflfor adoption.
Even though such
a contract might noi fAil foi lack of'consideration, in our
Clpin ion the courts of Kentuqky"would not enforce such contrr:Jct
or find such contract legal:' because of its obvious intont to
c ~ rCUlT1v(~ 11 t I: H~; , 199 . 6? 1 (,2) f~QI\~ tl~e pu~,~ c p~,l ~c;:y" b~!l ind ~he
flve day waltlng Pjerlod.;, I:~~,
:i';,\,~i', ~,~,:i'
; ,', F

f

,j

I

,

t

~

,

I

Termination of parentai"rights 'is differelltiated from
consent for adoption and is covered by different statutes;
these are found at KHS 199.601-199.617,"The penalty provision is found at KHS 199.990(5)., The penalty for willful
violation of the statutes or/"rules promulgated under them
is a fine of not less than 1$20 nor more than $200 or imprisonment for not more than,30, days' or both,
,

!'

\

\-.JhiJe either of t.he abOVe discussecl"statutes"is sufficient
in and o[ itself to declare the surrogate' parcntin~l process
iller]'11 ill Kentucky, in ourl'opinion the stroflgest'legal prohibition against surrogate parenting ,in Kentucky is found in
"

I.

Mr. Joe vJard
Page 4

the strong public policy against the buying and sed 1 inq o[
children. Courts in many states have held that as ,1. maLb'r
of public policy children are not to be bought and sold~
that is, monetary consideration other than for medical
expenses is not to be made to the natural parents who have
placed their children up for adoption.
Barwin v. Reidy,
307 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957); Matter of Adoption of a Child by
I.T., 397 A.2d 341 (N.J. super. 1978). Self-seeking on the
part of the natural mother is condemned.
See In re Shirk's
Estate, 350 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1960); Reimche v. First National
Bank of Nevada, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975).
In Kentucky, much of this public policy has been embodied
in statute.
KRS 199.590(2) states:
"No person, agency or institution not licensed
by the department may charge a fee or accept
remuneration for the procurement of any child
for adoption purposes."
The penalty provision for violation of KRS 199.590 is found
in KRS 199.990(4) and states that any person who violates
the statute shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than
$2,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months or both.
It is the opinion of this office that this statute precludes not only the surrogate mother from receiving pay~ents
for giving up her child for adoption but also includes all
who are involved in the surrogate transaction, since each
of them is involved "in the procurement of a child for adoption purposes".
As pointed out in Petrilli, Sec. 29.6,
"It is . . . clear legislative policy that no one shall
profit economically from the adoption process".
Even though there is not a statutory equivalent to
KRS 199.590(2) for termination of parental rights, there is
the same puhlic policy issue.
In addition, even in the termination of rights approach, it is expected that the wife of the
natural father will adopt the child.
It is our opinion that
the courts of this Commonwealth will not allow persons to
receive monetary consideration for the procurement of a child,
regardless of whether it is referred to as an adoption proceeding or as a termination of parental rights.

,jlle Ward

11r.
PulJ(~

5

III

addi.Liol\,

199.590(1) provider>:

KHS

,.,

,

"No per,ion, corporation or (lsGociation shall
advertine in any manner that it will receive
children for the purpose of adoption !lor shall
ony ncw,3[Japer published in the commonwealth of
Kentucky nor (lny other 'pUblication which is
pn~fl(Hed, fiolcl, or .distributed in the commonw(~alth of Kentucky contain af.1 advertisement
which solicits children for 'adoption or
solicits th~ custody of children."~~

I
Tile
The puhlic policy behind tllese statutes is Clr'i1L:
Commonwealth of Kentucky does not',condone the purchiH,e and
sal e 0 f chi I d r en.
. j ,I ~p ~ ,r

,
: ,

"

In YO\lr second qucstion'you:ask about the consequences
of (l breach of contract by any of the parties.
As wc have
just stated abovc, we do no;~believe'there can be a lcg~l
and enforceable surrogate parenting contract in Kentucky
under our present laws.
This being the case, there is no
reason to discuss the possible consequences of a breach of a
contract we believe cannot legally exist'!

... : 'f"""

I'le do no te,

{

,,11.

however, there may be non-contrac tUrl.l

remedies if parties to a surrogate arrangement back out.

/"

I'

. I f the surrog (l te mother decides to keep'the chi 1 d I the
',' natural father could institute! a custody' proceediny.
The
Etlther vlou.ld need to prove' that he is' the nCltural father of
the ~hild and that it would L~e'in the best interest of the
child to be. in his custody:Ht.IEvt:!l1 though .4he natural father
is not married to the mother'of the·child, he still has the
riqht to seek custody of his"child.
The court in Swc.lL v.
Tu;-ncr, 547 S.W.2c1 435 (Ky. :1976), concluded that ~bi~
logi.c;\l father of a child born out of wedlock has the ri9ht
to petition and obtain custo~y of his child if he is suited
to the trust, CIne! i.f such is·lin·'the best"interest of the
child."
It!. at 437.
An unWed father 'has' the same ri.ql1t to
a custodyl1ea.l·ing as do oth,er-p'ar~nts. \ Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
.i . '-,
t1'l~~I':":"
': 1- ' : - ,
I'

Kns '10J./'lO(l)
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~;I:i1tes~:in"par-t:I'''"Th'ecourt

shall determine custody in (lccordancc with the best~interest8 of the
child and equal considerati~f:,shc1l1 bo, giycn ',to each parent".
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(J\lth(luqh h)lllld ill Ul'.~ Cll'lll\('I~ ()Il div()t:ce, tll~ cu!;t:()dy
ata,tllto& havo been applied to non-divorce aitu.4iltiof)kl, a,9,
Swca tv. Tu~_~~er, surra.)
"So long as a I father can produce
reliable evidence that he is the father and is not a stranger
to the child, and that ,the best interest of the child would
result, the putati~e father may petition the circuit court
for custody".
Sweat v. Turner, supra~ a~ 437.
'I
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In response to your th,ird'guestion,l,the state:would
have the ~uthority to enactlJaws regulating"surrogate ,~rans
actions so 10n9 as suchl laws dO;I:10,t,.':yiol~te ,at:lY,'lofi'lther"
parties' ! cons ti tu tional') ~i~o.r\:s .~I", I , ; ",~(.ll ,,} :, I, ~I:: (,', Ii' j

tl

1"' ,
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,, ,
\
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If the natural father~'iand' his wj,fe, df~cide they do not
want to have custody of or adopt 1 the"child r thus leaving the
child with t:h~ surrogate mother, the surrogate has Cl remedy.
She could institute a paternity action. ,KRS 406.021 (1)
states i.n part:
"Paternity~maybe determiner! upon the
complClint of the mother, child, person or agency substantially contributing to the support of the child." There is
a presumption that the child born"duringlawful wedlock or
within ten,,{lO) rnonths afte:r;:wards is, a child of the husband
and wife.
KRS 406.0ll~
Du~ithis pres4rnptioncan be overcome.
After the surrogate mother prov:es(,that the child was born
'
out of wedlock, she could seek~to impose liability on the
natural father for: the payment of!l~e,ta~PI,expen~es.
,
'
~"",,,: I.,
~
"The father of a child'which is or may be born
out of wedlock is liablo to the~ same extent as
the father of a child ',born in w~dlo~k, whether
or not the chi ld is 'born alive, for: the reason-:
able expense ,of the mother's:p~egnancy and 'con,
finement and fat" the ed)..J.cation, nep~ssary supportj
-,"
and funeral ex~ense~,J ?1':\~~1!: c?i~d ~1~~.~;,~R~t1, 40,p:~.o~ 1.
I"

,, ,I

,

I

"

The f i n<1 1 quc~s tion you !have presented concerns po ten tia 1
liClbility of the nCltural father qr the physician"lif the
sur roy a te dies or I has "he~t:'~JT",~'~PI !impaire.9,:?Yl tpe v' pregn'f.~;y,
nre ,1Wi1re that Surrogate Parenting J\ssociates hClS
wi th this problem thro,tlgh severa 1 provisions in the
"contract" between the natural~father and th~ surrogate
moth(~r.
'I'll(! surrotJute andlherhusband agree to assume~all
risk!; illcic1ent to the pregnancy, includin9 the risk of
death.
The naturul father buys, a 'term insurance policy on
the ,,\l r rog a te 's lite a.nd ag ~ee s to pay, for her rned ica 1
,.' , 01,
expe n ses.
;'10"/"
\'1,:,
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,Joe Ward
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,

such provi!'don8 <15 Iloted nhove, the natural
would not appear to havt~ any liab.ilitiea for injurif'lf.l
done to the surrogate mother hecause of her pregnancy,
except if his paternity is shown, he'could be liable for the
"reasonable expense of the ~cither's pregnancy and confinement" pursuant to KRS .406.011. A:negligence action would
not be appropriate; it is u~Flear what t~e father's duty to
the surrogate would be, and "in any event, the surrogate
would have entered into ~~t91 "arfa~gE1~~nt. kno~ing wha t risks
she wou ld be e~posed to. ., f;~ ~". ,~." IIj r"
I,
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If any of the harm don~n to the· surrogate mother was a
result of some action by the physician, the surrogate could
bring a medical malpracticefaction .. Such a suit could be
brought as a tort action in:negligence or asa breach of a
contract, express or implied'.~ Hackworthv. Hart, 474 S.W.2eI
377 (Ky. 1977).
lethe surrogate dies, 'her family or her
es ta te could bring a wrong f~'~ dea th action, against' the
physician. The standard of~eare which the physician would
be under is set out in f31ai~v.,Eblenl 461 5 .. \'/.2d 370 (Ky.
1970). The physician would be "under ac1uty to,lIse that
degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably
competent practitioner in the'is ame class'to which,he belongs,
acting in the same or s.imi lar circums tances . ~, Id. at 373.
Sef2 al~,o Seaton v .. ~o~e'nber;g~:'!J 573. S·j~'~i~~~~,~~3'(K~.1978).
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In conclusion, it is t~e~opinion'of'this o~fice that
because of the ~xistence'ot' ·the above-:-mentionea 'Kentucky
statutes and the strong public~policy against the buying and
sel1111g of children, contracts involving ~:~urrogate parenthood Rre illegal and unenfo~ceable~in··the·Commonwealthof
"\'.11
"'I~';"~~
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APPENDIX 8
HOUSE BILL NO, 5184
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October 26, 1981, Introduced by Rep. Fitzpatrick and referred to the
Committee on Judiciary.
A bill to amend the title and sections 44 and 54 of chapter
X of Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 7939, entitled as amended
"An act to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the
organization and jurisdiction of the probate courts of this
state; the powers and duties of such courts, and the judges and
other officers thereof; the statutes of descent and distribution
of property, and the statutes governing the probating of estates
of decedents, disappeared persons and wards, change of name of
adults, the adoption of children and the jurisdiction of the
juvenile division of the probate courts; to prescribe the manner
and time within which claims against estates and other actions
and proceedings may be brought in said courts; pleading, evidence, practice and procedure in actions and proceedings in said
courts; appeals from said courts; and to provide remedies and
penalties for the violation of this act,"
as added by Act No. 296 of the Public Acts of 1974, being sections 710.44 and 710.54 of the Compiled Laws of 7970; and to add
sections 77,73,75, 76,77,79, 87, 83, 85, 87, 89, 97, 93, 95,
97, and 99.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:
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2

1

Section 7.

The title and sections 44 and 54 of chapter X of

2 Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 7939, as added by Act No. 296
3 of the Public Acts of 7974, being sections 770.44 and 770.54 of
4 the Compiled Laws of 7970, are amended and sections 77, 73, 75,
5 76, 77, 79, 87, 83, 85, 87, 89, 97, 93, 95, 97, and 99 are added
6 to read as follows:
7
8

TITLE
An act to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to

9 the organization and jurisdiction of the probate
70 of this state,

--,

the powers and duties of such

71 and the judges and other officers

thereof,

courts

COURT

courts

COURT,

OF THE PROBAXE

12 COURT, the statutes of descent and distribution of property, and
13 the statutes governing the
14

disap~eafed

probatin~

persens and wards,

of estates of decedents,

change of name of adults, AND

15 CHILDREN, the adoption of ADULTS AND children, and the jurisdic76 tion of the juvenile division of the probate

ceurtSr COURT: TO

77 GOVERN SURROGATE PARENTHOOD; to prescribe the manner and time

78 within which

claims

estates and other

a~aiflst

19 ceedings may be brought in

said courts

actions and pro-

THE PROBATE COURT; TO

20 PRESCRIBE pleading, evidence. practice, and procedure in actions
27 and proceedings in
22 FOR appeals from

said courts
said ceurts

THE PROBATE COURT; TO PROVIDE
THE PROBATE COURT; TO PRESCRIBE

23 THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CERTAIN STATE AGENCIES AND OFFICERS; TO
24 PROVIDE FOR THE EXECUTION, TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND ENFORCEMENT OF
25 CERTAIN AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO IN RELATION TO ADOPTION; and to
26 provide remedies and penalties for the violation of this act.
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CHAPTER X.
Sec. 44.

(7) Except as otherwise provided in this section,

3 the consent required by section 43 OR SECTION 79 shall be by a
4 separate instrument excecuted before the judge of probate having
5 jurisdiction or, at the court's direction, before another judge
6 of probate in this state.

In counties having a population of

7 750,000 inhabitants or more, a consent may be executed before a
8 referee of the probate court.

If the consent of a parent or

9 guardian is executed before a judge or referee as provided in

o

this subsection, a verbatim record of testimony related to execu-

7 tion of the consent shall be made.
2

(2) If the person whose consent is required is in any of the

3 armed services or is in prison, the consent may be executed and
4 acknowledged before any person authorized by law to administer
'5 oaths.
'6

(3) If the child to be adopted is legally a ward of the

'7 department or of a child placing agency, the consent required to

'8 be made under section 43 by the duly authorized representative of
'9 the department or agency may be executed and acknowledged before
~o
~7

a person authorized by law to administer oaths.
(4) If the consent is executed in another state or country,

22 the court having jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding in
23 this state shall determine whether the consent was executed in

24 accordance with the laws of that state or country and shall not
25 proceed unless it finds that the consent was so executed.
26

(5) If a parent's consent to adoption is required under

27 section 43 OR SECTION 79 or if a guardian's consent is required
02440'87
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1 pursuant to section 43(7) (e), the consent shall not be executed
2 until after such investigation as the court deems proper and
3 until after the judge, referee, or other person authorized in
4 subsection (2) has fully explained to the parent or guardian the
5 legal rights of the parent or guardian and the fact that the
6 parent or guardian by virtue of the consent voluntarily relin7 quishes permanently his or her rights to the child.
S

(6) If the adoptee's consent to adoption is required under

9 section 43, the consent shall not be executed until after such
10 investigation as the court deems proper and until after the judge

1

11 or referee has fully explained to the adoptee the fact that he or

7

72 she is consenting to acquire permanently the adopting parent or

13 parents as his or her legal parent or parents as though the

7

14 adoptee had been born to the adopting parent or parents.

7

15

SeC4 54.

(7)

Except AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (4) AND

76 EXCEPT for charges and fees approved by the court, a person shall

1

17 not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or
18 thing of value in connection with any of the following:

-T-

79

(a) The placing of a child for adoption.

1

20

(b) The registration, recording, or communication of the

2

21 existence of a child available for adoption or the existence of a

2

22 person interested in adopting a child.

2

23

(c) A release.

2

24

(d) A consent.

2

25

(e) A petition.

2

26

(2) Before the entry of the final order of adoption, the

2

27 petitioner shall file with the court a sworn statement describing
02440'87
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5

7 money or other consideration or thing of value paid to or
2 exchanged by any party in the adoption proceeding, including
3 anyone consenting to the adoption or adopting the adoptee, any
4 relative of a party or of the adoptee, any physician, attorney,
5 social worker or member of the clergy, and any other person, cor5 poration, association, or other organization.
7 approve or

disappr~ve

fees and expenses.

The court shall

Acceptance or retention

8 of amounts in excess of those approved by the court

ceRsittltes

9 CONSTITUTES a violation of this section.

o

(3) To assure compliance with limitations imposed by this

1 section -,- AND by section 74 of Act No. 776 of the Public Acts
2 of 7973, being section 722.724 of the Michigan Compiled Laws,

3
4

aR~

by sectieR 4 e€ Act Ne. 263 ef the Public Acts e£ 7973, as

affieR~e~,

beiR§ sectie" 337.484 of the Michi§a"

Cem~ile~

Laws,

5 the court may require sworn testimony from persons who were
6 involved in any way in informing, notifying, exchanging informa-

7 tion, identifying, locating, assisting, or in any other way par-

a

ticipating in the contracts or arrangements which, directly or

9 indirectly, led to placement of the person for adoption.

o

(4) THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO A PETITION FOR SURROGATE
ADOPTION FILED PURSUANT TO SECTION 73.
SEC. 71.

2

( 7) AS USED IN TH IS SECTION AND SECTIONS 73 TO

3 99:

4

(A) "ADOPTIVE PARENT" MEANS A NATURAL FATHER'S SPOUSE WHO

5 PROPOSES TO ADOPT A CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE
6?RENTHOOD AGREEMENT.
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"NATURAL FATHER" MEANS A MALE OF AT LEAST 78 YEARS OF

B

.·.L.·.·

z

2 AGE WHOSE SEMEN WILL BE USED TO ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATE A
3 SURROGATE.
4

(C) "SURROGATE" MEANS A MARRIED OR SINGLE FEMALE OF AT LEAST

5 78 YEARS OF AGE WHO AGREES PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
6 AGREEMENT TO BE ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATED WITH THE SEMEN OF A NAT-

7 URAL FATHER, AND, IF SHE CONCEIVES AND BEARS A CHILD, TO VOLUN8 TARILY RELINQUISH HER PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE CHILD.
9

(D) "SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT" MEANS AN AGREEMENT EXE-

10 CUTED AS PROVIDED IN SECTIONS 85 TO 93.
17

(2) IN ADDITION TO THE WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED IN SUBSEC-

12 TION (7), SECTION 22 DEFINES WORDS AND PHRASES APPLICABLE TO SEC13 TIONS 73 TO 99.
14

SEC. 73.

(7) IF A SPOUSE OF A NATURAL FATHER DESIRES TO

15 ADOPT A CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
16 AGREEMENT, THAT PERSON TOGETHER WITH THE NATURAL FATHER SHALL
17 FILE A PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION WITH THE PROBATE COURT OF

78 THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PETITIONER RESIDES OR IN WHICH THE SURRO79 GATE RESIDES.
20

(2) THE PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION SHALL BE VERIFIED BY

27 THE PETITIONER AND THE NATURAL FATHER AND SHALL CONTAIN THE FOL22 LOWING INFORMATION:
23

(A) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF RESI-

24 DENCE OF THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE MAIDEN NAME OF THE PET I25 TIONER AND OF THE NATURAL FATHER.
26

(B) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF

27 RESIDENCE OF THE SURROGATE.

239
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(C) A COpy OF THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT ENTERED

2 INTO PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 85 TO 93 BY THE PETITIONER, THE NATURAL
3 FATHER, THE SURROGATE, AND THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURRO4 GATE IS MARRIED.
5

(3) A PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION FILED PURSUANT TO THIS

6 SECTION AND ANY REPORT OR DOCUMENT FILED PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 75
7 TO 99 SHALL BE SUBJECT TO SECTIONS 67 AND 68.
8

SEC. 75.

(7)

IN A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING INITIATED

9 PURSUANT TO SECTION 73, THE COURT SHALL DIRECT A FULL INVESTIGA10 TION BY AN EMPLOYEE OR AGENT OF THE COURT, A CHILD PLACING

17 AGENCY, OR THE DEPARTMENT.

THE FOLLOWING SHALL BE CONSIDERED IN

12 THE INVESTIGATION:
13

(A) THE CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION OF THE PETITIONER TO GIVE

74 THE CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
15 AGREEMENT LOVE, AFFECTION, AND GUIDANCE, AND TO EDUCATE THE

76 CHILD.

77

(B) THE CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION OF THE PETITIONER TO PRO-

78 VIDE THE CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE PARENT79 HOOD AGREEMENT WITH FOOD, CLOTHING, EDUCATION, PERMANENCE, MEDI-

20 CAL CARE OR OTHER REMEDIAL CARE RECOGNIZED AND PERMITTED UNDER
21 THE LAWS OF THIS STATE IN PLACE OF MEDICAL CARE, AND OTHER MATE22 RIAL NEEDS.
(C) THE PERMANENCE AS A FAMILY UNIT OF THE PETITIONER'S

23
24 HOME.
25

(D) THE MORAL FITNESS OF THE PETITIONER.

26

(E) THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH OF THE PETITIONER.

,
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1

(F) ANY OTHER FACTOR CONSIDERED BY THE COURT TO BE RELEVANT

2 TO A PARTICULAR SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING.
3

(2) A WRITTEN REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION SHALL BE FILED

4 WITHIN 60 DAYS OF THE FILING OF A PETITION PURSUANT TO
5 SECTION 73.
6

(3) THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL REVIEW THE REPORT PREPARED

7 AND FILED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION.

IF THE REPORT RECOMMENDS

8 THAT SURROGATE ADOPTION BE PERMITTED, THE JUDGE, WITHIN 70 DAYS
9 AFTER RECEIPT OF THE REPORT, SHALL ENTER AN ORDER CERTIFYING THE

70 SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION.

IF THE

17 REPORT RECOMMENDS THAT SURROGATE ADOPTION NOT BE PERMITTED, THE
72 JUDGE, WITHIN 70 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE REPORT, SHALL CONDUCT
13 A HEARING TO REVIEW THE REPORT AND TO TAKE OTHER EVIDENCE REGARD74 ING THE SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER.

IF THE JUDGE IS SATISFIED

15 AS TO THE SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER BASED ON THE EVIDENCE

76 PRODUCED AT THE HEARING, THE COURT SHALL ENTER AN ORDER CERTIFY-

77 ING THE SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION.
18

SEC. 76.

(7)

IF A SINGLE NATURAL FATHER HAS ENTERED INTO A

19 SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT WITH A SURROGATE, THAT NATURAL
20 FATHER, TOGETHER WITH THE SURROGATE, SHALL FILE A PETITION TO
21 TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE AND TO ESTABLISH
22 THE PATERNITY OF THE NATURAL FATHER.
23

(2) A PETITION FILED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (7) SHALL BE

24 VERIFIED BY THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE SURROGATE AND SHALL CON25 TAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
26

(A) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF

27 RESIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
02440'87
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(B) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF

2 RESIDENCE OF THE SURROGATE.
3

(C) A COpy OF THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT ENTERED

4 INTO PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 85 TO 93 BY THE PETITIONER, THE SURRO5 GATE, AND THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED.
6

(3) A PETITION FILED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION SHALL BE

7 SUBJECT TO SECTIONS 67 AND 68.
8

SEC. 77.

9 AS THE RESULT

(7) UPON VERIFICATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PREGNANCY
O~

AN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, NOTICE OF THE PREG-

'0 NANCY SHALL BE FILED WITH THE COURT.
'1

(2) UPON VERIFICATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PREGNANCY, THE NAT-

'2 URAL FATHER SHALL JOIN WITH THE SURROGATE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT

'3 THE CHILD TO BE BORN TO THE SURROGATE IS

TH~

NATURAL FATHER'S

r4 CHILD IN A WRITING EXECUTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY THEM IN THE SAME

75 MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW FOR THE EXECUTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
16 DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE.

THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT SHALL BE FILED WITH THE

17 COURT.

78

(3) UPON RECEIPT OF AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT MADE PURSUANT TO SUB-

19 SECTION (2), THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL ENTER AN ORDER OF FILIA20 TION ESTABLISHING THE NATURAL FATHER'S PATERNITY OF THE CHILD TO
27 BE BORN TO THE SURROGATE.

ON THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER ENTRY

22 OF THE ORDER OF FILIATION THE COURT SHALL SEND A COpy OF THE
23 ORDER TO THE VITAL RECORDS DIVISION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF
24 PUBLIC HEALTH.
25

SEC. 79.

(7)

SUBJECT TO SECTION 44, CONSENT TO THE

26 RELINQUISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OVER A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT
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TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL BE EXECUTED BY THE
2 SURROGATE AND HER HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED.
3

(2) THE CONSENT REQUIRED BY SUBSECTION (7) SHALL BE EXECUTED

4 BEFORE THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD TO BE EFFECTIVE UPON THE BIRTH OF
5 THE CHILD.
6

SEC. 87.

AFTER THE RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF THE SURROGATE'S

7 PREGNANCY AND THE COMPLETION OF THE SURROGATE'S SIXTH MONTH OF
8 PREGNANCY, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL ISSUE AN INTERIM ORDER
9 GRANTING CUSTODY, CARE, AND CONTROL OVER THE CHILD TO THE NATURAL
70 FATHER AND, IN THE CASE OF A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING, THE
17 PETITIONER.

THE INTERIM ORDER SHALL GRANT TO THE NATURAL FATHER

72 AND, IN THE CASE OF A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING, THE PETI-

T3 TIONER THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO ALL MEDICAL, SURGI74 CAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND RELATED SERVICES FOR THE
75 CHILD.

THE INTERIM ORDER SHALL BE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UPON THE

16 BIRTH OF THE CHILD.

77

SEC. 83.

(7) A SURROGATE ADOPTION IS GOVERNED BY THIS SEC-

18 TION AND NOT BY SECTION 46. 57, OR 52.
79

(2) FOURTEEN DAYS AFTER THE COURT RECEIVES NOTICE OF THE

20 BIRTH OF A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
27 AGREEMENT, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL ENTER AN ORDER TERMINATING
22 THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE AND ANY CLAIM TO PATERNITY
23 BY THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED.
24

(3) NOT MORE THAN 4 DAYS AFTER THE COURT IS NOTIFIED OF THE

25 BIRTH OF A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
26 AGREEMENT, THE SURROGATE AND THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE
27 SURROGATE IS MARRIED, SHALL BE NOTIFIED OF THE DATE ON WHICH THE
02440'87 '
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1 JUDGE OF PROBATE WILL ENTER AN ORDER TERMINATING THE PARENTAL

2 RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE AND ANY CLAIM TO PARENTAL RIGHTS BY THE
3 SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED, AND SHALL BE
4 ADVISED TO RAISE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER BEFORE
S THAT DATE.
6

(4)

IF THE HUSBAND OF A SURROGATE ASSERTS A CLAIM OF PATER-

7 NITY, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL STAY THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER AND
8 SHALL HAVE A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE PATERNITY OF THE CHILD.

IF

9 THE JUDGE FINDS THAT THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND IS THE FATHER OF THE

o

CHILD, THE PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION SHALL BE DISMISSED.

1 IF THE JUDGE FINDS THAT THE HUSBAND OF THE PETITIONER IS THE
2~URA~LFATHER

~AT-

OF THE CHILD, THE JUDGE SHALL ENTER AN ORDER OF FILI-

3 ATION ON BEHALF OF THE NATURAL FATHER AND TERMINATING THE CLAIM
4 OF PATERNITY BY THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND.
S

(5)

IF THE SURROGATE OBJECTS TO THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER TER-

6 MINATING THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, AND IF THE SURROGATE'S
7 HUSBAND IS NOT DETERMINED TO BE THE CHILD'S FATHER UNDER SUBSEC8 TION (4), THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL STAY THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER
'9 AND SHALL HAVE A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO TERMINATE THE

!O PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE.

THE JUDGE SHALL ENFORCE THE

!1 SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT AND ORDER THE TERMINATION OF THE
Z2 SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS UNLESS TUE SURROGATE DEMONSTRATES BY
~3

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE

24 CHILD ARE NOT SERVED BY THE TERMINATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PAREN-

25 TAL RIGHTS.

26

(6)

IF AN ORDER TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF A

27 SURROGATE HAS BEEN ENTERED IN A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING

02440 1 87
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7 INITIATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 73, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE MAY ENTER
2 AN ORDER OF ADOPTION AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 56.

IF AN ORDER TER-

3 MINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS HAS BEEN ENTERED IN A PROCEEDING
4 INITIATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 76, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE MAY ENTER
5 AN ORDER OF FILIATION ON BEHALF OF THE NATURAL FATHER.
6

SEC. 85.

(7) A PERSON SHALL NOT BE A PARTY TO AN AGREEMENT

7 IN WHICH A FEMALE AGREES TO

CON~EIVE

A CHILD THROUGH ARTIFICIAL

8 INSEMINATION AND TO VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISH HER PARENTAL RIGHTS TO
9 THE CHILD UNLESS THAT PERSON, TOGETHER WITH HER OR HIS SPOUSE, IF
10 MARRIED, EXECUTES A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT AS PROVIDED IN
17 SECTIONS 87, 89, AND 97.
12

(2) THE ATTORNEY WHO REPRESENTS THE PROSPECTIVE NATURAL

13 FATHER AND HIS SPOUSE, IF MARRIED, SHALL NOT REPRESENT THE SURRO14 GATE IN THE EXECUTION OF A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT.

AN

75 ATTORNEY REPRESENTING A PERSON EXECUTING A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD
16 AGREEMENT SHALL ALSO SIGN THE AGREEMENT, BUT NOT AS A PARTY.
77

SEC. 87.

A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL CONTAIN THE

18 FOLLOWING TERMS:
19

(A) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO BE ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATED

20 WITH THE SEMEN OF THE NATURAL FATHER BY A LICENSED PHYSICIAN.
21

(B) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES NOT TO FORM OR ATTEMPT TO FORM

22 A PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE INTERIM

23 ORDER AS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 87. OR SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION
24 OF THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE CHILD.
25

(C) THAT THE SURROGATE EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGES THE INTENT AND

26 PURPOSES OF THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT AND AGREES TO
27 VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISH ALL PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE CHILD AND UPON
02440 1 87
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7 REQUEST OF THE NATURAL FATHER TO EXECUTE A CONSENT TO THE
2 ADOPTION OF THE CHILD BY THE ADOPTIVE PARENT.
3

(D) THAT THE SURROGATE UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES TO ASSUME ALL

4 RISKS, INCLUDING THE RISK OF DEATH, WHICH ARE INCIDENT TO CONCEP5 TION, PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, AND POSTPARTUM COMPLICATIONS.
6

(E) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO UNDERGO PSYCHIATRIC EVALU-

1 ATION AND TO SUBMIT THE EVALUATIONS TO THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE
8 ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, AND THE INSEM9 INATING PHYSICIAN, ABSENT ANY INFORMATION WHICH WOULD TEND TO
10 IDENTIFY THE SURROGATE, AND THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO SIGN

77 MEDICAL RELEASES PRIOR TO THE EVALUATIONS.
72

(F) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO SUBMIT TO THE INSEMINATING

13

PHYSICIAN ANY MEDICAL EVALUATIONS RELATING TO THE SURROGATE PAR-

14 ENTHOOD AGREEMENT WHICH ARE NOT MADE BY THE INSEMINATING

15 PHYSICIAN.
16

(G) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO ADHERE TO ALL MEDICAL

17 INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO HER BY THE INSEMINATING PHYSICIAN AS WELL
18

19

AS HER PHYSICIAN.
(H) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO FOLLOW A PRE-NATAL MEDICAL

20 EXAMINATION SCHEDULE TO CONSIST OF AT LEAST 7 VISIT PER MONTH
21 DURING THE FIRST 7 MONTHS OF PREGNANCY AND AT LEAST 2 VISITS PER

22 MONTH DURING THE EIGHTH AND NINTH MONTHS OF PREGNANCY.
23

(I) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES THAT SHE WILL NOT ABORT THE

24 CHILD ONCE CONCEIVED UNLESS SHE DESIRES TO DO SO UPON BEING
25 ADVISED BY THE INSEMINATING PHYSICIAN THAT SUCH ACTION IS
26 NECESSARY FOR HER PHYSICAL HEALTH.
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(J) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO UNDERGO A COMPREHENSIVE

2 MEDICAL EVALUATION, UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF A
3 LICENSED PHYSICIAN, TO DETERMINE WHETHER HER PHYSICAL HEALTH IS
4 SATISFACTORY.

THE COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL EVALUATION SHALL INCLUDE

5 TESTING FOR VENEREAL DISEASES, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING SYPHILIS
6 AND GONORRHEA.

THE SURROGATE AGREES TO UNDERGO VENEREAL DISEASE

7 TESTING BEFORE EACH INSEMINATION.
8

SEC. 89.

IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS REQUIRED BY SECTION 85, A

9 SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING
70 TERMS:
77

(A) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE

72 NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, AGREE TO DEPOSIT THE SURROGATE'S COM73 PENSATION IN AN INTEREST BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT UPON EXECUTION OF
14 THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT, TO BE PAID TO THE SURROGATE
75 IN FULL WITH ACCRUED INTEREST UPON BIRTH OF THE CHILD AND TERMI76 NATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS.
77

(B) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE

78 NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, AGREE TO PAY THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY
79 THE SURROGATE AS A RESULT OF HER PREGNANCY, WHICH EXPENSES SHALL
20 INCLUDE ALL MEDICAL, PSYCHIATRIC, HOSPITALIZATION, PHARMACEUTI27 CAL, LABORATORY, AND THERAPY EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE SURROGATE'S
22 PREGNANCY, NOT COVERED OR ALLOWED BY HER PRESENT HEALTH AND MAJOR
23 MEDICAL INSURANCE, INCLUDING ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED UPON
24 ORDER OF A LICENSED PHYSICIAN, BUT WHICH EXPENSES SHALL NOT
25 INCLUDE ANY EXPENSES FOR LOST WAGES OF THE SURROGATE OR OTHER
26 NONRELATED INCIDENTALS, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ENUMERATED WITHIN THE
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(C) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO UNDERGO A

2 COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL EVALUATION, UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPER3 VISION OF A LICENSED PHYSICIAN, TO DETERMINE WHETHER HIS PHYSICAL
4 HEALTH IS SATISFACTORY.

THE COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL EVALUATION

5 SHALL INCLUDE TESTING FOR VENEREAL DISEASES, SPECIFICALLY INCLUD6 ING SYPHILIS AND GONORRHEA.

THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO SUBMIT

7 TO VENEREAL DISEASE TESTING BEFORE EACH DONATION OF SEMEN.

S

(D) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO SUBMIT TO THE INSEMI-

9 NATING PHYSICIAN ANY MEDICAL EVALUATIONS WHICH RELATE TO THE SUR-

o

ROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT WHICH ARE NOT MADE BY THE INSEMINAT-

7 ING PHYSICIAN.
2

SEC. 97.

IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS REQUIRED BY SECTIONS 85

3 AND 87, A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL CONTAIN THE FOL4 LOWING TERMS:
5

(A) THAT THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT WILL TERMINATE

6 UPON WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE SURROGATE FROM THE NATURAL FATHER AND
7 THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, IF THE

S NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS
9 MARRIED, DETERMINE THAT PREGNANCY HAS NOT OCCURRED WITHIN A REA-

o
7

SONABLE TIME.
(B) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO ASSUME THE LEGAL

2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE
3 PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT.
4

(C) THAT IF THE NATURAL FATHER OR THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF

5 THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, DIES PRIOR TO TERMINATION OF THE
6 SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT
7 SHALL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT WITH RESPECT TO THE
02440'87
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76

7 SURVIVING PARTY; THAT IF BOTH THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE
2 PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, DIE PRIOR TO TERM INA3 TION OF THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, THE SURROGATE SHALL BE
4 ENTITLED TO HER FULL COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES AND MAY ELECT TO
5 KEEP THE CHILD OR EXECUTE A CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD
6 OR A RELEASE OF THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION.
7

SEC. 93.

A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT MAY CONTAIN TERMS

8 AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS REQUIRED BY
9 SECTIONS 87 TO 97.
70

SEC. 95.

THE DEPARTMENT SHALL ESTABLISH BY A RULE PROMUL-

17 GATED PURSUANT TO ACT NO. 306 OF THE PUBLIC ACTS OF 7969, AS
72 AMENDED, BEING SECTIONS 24.207 TO 24.375 OF THE MICHIGAN COMPILED
73 LAWS, A MAXIMUM FEE FOR COMPENSATION OF A SURROGATE.
74 FEE SHALL BE REVIEWED EVERY 2 YEARS.

THE MAXIMUM

THE MAXIMUM FEE ESTABLISHED

75 BY THE DEPARTMENT SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN $70,000.00.
76

SEC. 97.

A PHYSICIAN SHALL NOT ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATE A

77 PERSON WHO THE PHYSICIAN KNOWS TO BE A SURROGATE UNLESS THE PHY78 SICIAN IS PROFESSIONALLY SATISFIED WITH THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL
19 SUITABILITY OF THE SURROGATE AND THE NATURAL FATHER, AND, IF A
20 PROCEEDING UNDER SECTION 73 IS COMMENCED, UNLESS AN ORDER CERTI27 FYING THE SUITABILITY OF THE ADOPTIVE PARENT GRANTED UNDER
22 SECTION 75 IS PRESENTED.
23

SEC. 99.

NOT MORE THAN 3 DAYS AFTER THE BIRTH OF A CHILD

24 CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT, A HUMAN
25 LEUKOCYTE ANTIGEN TEST SHALL BE PERFORMED ON THE NATURAL FATHER,
26 THE SURROGATE, AND THE CHILD.
27 SUBMITTED TO THE COURT.

02440 1 87
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